The Timaru Herald SATURDAY, JUNE 13, 1942. ANGLO-RUSSIAN TREATY

Timaru Herald, Volume CLI, Issue 22297, 13 June 1942, Page 4

The Timaru Herald SATURDAY, JUNE 13, 1942. ANGLO-RUSSIAN TREATY

j I' SS than three months ago a J diplomatic correspondent wrote in the Spectator: “All is not well with Anglo-Rnssian relations. We •an ignore that or gloss it over; or we can face the fact frankly and set about seeing how to put what is wrong right. Some causes of misunderstanding stand out plain. \\ hen Russia was attacked last year there were many Russians who, completely unaware of what PostChamberlain Britain stood for, wondered whether we had not come to some sort of agreement with Rudolf Hess, after all.” These doubts of the Russian people, or a section of them, were attributed in part to imperfections in British propaganda, but there were other aspects of the Question to which attention was drawn by this writer in the Spectator. “The Russians since the battle of Moscow,” he wrote, “have acquired a certain sense of superiority. and tend to charge us with not pulling our weight in the common struggle. Ever since last July they have demanded action, and more action, from us. They have asked for a ‘second front" on the Continent of Europe. Sir Stafford Cripps and Lord Beaverbrook and, more recently. Mr Eden no doubt explained to them, each in his own way, the difficulties of the problem. Beaverbrook got Stalin to accept aid in equipment instead of a ‘second front’; but every time the Russians argued that the latter was infinitely more acceptable to their public opinion than so many tanks and planes. Every time they emphasised that the Russians did not admit the existence of any ratio between so many tanks and so many human lives. There is some danger that this state of affairs may create certain isolationist moods in Russia; Stalin’s Order of the Day of February 23 contains a clear warning that if we and America do not take a more active part in the war this year (and not in ’43 or ’l4l Russia may sink into isolationism after driving out the Germans, and not take any further interest in the organisation of European security in conjunction with us.”

The statements in this Spectator article are quoted because they summarise well the difficulties which have made it necessary for Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union to enter into new diplomatic commitments which are sufficiently precise to remove all doubts. The sincerity of Britain’s intentions towards the Soviet Union have never been suspected by the majority of the British people. They have, however, been suspected in Russia. Further, although the majority of the British people considered themselves sufficiently bound bv the mutual declarations made by the British and Soviet Governments after Hitler launched his attack against Russia, a vocal minority professed to scepticism concerning the relations between Britain and the Soviet Union. These doubts most recently found expression in the persistent demands for the opening of a second front in Europe to ease the pressure on Russia in the east. The new treaty, therefore, has a dual purpose. First, it is designed to silence criticism on the home front; second, it is designed to assure the Russian people that Britain is with them to the finish of the war with Hitler. The Second Front

For immediate purposes the most important British engagement under the treaty signed in London on May 26 is for the creation of a second 1 uropean front this year. It is announced also from Washington that M. Molotov and President Roosevelt reached a full understanding “with regard to the urgent task of creating a second front in Europe in 1942.” The mass air attacks upon Cologne and the Ruhr can now be seen as demonstrations of Britain’s ability to fulfil this pledge to the Russians. The establishment of a European second front does not necessarily mean that British troops will soon effect largescale landings on the Continent. It is more probable that air attacks of increasing intensity will be delivered bv the Royal Air Force. If Germany can be shaken by this sustained punishment, and it is difficult to believe that she will not be, then the way will be open for invasion of the Continent. Whatever happens it seems reasonably clear that Germany will be sufficiently engaged in the west to make her armies and the Luftwaffe reduce their pressure to the east; that is what Russia wants most of all. After The War

The next important part of the treaty, and it may prove to be the most important of all. is that Britain and Russia will remain at one when the peace settlement is made, and throughout the period of post-war reconstruction in Europe. Mr Eden has said that the treaty will remain in force “until the parties recognised that it was superseded by the adoption of a long-term system of international security.” It is possible that influential sections of the Russian people feared that their country was being used in the war against Hitler without adequate provision being made for the Soviet having an effective part in determining the basis of peace. 1 hat fear has now been removed. Mr Eden, however, has made is clear in his statement to the House of Commons that Britain and Russia do not hold themselves exclusively responsible for the peace of Europe after the war is won. “That,” he said, “is a burden which will be shared by all the United Nations.” The first virtue of the treaty is that it has swept all doubt away. The United Nations are now firmly united: they know what their common purpose is. The way is clear for the stubborn and remorseless prosecution of the war. Nazi Germany is the only country *iow having anv cause for fear.