MECHANISED ARMIES

Sun (Auckland), Volume III, Issue 841, 9 December 1929, Page 14

MECHANISED ARMIES

MANY OBSTACLES IN WAY MOBILITY VERSUS STRENGTH To the majority of lay spectators witnessing this year's Army exercises on Salisbury Plain, it may appear surprising that no greater progress j should have been achieved in the task j of “mechanising” the British Army, j It is not strange, therefore, that much attention should be paid to those ! critics who deplore the slowness of : the Army authorities in coming to j some satisfactory solution to what is j a most difficult, and in some respects j a most thankless, task; a problem, i moreover, which is replete with un- I known factors and pitfalls, writes j Lieut.-Colonel H. de Watteville, in the London “Sunday Times.” Often it has been urged that in the experiences of the Great War could be found the correct solution to the problems of mechanisation. The tank, the fast “whippet” tank, the motorised machine-gun battery, the universal adoption of the motor-lorry, these, it is urged, should supply all the experience necessary t,o complete the task in hand. Why, then, has not all this knowledge been systematised and exploited? Why should it have taken 11 years to reach a point where our “mechanisation” seems to be still so far from final? Is not this due to red tape, conservatism and prejudice? The answer is simple. The Great War evolved mechines designed to meet very specialised conditions, and to answer a very definite purpose. These, it may confidently be asserted, may never recur. Indeed, to embark on any future campaign, even in that same theatre of war, with the military equipment of 1918, would be akin to madness, while much of that equipment might never even come into play. It is as well, therefore, to /begin by stating the bare nature of the problem. “Mechanisation,” as a whole, is an attempt to obtain three results by the adoption of the internal combustion motor as an engine of war. The first is an increase of mobility due to the greater speed and radius of action of machine-moved troops - as against a muscle-moved enemy. The second is the immunity against small-calibre fire obtained by the armour which the engine permjits of being carried on the vehicle. Lastly, there is the capacity of that vehicle of surmounting obstacles such as trenches, barbed wire or low walls. To the uninitiated it might at first sight seem as though an army composed wholly of tanks or analogous machines might satisfy all present military requirements. Anti-Tank Weapons As against these possibilities, however, there must be named certain definite facts. Firstly, the tanks of the Great War .succeeded greatly bv reason of surprise or lack of weapons to combat them. This peculiarity has now vanished, while “anti-tank” warfare is receiving close study. Secondly, “anti-tank” weapons are coming into existence, and will unquestionably improve, whereas the tank’s armour is strictly limited by reasons of weight. Lastly, any rapidly moving light or armoured force suffers from innate shortcomings of reconnaissance, while lacking the power to force any strongly guarded defile or position. Tnere still remains the formidable problem of the supply of such a force with fuel, stores and ammunition adequate to ensure the “hundred-mile-a-day” performance of the enthusiasts. That such forces will, on a larger or smaller scale, be seen in a future war admits of little doubt. But to advocate the wholesale adoption of such an instrument of warfare is a totally different question. As opposed to these advocates of “see Europe in a week” there exisis an undoubtedly reactionary, now dwindling, tendency in favour of confining the machine to the speed and endurance of the foot-soldier —in other words, to return to the conditions of 1918. The great bulk of military opinion, however, is now in favour of greater caution and progress by trial and error. This party now proposes that all the machine-guns and adjuncts of our infantry and cavalry should be mechanised in such measure as to permit of the actual marching troops being conveyed, as entire brigades, on the occasion arising, by motor transport supplied from a divisional pool. This scheme will permit of our divisions gaining in mobility, while not losing any faculty of reconnaissance or any power in attack, since the accompanying artillery and other arms are already being mechanised Moreover, to the cavalry there are being allotted some armoured cars: while the infantry brigades are receiving a battalion of the new two-or-three-man Carden-Lloyd light tanks, anti-tank guns, and light mortars. Mobility and fighting power would go hand iu hand. Armoured mobile brigades, not yet on the scene, but elaborated on paper, w-ould support these new "mechanised” divisions. Such is the tentative scheme which is at the root of the recent Armv exercises. Many details of the whole conception are to be tested, and several alterations may be expected before any finality can be reached. Although the ultimate organisation of the Army cannot be forecast, it may be expected to follow these broad lines, and to be on a mechanised basis. Flexibility Essential It is inevitable that the British Army should be “mechanised” on a sufficiently flexible basis to admit of its adapting itself to any one of the lesser campaigns in which it might become entangled, as well as in the major “police” duties that so often fall to its lot. That is by far the most urgent solution to the whole problem. Again, there is the fundamental question of finance. The initial cost of “mechanisation” must be immense. Machines depreciate rapidly, while technical progress soon renders an existing type of armoured vehicle obsolescent. As an instance there might be quoted the cost of the “medium” tank, which is £20,000. Although little Carden-Lloyds might cost a fortieth of that sum, there must be a formidable outlay in view for any army which “mechanises” itself cap-a-pie. And what of the financial claims of the Royal Air Force, without whose effective and liberal support a fastmoving “mechanised” army could scarcely be contemplated as taking the field? “Mechanisation” remains an expensive affair, and the Army Council might well hesitate to embark upon “mecahnisation” on the grand scale at a moment when a reduction of national expenditure on the fighting services is a popular cry.