THE DARDANELLES

Taranaki Daily News, 29 October 1915, Page 5

THE DARDANELLES

WHY WE FAILED

MR. BARTLETT ON THE

SITUATION.

UNDERESTIMATING TURKEY.

llcecivcd Oct. 38, ■>/> p.m. Loudon, Uct, -T

There wore iollO people present at t lie nneen'-, Hall to hear Mr. Ashmeadllartlett's lecture on the Dardanelles. Mr. Bartlett emphasised the necessity oi siring nothing that would be helpful to the enemy. Whatever criticism we might indulge in regarding the after events, we must admit that the scheme was a great conception. The importance of opening a passage for Russia's Black Sea ports was obvious to everyone. Unfortunately, Britain entered on the expedition without a real knowledge of the Turkish strength. We' thought Turkey was 011 its last legs. Turkey was -believed to be the ''sick man of Europe," and sicker than ever.

We were also led astray by the reports of great Russian victories in the Caucasus, where, though the Russians had smashed the Turks, they were unable to follow up their victory.

'Mr. Bartlett estimated that there wore at least eight hundred thousand Turks under arms. This was a big number for Britain to tackle, in view of commitments elsewhere.

:Mr. Bartlett then proceeded to detail the Australian landing, with the. help of large maps.

THE NAVAL OPERATIONS. Referring to the naval operations he said it was quite possible to justify the use of a large surplus of the preDreadnought fleet in an attempt to force the Dardanelles, but, unfortunately, there had been little co-ordination in tlie military and naval operations, not only at the Dardanelles, but throughout the war. After the outer forts were demolished on February 25, tlie graver problem of the Narrows arose. Here direct, naval gunfire was of little use against guns behind earthworks. Nevertheless, 14-inch Krnpps and coast batteries would not have stopped the fleet at the narrowest passage, which measures fourteen hundred yards, tat three lines of mines west of the Narrows made the task impossible, despite the heroism of the trawlers and mine-sweepers. A REMARKABLE SEA-FIGHT. The attack which followed a council of war on March IS w.is the most, remarkable sea fight since Trafalgar. After this naval battle Mr. Bartlett dined with several of the Turkish Embassy at Home, when the officials allowed him reports from Constantinople disclosing that the Turks were extivmcly frightened at the fearful noi.-e of the bombardment, 'hut firmly believed that Divine Providence was protecting them, since practically no damage was done, and only twenty-eight peisons were killed and forty wounded, while two guns were destroyed.

Mr. Bartlett said lip told Admiral de Kobcck this, aud tlw admiral said: "I am surprised. [ thought we had only destroyed one gun." Mr. Bartlett added: ''Diplomatists Ift us down badly,"

WHY WE SHOULD HAVE GOT BULGARIA.

The operations at f.'allipoli were severely handicapped by the difficulty of getting a concentrated artillery fire upon the trenches. Commanders in France were now country commanders at tiallipoli. Did not the British Cabinet in July decide to send ont reinforcements to secure decisive -results 1 It would have been far better to have used the troops to force Bulgaria to join our side. Bulgaria could have got astride Bulair, and with our attacks on the coast and those of the submarines in the Sea of Marmora we could easily have cut off the Turks at Oallipoli.

BAD STAGE MANAGEMENT. The Bulgarians were sympathetic with Russia, and to the last did not desire to fight against the Allies. The diplomatic situation wanted proper stage management. Diplomatists needed plenty of money to spend, and as these were lacking Serbia was sacrificed. Qi view of Bulgaria's indecision, our best course would have been to land north of Bulair. The difficulty was the length of communications, which was thirty miles, if luios had been chosen aa the base. If we had landed at Bulair alone the sea communication would have been equally lengthy, though the navy undertook to land troops anywhere.

•'NEVER HAD A HOPE." Even if the attacks on Au/.ac had succeeded, Mr. Bartlett- said he was convinced that it did not mean getting to Constantinople, as the Turks had fortified the channel beyond the Narrows at the entrance to the Sea of Mariuont. Even if a. large part of the navy reached Constantinople it was doubtful if the Turks would surrender.

"1 have never wavered from my opinion that the attacks and attempts had not the smallest chance of success.

THE DEFEAT AT ANAFARTA. No regulars were landed at Suvla who were trained to fight in any climate. The attackers deserve all honor and consideration, but the untrained old-fashion-ed skirmishing style of warfare was required at Gallipoli. Men who were trained in modern trench warfare, when unable to nee their officers and required to work individually, failed/in the objective of capturing Anafarta heights. The English nation is one of the thirstiest in the world, and it was impossible to supply the Suvla troops with water, particularly as Turkish corpses were found in the wells. The whole operation at was far too difficult in the face of modern rifle fire.

i'OLONIALS' REMARKABLE FIGHT. The Australians and New Zealanders at Anzac put up a remarkable tight, and the great tragedy had not succeeded. It was hoped that if they took the position they would get to Constantinople, but it was useless to hide the fact that it was a very bad reverse. When the Bulgarian attaches found that we had failed ttiev reported that they thought the other side would win. Now that the Bulgarians and Turks tiave joined with the Austro-Germans coming south it is too much to hope that we Bhnll reach Constantinople. "I don't think," said Mr. Bartlett, "that we can advance any further in the Dardanelles."

THJi CA.I"K -MISTAKE. Continuing, .'Jr. !iar;!ett said that the popular <|iiery wa.--, wuv did not tile All; e.s pi-; rn' 11 'tin' aU.'.ek 011 the A-iali>* ride. Tlv uns the'l'e were hardly enough ST'ioiu to hold Cape II. was es-eiitia! to bring buck liir Kii'hcii and 1 -:. i.■.■ >1 d our lines. All- - ]io»-ili>liCv ''as a landing at liubut though Ihp naval demonsti'a[ion revcalc-d that there were no Tuiks Inert we landed mi troops, Cane llelh-s was selected necau.-e the landing va» easily covered by the lire IVoiu the battleships.

Tllli AUSTRALIAN'S' TASK. Mr. liarth'tt considered that the landing af Auzac was unwise, as our hands were lull at lape llclies in withstanding the Turkish counter-attacks. If the had been put ashore at Cape llclies there would have Ijeen enough men. The capture of Ae'ni Baba would not have been decisive, but it would have been useful in view of future operations. The task of the Australians was to push 011 to Maidos, capturing the Narrows, but the scheme failed.

FALSE OPTIMISM. A new situation arose after the failure of the May attacks, and new plans ehould have been introduced at tins juncture. It was quite evident that the Turk-; were not feeble and were noi going to surrender tile Dardanelles. H»wlish divisions continued to arrive ami were used in various local attacks of little purpose. false optimism prevailed everywhere. People seemed to think it e.n accident that the Turks had held out so long. Tliey were in reality becoming more skilful and more tenacious daily, and the positions at Achi fiahn and Anzae were stronger than at Plevna.

THE PLEDGE TO SERBIA. Mr. Bartlett sail!: "The pledge to help Serbia was made in all honorable intentions. and it is deplorable tliat we lire unable to redeem it. Serbia must not go under nor make terms. It is useless for the Allies to pour troops into Salonika. The difficulties are enormous. Tt is mountainous country. Die railway is cut, and there are no roads. Tt is equally impossible to attack Bulgaria, and only three or four weeks remain wherein a campaign is possible.

"Our mistake was not going to Macedonia long i\go to occupy the Varna line which is one of the best defensive positions in the world.

"WE ARE ROrV'D TO WTN." "I am not pessimistic. We are bound to win the war, but we are going the wrong way about it. Our enemies are now able to send men to any part of the Near East in three or four days, and our troops arrive in the worst condition, when we direct our forces to the right channel the real end will begin."

MARVELLOUS WORK OF SUBMARINES.

Mr. Bartlett declared that what our submarines had achieved in the Sea of Marmora was so maiiyellons that when the complete tale is' told their deeds will almost, atone for the other mistakes on the Peninsula.