The Timaru Herald THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1944. The Siegfried Line

Timaru Herald, Volume CLVI, Issue 22991, 7 September 1944, Page 4

The Timaru Herald THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1944. The Siegfried Line

THE Siegfried Line, Germany’s boasted West Wall, is about to be put to the test of attack, if the assault upon it may not be considered already begun by the Allied outflanking advance through Belgium across its northern end. The American Third Army’s advance toward the very centre of the West Wall, between Metz and Nancy toward Karlsruhe, makes it clear even at this stage that there will be some frontal encounter with these German fortifications. The West Wall, it appears at present, will not be made altogether militarily ridiculous (as the Maginot Line was made) by being by-passed in its entirety by the attacking forces. Just what its capacity may be to delay or hold up the forces approaching it frontally must be a matter largely for conjecture; but there are factors which will bear consideration. A British commentator has pointed out that the West Wall was originally constructed to resist any forces which might have been brought against it by the Allies at the time of the outbreak of war, but that the German fortress organisation created by Dr Todt has had ample time in which to bring it up-to-date. To this it might be added that the Todt organisation also had “ample” time in which to construct its fortress positions and “hedgehogs” on the Eastern Front; and that these have proved no insurance against the Russian tactics of massed air and ground assault. The Todt fortifications along the Channel coast, with the advantage of a sea frontage, proved no real strategic barrier to the Allied invasion forces. It cannot be doubted that extraordinary labours have been spent on the western fortifications of the Reich itself; but no less can have been done for the vulnerable Channel areas and the White Russian line. What these lines lacked, and what the Siegfried Line may be expected to lack, was sufficient troops to man them, sufficient aircraft to cover them, and sufficient resources to supply them. In themselves, such “walls” are merely a kind of defensive weapon. Without men to wield them effectively, without supplies to charge them, and with overwhelming superiority in'mobile forces brought to the assault, they become little more than physical obstacles, to be surmounted or by-passed as may seem most opportune. So much has been proved in practice. And acceptance of these facts may account for the absence in German pronouncements and warnings to the German people of anv mention of the once “impregnable” West Wall; and for vague reference's by enemy spokesmen to a “new line.’ I 1 or it has become clear that the defence of Germany, if possible for long, depends not on any fixed fortifications but on the reserves of men, armour, and aircraft Hitler may still possess. Some commentators are already doubting the existence of such reserves, at least in any effective strength. The complete collapse of German strategy in France and the Low Countries indicates such a wide miscalculation by the German High Command of the strength it had to face, that almost anything short of a similar swift collapse of Germany’s home defence is being confidently predicted. Yet in spite of the general view that it is almost irrelevant in the broad strategy of the assault on Germany, the West Wall must command some interest, for it seems certain to come under attack, as its French counterpart never was. Nothing can be known of its reconstruction, if any has taken place, since the war began; but a brief account of its main features was given by its architect, Todt, about two months before the outbreak of war. He announced then that within four weeks the West Wall would have been under construction for a year, and that the defences would be completed within two months —a period which gains significance in retrospect. The line, then as now, stretched from near Basle (Switzerland) to the German-Dutch frontier near Aachen. It was constructed in triple lines of fortifications. These lines, following instructions from Hitler in October, 1938, were extended to protect the districts of Aachen and Saarbrucken, which originally lay in front of the defences. The West Wall comprised 12,000 steel and concrete forts running in an unbroken line from Holland to Switzerland. Many of them were subterranean, and these were reputed to be equipped with batteries of heavy machine-guns, trench mortars, and flame-throwers. In the Moselle Valley (where the American Third Army is reported to be advancing) many fortifications were built deeply into hillsides. Under the ground were spacious quarters capable of accommodating large units; these were heated and lit by electricity. There were also extensive munition depots, machine rooms and workshops, linked together by subterranean passages. The advanced fortifications were strongly defended with machine-guns and anti-tank guns. Reports also spoke of “an elaborate system of road barricades, tank-traps, and barbed-wire entanglements.” Such were, and doubtless are, the main features of the Siegfried Line. A recital of them five years ago might well have given an impression of impregnability; but in general they amount to no more than the defensive machinery which the fifth and Eighth armies overcame at Gassino, and the Russians at Vitebsk and elsewhere; and they require, moreover, immense reserve forces to make them effective. Jn the long run they msy prove to have increased the cost of victory, but not to have delayed it very much.