THE PACIFIC NOT SAFE.

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXIX, Issue 81, 26 May 1911, Page 5

THE PACIFIC NOT SAFE.

STRONG FLEET WANTED. , PRESENT SQUADRON MAY BE “PORT ARTHURED.” A series of articles have been published in the “Times of Ceylon” on the subject of British naval strength in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The writer points out that there is at present only one largo modern British cruiser stationed in the North Indian Ocean to guard British interests in time of war. The only obvious way to prevent great damage to ogr shipping in time of war, ho says, is to station vessels capable of overtaking and sinking ships that are likely to prove “Alabamas” on stragetically well situated stations, such asyCeylon; and at firesent we have none. He gives a ist of the possible destroyers of British commerce—fast, modern cruisers (well coaled), which could dodge or fight our best vessels of the large armoured cruiser typo. Proceeding, he says: “We, in the outlying parts of the Empire, have, of course, nothing in common with those people at. Home, who would not care if the Empire fell so long as no German soldier was likely to tread on the .cabbages in their own garden, and it is a really healthy sign of vigorous Imperialism that Australia, now Zealand and Canada arc now laying down such expensive items as Dreadnoughts. I have merely tried to point out the immediate need for an increase in the strength of our eraser squadron, both in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific. For an Empire which relics upon soa-ppwor it is a sign of staleness to send out a ‘new’ flagship to an important, or rather should be important, squadron such as the East Indian, a vessel which was built in 1898, and was stationed out here many years ago. Possibly, when the Treaty with Japan has expired,’ or even before, it may be necessary to form a battleship fleet in the Near or Far East, on the lines of the China fleet before the Russo-Japanese war, and the fact of Australasia building two battleship cruisers looks like forming the nucleus of such a fleet. But to be of any use at all a battle squadron would have to be one consisting of the very largest, fastest, and most heavily armed vessels that we could afford to spare from home waters. The fact of the Triumph and Swiftsure being at Hongkong, as they will be soon, would not deter the Japanese from their designs on Australia one iota, and even a fleet of eight of these veswould only be ‘Port Arthured’ or ‘Tsushima-ed’ before the arrival of the reinforcements necessary to cope with the Japanese Dreadnoughts. As I have already pointed out, these vessels were too slow to act as hunters of commerce destroyers, and a fleet of obout the strength of our present Mediterranean fleet would either have to follow the example of the Spanish fleets at Santiago and Manilla or the Russians at Port Arthur and Vladivostock, and shut themselves up in their harbours, or else go to a perhaps glorious, but nationally useless doom. When strengthened by the two ‘Lord Nelsons’ the Mediterranean fleet will bo perhaps capable of holding its own, for it lias two very strongly fortified bases in Gibraltar and Malta, and could easily be reinforced in a week or so; but in the case of a similar fleet being stationed at advanced baues like Hongkong, Sydney, or Colombo, with only moderately fortified harbours, its fate would be sealed before it could be relieved, as either Japan or America could concentrate such a force of modern 'Dreadnoughs' against it (besides hosts of smaller craft) as to compel its capture or destruction. To be of any use, therefore, at battle fleet for the defence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and all the Imperial possessions that lie within them, would have to be a homogeneous, up-to-date, well-handled fleet of powerful vessels, and the main fortified base shopld not bo too far from reinforcement.”