THE SINEWS OF WAR.

Timaru Herald, Volume XXVII, Issue 1761, 26 June 1877, Page 4

THE SINEWS OF WAR.

(Globe.) There is a phrase which, since the boginning of the present troubles m the East, has become common and even hackneyed m the mouth of Londoners. It is summed up m the maxim that "no nation was ever hindered from going to war by the mere want of funds." Politicians and financers, philosophers and gossips, [have all at ono time or another wondered at the rashness of Russia m plunging forward m the face of probable bankruptcy. And each and all of them have, Booner or later, m advancing their views on the subject, and doubting the possibility of such a course being adopted, been comforted by the same bold but unanswerable axiom. On the other hand, there is an ancient saying not yet shown to be obsolete, which tells m truo proverbial style that " money is the sinews of war." It is not unimportant at the present crisis to consider which of these very contradictory maxims has the greater amount of truth m it, or whether by any reasoning tho two can be reconciled. Each of the opinions may be supported by examples taken from a very remote antiquity. On the one hand, overy one remembers the remark made by a Greek philosopher to the rich potentate of Asia. When tho Lycian despot was about to make war on the indigent nation of the Medes, " Take care," said the sage, " how you expose your riches and weakness, to the rapacity of a hardy race, who have nothing to lose but their lives, and everything to gain." Aristotle was not less severe m his strictures on wealth as a corruptor of martial courage, and the effect of Capuan treasuro on the Carthaginian soldiers was illustrated m a very tragic page of history. On tho other hand, Pericles, the greatest War Minister perhaps the world has ever seen, rested his hopes and confidence on the monied resources of Athens, and, encouraging his trembling countrymen on tho eve of the great war, pointed to tho accumulated treasure hoarded by his prudence as a sure guarantee of ultimate triumph. Neither Csasar nor Octavius differed m an} way from tho opinion of tho Athenian, and attained their ends far more by the expenditure of treasure among the troops than by other means. Throughout the Middle Ages wars of aggression could only be waged by the aid of ready money, and even tho Crusaders, with all their zeal, were constantly checked and delayed by the necessity of finding this base but indispensable adjunct to their ardour. But the history of England affords the most striking illustration of the use of money m war. King John, at the height of his unpopularity, detested by all classes of his subjects, was able to make head against his foes simply by reason of possessing the necessary funds. As soon as he patched up his quarrel with the Pope, and was able to count on supplies from the Holy Father, he could fill the country with mercenary soldiers ; and, as the most candid historians have all begun to admit, would probably have won the day had he lived a little longer. Tho converso of this proposition has been aptly pointed out by Mr Hallain. "The greatest constitutional victories of the Commons have been won against the Crown m the reigns of the most warlike Sovereigns." Why ? Because these Sovereigns, m order to carry on their successful wars, were obliged to come to the nation for supplies. # The supplies were granted, but only as tha price for concessions of a political nature. Thus it was that Edward m., the victor of Cressy and Poctiers, granted more ample privileges to the Parliament of his time than any other King. Thus it was that Henry VII. and Henry VIII., the most despotic of English kings, had never money enough to carry on a serious war on the Continent. The question was simple enough — either they must degrade their prerogative and win laurels m tho field, or they must abandon schemes of foreign ambition, and reign with a strong hand at homo. If Charles 11. was strong it was becauso he was subsidised by Prance. If the Georges wore weak it was because their armies were fed with money doled out by the Commons.

Still, it is said, a poor nation has never hesitated to embark m a just war. There is a show of reason m the statement, but little substanial truth. The fact is that the spectacle of a roally poor nation — of a nation absolutely at the end of its resources, m a word virtually bankrupt — has never yet been seen. It has been reserved for quite recent times to afford some approach to such a sighi ; and oven now the approach is not very close. After a nation has resorted to paper money, has repudiated its external debt, and announced persistent deficits m its annual budgets, there remains an immense amount of private and unestimated wealth. There remains always the people who lire on turtle, and whose life could be supported, if need were, on bread and cheese. There remain the people who drive m carriages and go to theatres, who could <>n an emergency cut off these luxuries. There remain the idlers and loiterers, who can be forced to serve as ,

food for power or as tillers of the soil, j Let a nation bo put to it seriously, and I these hidden resources start as ii by i magic into existence. Tho result is that , a nation rightly pronounced poor m time | of peace may prove rich enough to pro- ! vide the money necessary for entering j upon a campaign. This is a truth of which the full significance may well bo appreciated at the present moment. Seldom have two nations gone into a war m a ; more desperate condition than Turkey . and Russia are now. Reckless cxpendi- ! ture on tho one hand, and the maintenance of bloated armaments on tho other, ; have reduced tho national exchequer to ' insolvency m tho one case, and to a fear- j fully low ebb m the other. But the private wealth accumulated m each country represents still n very respectable sum, and upon this sum does each Government with justice reckon to carry it through a first campaign.

The fallacy — or rather the speciousness — of tho modern maxim lies m tho wording of it. It is not tho "going to war" which is the difficulty, but the keeping of it up. A first, or even a second, campaign may be carried on with vigour by a nation apparently bankrupt, lint it is at the third and subsequent stages that the pinch begins to bo felt. Protract tho struggle, and the " sinews of war" begin to slacken and fail. This was what ruined the ambitious schemes of Louis XIV., caused his early victories to turn to wormwood m his mouth, and replaced tho glories of his youth by tho disgraces of [ his old age. This is tho danger Russia runs m her present venture — a danger of which she was amply warned by tho outspoken prudence of Lord Bi>aeonsfield. Only let tho Turkish forces and fortresses hold out for a brief space, and the aggressor with tho sinews of war exhausted and dried up, will bo exposed to the mercy of those third parties who choose to come fresh into the fray. All this is a stato of things which any politician ought to be able to foresee, and tho knowledge that this is so has made it difficult till tho last moment to believe m tho infatuation of the Czar. Russia may now enter on tho war, as other nations have done, undeterred by financial considerations. But m the end she may find that tho more ancient maxim which she affects to despise was worth fully as much as that modern phrase which is cited m support of her proceeding.