DARWIN’S NEW ROLE

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 55, Issue 3927, 16 July 1937, Page 7

DARWIN’S NEW ROLE

TO BE NAVAL STATION. AUSTRALIAN DECISION. By establishing a naval fuelling station and a fortress at Darwin, Australia has undertaken military obligations the extent of which may not be generally understood, says a writer in the Sydney Morning Herald. The Ministry had done little to educate the people it serves on this subject, or to stimulate discussion about a unique step towards Imperial military co-operation. Assuming that the development of the Darwin base is not proceeding haphazardly, the ultimate intention must be to make Darwin a self-suf-ficient outpost, capable of protecting and fuelling ia substantial force of naval vessels. Why is such a station to be desired? Both British and Japanese naval officers have written objectively about the probable course of a major war- in the East. Writers of both nationalities are agreed upon two points: First, the possibility of Britain’s base at Hong Kong being taken by an Asiatic enemy in a few weeks; secondly, the probability of Singapore being invested before a considerable British fleet would have time to arrive from Europe. A fleet without a base is in a precarious position. The problem that would face a vast fleet travelling in time of war from European waters to Singapore would be to reach that base without disaster. Singapore can be reached from the west and south only through one or another of half a dozen narrow straits, which offer excellent conditions for the operation of hostile submarines and aircraft. Without an alternative base (such as Darwin) the arrival of the fleet at its base might be delayed for a disastrous period. Might Take Week*. The task of re-establishing naval ascendancy in such a hazardous area and of clearing a way for the progress of a battle fleet, might take weeks. The naval operations of 1914-19 demonstrated the power of small craft to harass big ships in narrow seas; since then the aeroplane has been added to the list of torpedocarrying ’ craft. Thus Darwin, if it is to do its job in such a war (the only kind of war in which it could serve any purpose of the first importance) must at least be able to offer an itinerant fleet the protection of big guns and aircraft, and also fuel and stores. To do this it must be able to protect itself against capture before the arrival of the fleet it is to shelter. Stores of oil fuel are maintained at Darwin, and it is understood that the Ministry intends to add to the artillery now installed long-range guns capable of keeping warships at bay. But such artillery, unless it is protected by mobile troops, is a tempting bait for a resolute raiding

force which sets out not to subdue the guns by bombardment, but to land troops nearby and take them in the rear. The Japanese operations against the German station at Tsingtao in 1914 might well be a model for such a raid. Australia’s other fixed defences are at the chief centres of population, and, therefore, militia formations of all arms are available to oppose attempts to take the guns from the landward side. The white population of the Northern Territory is so small (about 3500) that the recruitment of an adequate local militia may be regarded as impossible. The distance of Darwin from the centres from which militia forces could be spared in an emergency is so great that, in a race between the reinforcements and the attackers, the attackers should win easily. The sea route to Darwin from both Perth and Brisbane is circuitous; the land route both from the south and south-west includes 500 to 600 miles of railless, practically roadless, distance. Even the investment which Australia has already made at Darwin is insecure until a permanent force of mobile troops has been established there, and also an air force station, as another essential complement to the fixed defence. Mobile Force Needed. A mobile force of regular troops does not exist to-day. Most of the men of the permanent forces belong to the Royal Australian Artillery (about 700 strong), and form the garrisons of the fixed defences protecting the principal ports. There are other small technical and experimental units, but no striking force. The necessity for such a force has often been argued in the past on the ground that the existing permanent regiments are to# small even to be an adequate training ground for instructors for the militia. In his reports as Inspector-General, Sir Harry Chauvel persistently made this point.. The development tf Darwin as a naval station provides another and more urgent reason why the establishment of such a fbrce cannot be delayed with wisdom. The size of such a force depends on many factors. It is indicative, however, that at Singapore Britain maintains three battalions of infantry in addition to the substantial volunteer force there, and at Hong Kong four battalions, in addition to the technical troops.