MASTERY OF THE AIR

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 63, Issue 4491, 17 October 1941, Page 8

MASTERY OF THE AIR

BRITISH AIM IN SIGHT. MOMENTOUS ACHIEVEMENT. LONDON, October 12. To-day is Britain’s chance to outstrip the Luftwaffe. The opportunity has come sooner than we dared to hope. Mr Churchill’s latest statement contained this cheering news. His words were based on three main factors:— (1) The Luftwaffe is doing a bigger job than was ever intended for it Compare its task now with that of May, 1940. Then, compactly based on Western Germany, it could concentrate its whole effort upon a comparatively small area—Holland, Belgium, Northern France. To-day it must cover an area 2000 miles one way and 1200 the other. It must man bases ranging from the north of Norway to Libya, from Estonia to Bordeaux. It is summoned simultaneously to keep up the air bombardment of Britain, and British shipping, to ward off the mounting British offensive against German industry, to defend “occupied coasts”, to bolster the Italians, to police Norwegians and Serbs over and above all this to fight on the Eastern front of the greatest campaign the world has even seen. According to current estimate the Sunday Times Air correspondent on October 5 said the Eastern campaign is fully occupying four out of five of

the great air armies that make up Germany’s air strength. “One,” he says, “before Leningrad, the second backing the thrust towards Moscow, the third in the Ukraine, the fourth, calling for reinforcements’, is based on Northern Norway and Finland and is operating in the Murmansk area. This leaves in the rest of Europe the only remaining air army, plus two subsidiary corps in North Africa and the Balkans respectively. These forces cannot answer all Germany’s other requirements. At present, the Luftwaffe is spread too thin to be effective”. LUFTWAFFE’S BIG LOSSES. (2) The second factor is that the Luftwaffe this summer has suffered more losses than it bargained for. The Battle of Britain was called off when it lost 2100 aircraft. Even the most conservative estimators allow that it has already lost more than 3000 in Russia. German aircraft industry is great and this loss probably does not exceed German production, though it has certainly eaten into the German reserves. But the loss in machines is less important than the loss in men. We know that the German air crews now fighting in the front line have been rushed several weeks before their time, straight from draining schools, to replace casualtie^t ; result is a falling off of skill/ introducing a vicious circle which inevitably leads to greater loss. The use of inadequately trained crews is uneconomic and must have been dictated by dire necesTECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES. (3) The third factor in Germany’s weakness is the indirect loss she has suffered through her inability to concentrate on technical improvements while she is fighting at the present pressure. To meet this pressure she must keep her factories hard at it on the mass production of existing models. She has no time to organise that slow complicated process—the change- ■ over Of plant to new types. Still less

can she get on as she would wish with introducing those new types in effective numbers into her squadrons. This handicap brings her face to face with the greatest problem of her future: unless she can organise a breathing space she cannot keep pace technically or operationally with the R.A.F. “Strike when and where your enemy is weak” is first golden rule of strategy. These three German embarrassments are not' necessarily permanent. Therefore, now is our moment to strike for quantitative as well as qualitative superiority. Mr Churchill’s hint about German weakness was not just a pick-me-up. It was a summons to effort. Every worker now has his opportunity to turn the tables on the Luftwaffe whether directly from the R.A.F. and aircraft factories, or the Air Training Corps, or indirectly from the ranks of those who release others to train; plan, build and fly.