THE FRONT AGAINST THE AXIS

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 64, Issue 4534, 9 February 1942, Page 5

THE FRONT AGAINST THE AXIS

WILL RUSSIA FIGHT ONLY HER OWN WAR ? SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS JAPAN (By a Special Correspondent of “The Sydney Morning Herald”)

WASHINGTON, January 8. Continuance of Russian victories against the Germans and Soviet abstention from war in the Pacific have u a question in the minds ol careful observers here, namely: Is Russia fighting a war of its own, and is Russia, in fact,‘as completely divorced from its ostensible Allies as is possible, although the enemy is common to all ? This may at first glance appear like an academic query in face of the exi isting grave concern about the situation in the south-west Pacific, and the knowledge that the destruction of Hitler would probably mean speedy termination of the whole war. But it is emphasised that if the situation in the south-west Pacific increased in gravity and Russia’s presence against the Germans continues to be successful, but not decisive, Russia’s so-called self-contained war might present Britain and America with extraordinarily acute problems. RUSSIAN ALLIANCE As recently intimated by the Australian Government, one of its most important items of foreign policy was the exploration of the possibility of an alliance with Russia. This can be said to have failed because Russia was definitely unwilling to enter an alliance. It is no secret that Russia, in spite of all its consultations with Britain and America, has persistently played a “ lone hand.” Hitler’s attack on Russia did not altogether dissipate the latter’s self-contained for- / eign policy, and Russia to-day is telling no one any more about its strength and disposition of its forces and other matters than it did before last June. British and American observers are not being allowed to the eastern front. ■ This has perplexed British and American officials, and has complicated all efforts at co-operation with Russia. Despite this aloofness and of difficulties created for Britain and the United States by the Japanese attack, Anglo-American policy of all possible aid to Russia—President Roosevelt on Tuesday reiterated that lease-lend aid would continue. REST STRATEGY Russia’s declaration that it cannot at present divide its forces by attacking Japan as well as Germany has been accepted here at its face value. It is agreed that for over-all strategy it is best for Russia to continue pursuit of the Germans, but observers here ask themselves in this connection:— 1. May not events in the next few months compel a change in the theory commonly held by the British and Americans that Russian enmity to Japan is immutable, and that at the proper moment Russia can be expected to turn against Japan ?

2. To what degree would a decisive Russian victory against Germany give Russia the whiphand in dictating the terms of a European peace, with its possibility of the Communisation of Europe ? Thus, if Russia is unable decisively to defeat Germany, and the AngloAmerican need for Russian bases against Japan increases, or if Russia decisively defeats Germany and centres its attention on Europe and abandons any thought of joining in the defeat of Japan—perhaps preferring a stalemate in the Pacific between Japan and the Allies—what then ? Sober American newspapers like the Christian Science Monitor, in the last few days have had leading articles emphasising the danger of Russia attempting to enforce her social theories on Europe if she defeats Germany indicating clearly that the whole Russian problem is arousing much thought. I have conducted a series of inquiries in Australian, British, Chinese, and American quarters here, and find on the whole that most officials, while not satisfied with Russia’s “lone hand”, policy, take an optimistic view about the ultimate outcome of Russian activities. These officials give the following reasons for their conclusions:— 1. It must be accepted as a fact, no matter how unpalatable, that Russia will think only of itself. It will divorce any consideration of anyone else from its activities or policy. 2. Nevertheless, the fact that there is a common enemy—Hitler—makes inevitable a parallel and mutuallybeneficial course between the Soviet Union, Russia, and America. 3. It is inconceivable that any situation will arise in world policy in which Russia can consider Japan anything but a long-range, if not immediate enemy. Russia cannot ever conceive itself safe unless Japan be shorn of all aggressive power. 4. Russia, even if she decisively defeats Germany, will not be in a position to dictate peace terms. Britain and America, under any circumstances, must be conceived as having more than enough power to make their influence felt at the peacetable. 5. It is questionable if Russia either will have the desire or power to Bolshevise Europe after the expenditure of strength required to defeat Hitler. 6. Even if Russia does not wish, or is unable for any reason, to join in the defeat of Japan, Britain and America command sufficient power to achieve that defeat by themselves. 7. Russia, knowing this (and if it is accepted that after Germany, Japan is Russia’s most powerful enemy, actual or potential, which, under any circumstances, Russia must wish to eradicate) it is reasonable to expect Russia must enter the war against Japan if at all able to do so.