The Southland Times. SATURDAY, JANUARY 24, 1942. Japan's Strategy in the Pacific

Southland Times, Issue 24651, 24 January 1942, Page 4

The Southland Times. SATURDAY, JANUARY 24, 1942. Japan's Strategy in the Pacific

IT WAS ON Sunday, December 7, that Japan announced her entry into the war by attacking Pearl Harbour. During the seven weeks that have passed since that fateful day the enemy has reached out across East Asia and the Pacific in a remarkably wide series of operations. A major expedition was sent to the Philippines. Large forces poured into Malaya and successfully filtered through the greater part of the peninsula. An attack of unexpected power has been launched against the vulnerable south of Burma. Further north, on the mainland, a determined assault on Changsha was smashed by the Chinese. Borneo is under Japanese control, and landings have been made on outlying territories of the Netherlands East Indies. Scattered islands in the Pacific have been occupied or raided; and reports have now been received of an attack on New Guinea. These operations seem to imply a dispersal of forces which would be risky to the point of madness if it were not based on a large advantage in armaments, and on naval supremacy in northern waters. They have been successful up to the present because the defences were weak in almost all the areas involved. More successes may be gained before it can be said that the danger is past: indeed, the near future threatens to be a period of acute strain and anxiety for all British countries and outposts in the Pacific. Japanese strategy is not haphazard or confused. The attacks on Luzon and Hong Kong deprived the Allies of their two advanced bases, and left only Singapore as a possible springboard for offensive action. But the attack on Malaya and the destruction of two British battleships neutralized the southern base, while at the same time it was outflanked by the occupation of Borneo. The next major objective seemed to be the Netherlands East Indies. It now appears to be probable, however, that the Japanese are “bypassing” these strongly defended islands in an attempt to control the sea lines of communication before American aid begins to affect the balance of power. Possession of New Guinea will enable the Japanese to dominate the Torres Strait, thereby sealing another and important approach to Singapore. It will also bring nearer an invasion of the Australian mainland, which would for its initial purpose the seizure of Darwin, the port named as a probable naval base for British and United States warships. All these advances are being made with a rapidity and thoroughness which reveal the full extent of Japan’s military preparations. Although they appear to be spread over wide distances they are confined to a single strategic zone, and they are aimed at obtaining and consolidating positions from which the Japanese could not be easily dislodged. But time is the vital factor, and in the seven weeks of spectacular enemy achievement the strongest Power in the Pacific has not been idle. According to a statement made by a high official in Washington, the flow of reinforcements has already begun. He admitted that the United States may have lost control of the seas “for the time being.” But long-range bombers are being sent to vital points in increasing numbers, and aircraft production is rising steadily. The opinion has also been expressed in Washington that “if Singapore and the East Indies can hold out for 30 days the united nations will have air superiority over the Japanese in the south-western Pacific.” They may be the most anxious 30 days in the history of the Pacific Dominions, and even when they are over the worst of the struggle may still be in the future. But the consciousness of growing strength will make it easier to face the dangers that must inevitably attend every new phase of Japanese aggression.