LARGER NAVAL ESTIMATES

Taranaki Daily News, 24 January 1933, Page 7

LARGER NAVAL ESTIMATES

EXPECTATION IN ENGLAND POWERS’ RELATION ALTERED BRITAIN SHORT OF RIGHTS TREND “CAUSING ANXIETY” By Telegraph—Press Assn. —Copyright. London, Jan. 21. Naval circles expect the 1933 naval estimates to be substantially above those for 1932, says the Daily Telegraph. During the past year the Powers’ relative sea strengths have altered greatly, to the disadvantage of Britain. At the present rate of construction Britain, when the London Treaty expires in 1936, will be short of its treaty allocations by 106,220 tons in cruisers, 85,619 tons in destroyers, and 11,491 tons in submarines, which is causing anxiety and alarm, especially as three years from now one-third of the cruiser tonnage will be obsolete.

As a result of the London Naval Conference early in 1930 the British Empire, the United States and Japan undertook to proceed at once with the reduction of their capital ships, and all five Powers agreed to waive, during the years 19311936 inclusive, the right to replace obsolescent ships granted by the Washington Treaty. . • BRITISH NAVAL WEAKNESS DEFICIENCY IN DESTROYERS. SUPREMACY OF THE FRENCH. Britain’s destroyer force, her first line of defence against submarine aggression, has shrunk to such small dimensions that it now ranks fifth among the fio- ' tillas of the leading Naval Powers. In other words, she has fewer effective destroyers than the United States, Japan, France or Italy, writes Hector Bywater in the London Daily Telegraph. This startling disclosure is confirmed by figures taken from the official Return of Fleets presented to Parliament by the First Lord of the Admiralty. It is the practice of the Admiralty to assume that 12 years represents the span of efficient life for a destroyer. Once she has passed that limit she is no longer considerd to be thoroughly competent to perform her duties. Owing to the necessarily light construction of her hull and machinery the destroyer deteriorates more rapidly than larger men-of-war. After passing the age-limit she can no longer be trusted to make her speed or to maintain the requisite standard of all-round efficiency. For these reasons the only dependable destroyers are those under age. Applying the Admiralty age-limit to the destroyer lists of the five principal Powers, and including flotilla leaders, which are merely super-destroyers, the following position is revealed in units built and building:— No. of Total

RESULT OF STARVATION. The foregoing table epitomises the result of starving the Navy of new construction for many years past. Since the war, as regards destroyers, we have been living mainly on our capital. The Armistice left us with hundreds of these craft, but the majority were prematurely obsolete in consequence of the abnormal strain of war service. Seven years elapsed before destroyer construction was and then only two vessels were begun. Not until 1927 was a regular programme of destroyer replacements instituted. Since then a “short” flotilla of one leader and eight destroyers has been voted each year, with the exception of 1,929, when the newly-formed Labour Government cancelled four of the eight destroyers which Parliament had approved. Meanwhile large groups of our wartime boats have become obsolete each year, and have either been scrapped outright or paid off, while the leading foreign navies have been energetically building destroyers of the largest and most powerful types. During the Great War the destroyers were the first ships out and the last home. When the “cease fire” sounded we had 527 of these craft in commission, including torpedo-boats, but there were never enough of them. The demand for destroyers was insatiable. They were needed to screen the Grand Fleet and detached squadrons from submarine attack, for convoy escort, anti-submarine work, and a host of other duties which they alone could perform in an efficient manner. WOULD NEEDED. ‘ A future crisis would inevitably revive the demand for these craft, but it jeould not be met. As war experience proved, over-age destroyers are unreliable, being apt to break down at critical moments. The true destroyer strength of the Navy is to be measured only by its modern craft, and when that standard is applied the British flotilla is seen to have declined to a position of relative insignificance.

Naval opinion unanimously regards the destroyer as the surest antidote to the submarine. It is, therefore, instructive to compare the output of British destroyers and foreign submarines in the last 10 years:— British destroyers, built and building 45 U.S.A., Japanese, French and Italian submarines, built and building 187 Of the above submarines 135 have been built by France and Italy alone.

It will be seen from the comparative table of destroyer strengths that although France has only five under age destroyers more than the British Empire, her tonnage aggregate is larger by 38,000 tons. This is due to the far greater individual tonnage of the French craft. Whereas our largest flotilla leader, the Codrington, is of only 1540 tons, with a speed of 35 knots and an armament of five 4.7 in. guns, the largest French vessel is of 2569 tons and 37 knots, with five 5.5 in. guns. France has no fewer than 31 of these formidable leaders — actually light cruisers in size and gunpower—totalling 74,247 tons, as against seven British vessels of 10,090 tons. DANGEROUSLY WEAK. The French destroyers, too, are larger and better armed than ours. They mount four s.lin. 70-pr. guns, as compared with the four 4.7 in. 45-prs. in British craft. We have'nothing to compare with the numerous French leaders, which carry five 5.5 in. 88-pr. guns. Our best destroyers are also inferior in size and armament to the latest boats of the United States, Japanese and Italian navies.

Even if we desired to build ships equal, in tonnage and armament to the huge French vessels we should be un-

able to do so. The Three-Power Treaty of 1930—t0 which France is not a party --restricts British destroyers to 1500 tons and flotilla leaders to 1850 tons, and their guns to a calibre of s.lin. But naval opinion prefers numbers rather than big dimensions, and our future destroyers should be the smallest and cheapest compatible with the duties they have to perform. '

By the London Naval Treaty the destroyer quota for the British Empire is restricted to 150,000 tons. At present, counting under-age boats only, we have less than half that tonnage. It follows that we must either increase very substantially the yearly programmes of destroyer replacement or remain dangerously weak in the one arm that is, by universal consent, the surest form of attack to which our floating shield against submarine raiding—the trade is most vulnerable in war.

boats. tonnage. ... 97 : 112,421 ... 59 112,069 U.S.A ... 78 95,930 ... 57 67,583 British Empire . ... 54 73,921