ABYSSINIAN WAR

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 55, Issue 3928, 19 July 1937, Page 7

ABYSSINIAN WAR

SECRETS OF CAMPAIGN. MUSSOLINI’S LONG DRIVE. Marshal de Bono’s story of the preparations for and the first phase of the Abyssinian campaign, as recorded in “The Conquest of an Empire” is frank to a degree, writes MajorGeneral A. C. Temperley in the Daily Telegraph. He reveals himself as loyal, enthusiastic, and quite undeterred by the most appalling administrative difficulties. Behind him we see something of the lowering figure of the Duce, who inspires all, knows all, and gives every order. Terse commands keep flying over the ether and de Bono monotonously replies “Very good,” but the strain increases and the last one is too much. Even so great an optimist is bound to say, “It can’t be done.” This brought dismissal and the consolatory baton of a marshal. The book opens with an appreciative introduction by Signor Mussolini, in which he truly remarks that “without what we may call the de Bono period, the victorious campaign would have been neither conceivable nor possible.” In 1932 General de Bono, as Minister for the Colonies, was sent by the Duce to report on the condition of Eritrea. Both the East African colonies had been neglected owing to the needs of Libya. The garrisons were small; they were largely roadless and considerable harbour improvements in Massawa had been long overdue. Relations with Abyssinia were bad. General de Bono set in motion some essential constructive work, but began more and more to ponder over the idea of an offensive war, in spite of the discouraging attitude of the General Staff. His importance in the Fascist regime must not be forgotten. He was one of the famous quattuor vioi who led the march on Rome and, as the only general among them, he took the chief part in the organisation of the Fascist militia. He stood indeed very near the Fascist throne. Planned in 1933. In the autumn of 1933 he went to the Duce and spoke to him as follows: “Listen; if there is war down there —you ought to grant me the honour of conducting the campaign.” The Duce looked at me hard and at once replied, “Surely.” “You don’t think me too old?” I added.

“No,” he replied, “because we mustn’t lose time.”

From this moment the Duce was definitely of the opinion that the matter would have to be settled no later than 1936, and he told me as much. I replied, “Very good.” It is thus established historically that the war was planned between the Duce and General de Bono in the autumn of 1933. Henceforth General de Bono took into his own hands all practical details of the preparations of the campaign. He had to begin at the very beginning. There was the reconditioning of the port of Massawa, the construction of roads and bridges, and engineering work of all kinds, as well as the preparation of a first-class asphalt road from the harbour to Asmara, the capital. On the military side the Eritrean troops had to be raised from 4000 to 65,000, and every kind of stores and war material had to be obtained from Italy. Reading between the lines, one can see that General de Bono believed that at least as much could be done by what he euphemistically calls “political preparation” as by fighting. The ex-military attache at Addis Ababa became head of the political bureau and with plenty of funds was able to throw his net wide. Haile Selassie Gugsa was a prominent renegade. In January, 1935, General de Bono landed in East Africa, first as High Commissioner and then as Command-er-in-Chief, and he notes that “about this time the conversations with Laval took place in Rome, which gave us reason to hope that, if we did have to take action France would put no obstacles in our way.” This is contemporary evidence of some 'undertaking that M. Laval afterwards denied in the Chamber. Only By Offensive. On December 20, 1934, the Duce personally compiled his “Directions and Plans of Action.” “Time is working against us,” he wrote, “we must haste. Besides 60,000 native soldiers, there ought to be as many Italian. Three hundred aeroplanes and 100,000 Italian soldiers must be ready in Eritrea by October, 1935.” Again the Duce writes: “In case the Negus should have no intention of attacking us, we ourselves must take the initiative,” and talks of 200,000 white soldiers. On March 8 he once more raises his bid and mentions 300,000 plus 300500 areoplanes and 300 swift lorries. “You ask for three divisions by the end of October; I mean to send you ten, I say ten: five divisions of the regular army and five divisions of Black Shirts. These (latter) will be the guarantee that the undertaking will obtain popular approbation.” General de Bono was continually harping on the theme that the Abys-

sinians did not want to fight, and with the masses of troops then promised, the idea of a preliminary defensive phase was dropped and an offensive only was decided upon. This that the Abyssinians were so bellicose that it became a war of self-defence. As the divisions began to arrive incidentally disposes of the argument from Italy the feverish preliminary work was to be highly tried. There were the inevitable breadowns and both troops and labour corps suffered considerable hardships, while the congestion in Massawa was terrible. These are the inevitable accompaniment of a campaign, and the performance of General de Bono, his staff and his engineers showed powers of organisation of a very remarkable character. Near a Breakdown. By September General de Bono had three army corps, each of two divisions, in line near the frontier, and two divisions in reserve. He seems to have had fairly accurate information of the numbers opposed to him and their probable attitude. The intelligence service was good. He finally fixed October 5 as the day, after being told by the Duce to “make an end” and that the order to advance was to come from him (de Bono). On September 29 he received yet another telegram from his chief. “I order you to begin to advance early on the 3rd. I say October 3. I await immediate confirmation.”

As we know, the Italians succeeded in occupying Adawo —Aksum—Adigrat almost without opposition and the wiping out of the old score aroused immense enthusiasm in Italy. The difficulties of supply, of roads, and of lorries multiplied, and General de Bono’s agents combed out the Middle East for camels, mules, mechanical transport, and oil. On October 8 he wired, “Continual consignments of petrol wanted, having only two months’ supply, excluding that for aviation.” The position in view of the possibility of oil sanctions or closing the canal was almost desperate. Marshal Badoglio had arrived on a visit of inspection on October 16 and he had made de Bono realise that more reinforcements might cause the whole machine to break down. They represented this accordingly in a joint telegram to the Duce, who still insisted on sending another two divisions of Black Shirts. Further difference of opinion occurred as to the date of the next advance to Makale. Finally, after de Bono, who had become more and more uneasy, had sent a long telegram temperately setting out the very real difficulties on the lines of communication, he received a brusque order

to move on November 3, with which he complied. The Final Straw. But the pace could not last; he had hardly consolidated his position at Makale before he received a telegram on November 11: • He was haunted by the lesson of Adowa and insisted upon sending more and more men. Marshal Badoglio with a greater understanding of war, realised in time that a campaign of this kind where problems of supply predominated, the larger the mass the greater the immoblity, and he had the courage to thin them out. In accepting the command he probably secured a freer hand Marshal de Bono’s book makes it clear that the war - would not have been won before the rain without Signor Mussolini’s remorseless drive, but it can hardly be considered a normal method of conducting a campaign.