The Southland Times WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1945. Russian Policy in the Far East

Southland Times, Issue 25763, 29 August 1945, Page 4

The Southland Times WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1945. Russian Policy in the Far East

THE treaty of friendship signed by Russia and China is in some ways a reassuring document. It provides welcome evidence that Soviet intentions in the Far East have been influenced by a desire to avoid friction with the western Powers. The most significant feature, from a short-term point of view, is the pledge “to give military supplies and moral support to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s Government, and not to interfere in China’s internal affairs.” ‘This seems to mean that the Russians will not give any assistance to the Chinese Communists. The decision is at first sight so unexpected that there may be a temptation to look beyond it for doubtful motives. It must be admitted, however, that Communist regimes in recent years have not been able to regard Soviet support as axiomatic. On the contrary, the Russians have sometimes surprised the world by ignoring left-wing groups and establishing diplomatic relations with more or less reactionary Governments. A case in point was the recognition of the Badoglio regime in Italy, to the confusion of Italian radicals—and, incidentally, to the embarrassment of Britain and the United States,' who had withheld recognition. The trend of Russian policy has not shown any strict conformity to a political faith; instead of being consistently ideological, it has moved increasingly towards an open nationalism, touched here and there with a colouring of imperialism. It is still easy to forget that M. Stalin rejected the theory of world revolution. His foreign policy cannot be understood if it is interpreted as an expanding communism; the test is to be found, not in what may be favourable to communism in other countries, but in what can serve Russia’s national interests. The treaty with China gives the Russians some outright gains. Although Port Arthur is to be a naval base for “joint Sino-Russian use,” the fact that China has no navy worth the name, and is unlikely to have one for many years, may indicate that the Chinese are politely conceding the recovery of what was formerly Russian territory. Similarly, China’s pledge “to. recognize Outer .Mongolia’s political independence,” if aplebiscite confirms the people’s desire in that direction, may bring to an end a long and obscure struggle for the control of this strategic area. Outer Mongolia is the key to eastern Siberia, and since 1921 it has been a buffer State—indirectly controlled, but directly influenced, from Moscow. All through this period there has been no formal repudiation of Chinese sovereignty; but it seems certain that the plebiscite will bring the territory finally and decisively into the Russian orbit.