THE BALKAN PROBLEM.

Taranaki Herald, Volume LXIII, Issue 144828, 4 November 1915, Page 3

THE BALKAN PROBLEM.

COURSE OF EVENTS DESCRIBED. The present situation at tho Dardanelles had received most careful and anxious consideration as part of tho largo strategic question raised by recent developments. Ms. Asquith explained how tho Allies 'had laboured ceaselessly for unity in ■the Balkan States, and admitted that tho result had been a disappointment and a failure. Ho pointed out to tho critics who were talking of greater firmness and greater adroitness thht unity ] ■of direction was the most important asset. Germany had the advantage of ■ sucli unity, .while tho Allies must consult each other, this resulting in inevitable differences in tho point of view of ■ any operation. Germany had a further advantage in making lavish xn'omises bo Bulgaria, whereas tho Allies could nob barter away the property of the Allies’ friends behind their backs without tho assurance of adequate compensation. Further, when tho Allies were reproached for being too lato in providing active help to Serbia, it must be remembered that to the very last moment there was tho strongest' reason to believe that Greece would acknowledge and act upon her treaty obligations to Serbia. When the Bulgarian mobilisation began, Mr. Vonezolos asked Franco and ourselves for 150,001) men. This was on tho express understanding that Greece would mobilise also. M. Vonczelos later announced that Greece must abide by tho treaty with Serbia, bub tho King repudiated the declaration and M. Vcnozelos resigned. These were facts to bo recognised by people who were complaining of alleged inertia on the part of the Allied Governments. Ho wished to say, on behalf of the Government and people of Britain, and his opinion was also shared by France and Kussia, that Serbia cannot bq allowed to become a prey to- this sinister and nefarious combination. The British and French General Staff had come toa complete agreement as to Serbia, who may rest assured that her independence is regarded by us as one of-tho .essentialobjects, of -the -alliance.

THE FINANCIAL QUESTION. Mr. Asquith next dealt with the Homo questions of an adequate supply of men for the Army and Navy, the provision of munitions, and the burden of common Allied finance. Tho, nation had to consider how she could co-ordin-ato and adjust the different ways of serving those purposes so that the United Kingdom and Empire should contribute most fruitfully and effectively to the common cause.

The financial position was very serious. Wo wore buying goods abroad in excess of exports to tho extent of thirty millions monthly, against an average of eleven millions before tho war, and at the same time making advances to Allies and others which bo estimated would for tho current financial year amount, to £423,000,000. Wo alone amongst the belligerent nations maintain a ircc market for gold, and, indeed, had exported a largo amount. Wo were further undertSdng commitments which could only bo paid by the further export of gold or tho sale of securities. Hence., rich and resourceful though wo were, wo must cut our coat according to our cloth. Nevertheless ho did not think the position compared unfavourably with that of Germany, where her consumption far exceeded what she could pro(luce, and stocks were rapidly diminishing. Further, tho standard of living was greater. Part of tho population of Germany had loft little or no margin of reserve and Britain was in u much better position in this respect, bub we could not sustain the burden of this great war unless individuals and the Government aliko were prepared to make greater sacrifices in retrenchment and economy. Tho average 'cost of the army was usually reckoned at one hundred pounds tier head annually, bur under the present conditions it had vastly uieioasetl, and was costing between i.'200 and IJOO. COMPULSORY SERVICE.

Mr. Asquith then dwelt on the question ol compulsion. Ho admitted that voluntary rccruitiiur us Imiierio practised wits haphazard and capricious, and to .soiuo extent unjust, but bis objection to compulsion was based on the ground that under existing conditions compulsion would forteit what ho regivmcd as ot supreme capital importance, namely, tho mainteuauco ol national unity. He would propot,o not to rule out compulsion as an impossible expedient, out that compulsion only to be resorted to with something approaching general consent. He did not tear that there would be any necessity to resort to anything beyond Lord Derby’s, great national otlort, wliich is being carried out with hearty goodwill by all parties. He emphasised that married men who enlisted would not be called up to servo while younger and unmarried men were holding back. Ho hoped that unmarried men would ho obtained by voluntary cllort, but if need be they would bo secured by other means. > In concluding, ho mentioned the question of a War Committee. Cabinet had tho power to summon experts of special knowledge on all important questions. Cabinet would be kept constantly informed of the decisions of the committee. Also, on all questions involving a now departure impolicy Cabinet would be consulted before decisive action was taken. Ho was confident that only on these lines was tho successful conduct of tho war possible. BETTER CO-ORDINATION NEEDED.

Ho attache*! tho greatest importance to more complete ami more intimate coordination between the stalls ol tho Allied Powers. A very happy illustration was Clciicral Joffre’s visit. Ho affirmed that a great responsibility was resting on him as head of tho Government, as measured hy what had happened and what was still to happen.. Our best blood had been spilled and thousands of young lives had been cut short. A cry went up in ever-increas-ing volume from torn hearts and mutilated homos, and wo might well stand aloof from this most moving tragedy in the history of mankind. Yet ho did not believe that those sufferers would sav that Britain could have acted otherwise. (Cheers.) He had laboured unceasingly in upholding tho common cause. If thoro had been errors and shortcomings and lack of foresight ho would bo tho first person to acknowledge such, but lie challenged anyone to prove that there had been anything .like sloth, indifference and solf-complaoonoy to face unpalatable facts, or to conceal the truth. Ho was confident wo were going to carry the righteous cause to a triumphant issue.

“I am not gob" to shift tho burden until I am satisfied I cannot bear it, or that it can bo performed hotter by others. I enjoy the confidence of my Sovereign and the Commons and tho country, and shall not surrender the heavy task. If there bo moments when wo are tempted to be faint-heart-ed, lot us ask ourselves in what year in our history have wo done more to justify our faith in our manhood, our womanhood, and our people. It has brought us an imperishable story, in tho last hours of Edith Cavell facing a worse ordeal than death, watching tho moments creeping on to her doom, slowly and remorselessly. She has taught our bravest men a supremo lesson in courage, and in tho United Kingdom and tho Empire thoro aro thousands of such women whom a year ago we did not know of. Wo have groat traditions, but tho nation does not exist on traditions alone. Thank God. wo have living examples of all the qualities that have built up and sustained our Empire. Let us ho worthy of them-and onduro to tho end. (Loud cheers.)

Sir E. Grey, following Mr. Asquith,emphatically denied that through) vacillation or hesitation help had been-, lost to Serbia. “We have boon inclose consultation with Franco as to the best uso wo could make of the forces sent to tho Near East. There was absolutely no delay. All forces at our disposal wore landed at Salonika, and are now engaged in operations in the Balkans, while _ preparations are, being made for sending further forces!, to tho East. All the assistance in thes power of Britain and Franco was given Serbia in her hour of need, after thoGroek Government took a different view of her-treaty obiigaiions hia.” ;

SIR EDWARD CARSON. EXPLAINS* HIS RESIGNATION. Sir Edward Carson, continuing tho debate, said that tho wholo question was tho concentration of responsibility upon a small number of competent men, who should sit daily with the best expert advisors, working out tho problems as they arose. Tho gravest instance as to how the Cabinet worked could bo found in tho Balkans situation. Tho Premier had just said that tho Government had made up their minds in conjunction with their allies to carry out their plodgo to Sorbia._ Sir E. Carson said ho wishect-a deoisfoirtcabo-anade^iseeka.

ago, and valuable time had been lost. When ho learned that that pledge was no longer the Government's policy, and there were no plans for carrying it out, ho severed his connection with the Cabinet.

Sir E. Carson declared that the terrible revelation of the absence of ihunitions showed that the Cabinet machine was utterly incapable of carrying on the war. Why then take on the Dardanelles, which hung around their nocks like a millstone, with absolutely no hope of result there? It was impossible to understand why, at the very moment the shortage of munitions was discovered, the Cabinet took on tho expedition. Tho Government, was not justified in mitering on it. It bad cost one hundred thousand casualties, and the sufferings baffled description. Unless tho naval and military advisors could give assurances of a successful conclusion there never was such a story of miscalculations. Ho considered the failure at Ruvlii the most disastrous and vital of the whole war. Under the Cabinet system the Government wore unable to make up their minds whether they ought to proceed with the operations or boldly withdraw, and save tho suffering and losses which went on with absolutely no hope of any result. Wo wanted the best military staff wo could get. but so far as ho could see, with the Cabinet there was no staff at all. He did not think the Premier’s plan would bo a great improvement. The House and the country really were anxious about three things—whether the resources of men and material were being used to the best advantage; whether what appeared to bo grave miscalculations could have been avoided; whether the machinery of the Government was the most effective for carrying on the war. The country was gropim- in the dark. Sir K, .Carson then road a Jotter, dated October 12, justifying his resign nation and pointing out that it was impossible for him to support the conclusion of tho War Council which had been reached tho previous day. Ho wrote that in view of Sir E. Grey’s declaration of September 28 ho was unable to understand how England could ‘abandon Serbia to her fate without national dishonour, oven if wo were not Ikjuikl. His letter pointed out tho probable effects on Hie other Balkan States, and lie urged the Government to proceed vigorously with tho concentration of troops at Salonika, and use our naval power where possible to demonstrate that wc wore resolved to reserve Serbia for the Serbians, as wo, had undertaken to restore Belgium to the Belgians. Enormous efforts should be mado to compel Greece to fulfil her treaty obligations. The Allies had sent troops to Salonika at Greece’s invitation, and we should be rendered ridiculous in tho eyes of tho Powers if compelled to withdraw.

Tlie letter continued; ‘‘King Constantine’s party is afraid of the Central Powers. We ought to make Greece afraid of ns, and onr naval supremacy enables us to do tins. 1 would not hesitate to infonh Greece that unless she is prepared to continue her poliey of joining tho -Allies to defend Serbia wo will draw off relations. I do not bcliovo that, once Germany is given access to tho lines of communication, it will be possible to maintain our forces at Gallipoli.” Sir E. Carson, resuming bis speech, said he did not care a straw what men carried on the _ war, so long as they used every possible effort, to realise the victory te whidi wo were all looking.

MR. REDMOND’S VIEWS. (Received Nov. 3, 11.5 p.m.) LONDON, Nov. 3. Air. John Redmond said that Air. Asquith’s proposal, witli reference to tiiu Cabinet, would silence the wreckers for the inno being. Ho was against imposing compulsion. Unless the country were' practicably unanimous it would be a folly and a crime. Tile voluntary .system had not had fair play in Ireland, where hitherto tho Government and the War Office had given neither assistance nor sympathy. Despite discouragement there were between three hundred and four hundred thousand Irishmen in the army, including 115,000 in llritaiu, and tliero were Irishmen in tho Canadian, Australian aud Now Zealand forces. LABOUR MEMBER'S SPEECH. Afr. Barilos did not object to Air. Asquith’s statomoiß. Tho safety of tho State must bo tho supremo consideration aud if it became absolutely necessary to bring in compulsion for the young unmarried men who did not yet realise their duty, ho supposed it was justifiable, but tho time hud not coma.

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD. Lord Charles Berosford did not think (that Mr. Asquith’s speech would relievo the nation’s anxiety. Tho Gov- • eminent now knew they would never got through tho Dardanelles. It was altogether wrong for Lord Kitchener to conduct tho war while in tho Cabinet. • Mr. Asquith’s cynical and callous doctrine of waiting" to see was absolutely fatal to success in war. Hitherto we had had no proper plan of campaign. -The naval authorities had never been consulted about tho Dardanelles operations, but had simply been told to do it. A largo army ought to have been sent to Serbia in tho first instance, instead of embarking on tho blind gam-' bling risk at Gallipoli. Mr. Whittaker deplored Sir Edward Carson’s speech, which would havo a disastrous effect upon tho colonies and the Allies. It looked as if Sir Edward Carson had taken to moonlighting. A debate followed on the formal motion for adjournment, which con>, .sequently -terminated without’a vote.

THE TIMES-CRITICISM. OF MR. ASQUITH’S SPEECH. (Received Nov. 4. 9.5aa.m.) LONDON, Nov. 3. Tho Times says that Mr. Asquith’s ■speech is-a record of shortcomings and the acceptance, of responsibility. The Premier t-'uii tho. situation called for patience, and, courage, but throe other essential qualities, foresight, initiative \and energy, had hitherto been conspicuously lacking in the Government. FURTHER SPEECHES. IN THE' HOUSE OP COMMONS. (Received Nov. i, 8.55 a-m.) LONDON, Nov. .3. In the llduso of Commons debate Mr. Churchill, replying to Mr. Moltono’s question inquiring what bo referred to in his Trafalgar Day letter, when ho used tho words, “Through our long delays tho enemy seized a now initiative in tho Near East,” explained that he referred to tho , delay incidental to ■joint action in military’and diplomatic affairs by tho various Allied Govorn- . mnnts who share tho responsibility. 5... Lor<Lßolmrt'CocitJsaid3lgwas;e6Scnj,

tial to stop Germany’s export trade. She would then be unable to. pay for her imports. American statistics showed that we had stopped 96 per cent, of her exports. The blockade was a great success and moreover had been carried out without serious trouble. The imports of cotton from neutral Powers into Germany had practically ceased on Juno 1. ■ .Mr. Amcry condemned the Government’s refusal to face the facts in the Near Hast. Mr. Chaplin said he was unable to understand Mr, Asrjnitli’s opinion that national service would bo unworkable except with the general consent. Sir J. 11. Dalziell said they had been told that a general had been retired for bis work at the Dardanelles, but actually four generals bad been retired. Ho asserted, nu the authority of a member of Parliament, that a number of our men at the Dardanelles had died of thirst, yet the man responsible was still in the {service.

NEW WATI COUNCIL. PROBABLE MEMBERS. BT EEECTRIC TKI,EG raeH.—GOrTUIv,uT. (Received Nov. 4, 8.50 a.m.) LONDON, Nov, 3. It is expected in the lobbies that tho new War Council will include Mr. Asquith. Lord Kitchener,, Air. Lloyd George, Sir E. Grey and Air; Balfour.