The Southland Times SATURDAY, AUGUST 23, 1941. The Outlook for a Land Offensive

Southland Times, Issue 24521, 23 August 1941, Page 6

The Southland Times SATURDAY, AUGUST 23, 1941. The Outlook for a Land Offensive

EVER since the beginning of the war in Russia the problem of diverting German forces from the east has been widely discussed in British countries. The need for such a diversion has become so urgent that arguments which seemed to be valid a few weeks ago must now be re-examined more carefully. We have already pointed out that a land offensive on a large scale would require more ships than can be spared while the Battle of the Atlantic remains at a critical stage, and while the large British forces in the Middle East have to be reinforced and supplied. Since then it has become known that shipping losses in the Atlantic, although still serious in terms of a long war, are less serious than they threatened to be a few months ago. The American occupation of Iceland has had an immediate and favourable effect, and the extension of the patrol system promises to be effective. In the Middle East, however, there has been no slackening in the demands on naval and merchant tonnage. It seems most unlikely that occupied territory could be invaded while so much depends on the Atlantic and Mediterranean supply lines. When these chances have been examined there remains one possibility which deserves more than casual attention. Could Britain open a new front by using the large and well-equipped army of the Middle East?

The Libyan Flank

The problem of sea transport remains, and would become more serious if an offensive were planned; but it is obviously easier to increase the flow of materials to Egypt than to open a new supply line while simultaneously strengthening the forces of the Nile. Until recently it was generally assumed that General Auchinleck’s first major battle would be in the Western Desert. The expulsion of Axis forces now inside the Egyptian frontier would probably remove the danger to the left flank of the Army of the Nile, for the Germans might not be able to send new panzer divisions to Libya while the Red Army continues its resistance. Moreover, the enemy’s shipping losses have reached a scale which can scarcely be justified by the importance of the Libyan front. Last month, according to Mr C. R. Attlee, the Axis lost 168,000 tons in the Mediterranean, and its resources at sea are not comparable with Britain’s. A battle in the Western Desert at the present time would be essentially a defensive action, whereas the general war situation seems to call for- an offensive strategy. There can be little doubt that an important move is being planned. The Foreign Secretary recently told the House of Commons that “men and material are pouring out to strengthen our forces in the Middle East for their next-forward plunge.” This systematic reinforcement has been continuing without a pause for many weeks. Yet a few days ago it was reported that the Germans still had more tanks than the British in the Western Desert, and it has even been suggested that the Axis forces may be planning a new assault on Egypt. When these various statements are assembled for comparison it becomes fairly obvious that a great part of the Army of the Nile is no longer stationed in Egypt. One clue to the new dispositions can be found in a report (by Americans from Bagdad) of British columns that “have been moving eastward for a week towards the Iran frontier.” This appears to mean that if the political situation in Iran continues to be unsatisfactory Britain will be forced to place the country under military occupation.

Defensive Action

From a strategic point of view, however, the move would still have to be regarded as defensive action, comparable with the occupation of Syria and Iraq. The Middle East would be strengthened, although at some risk of weakening the Libyan flank; and it is clearly necessary to secure strong positions in the zone which is most likely to be threatened if the Germans are- successful in Russia. But these moves, essential though they may be to a defensive strategy, do not point towards land operations in support of Russia. It has been suggested that supplies for Russia will be sent through Iran, and the Turkish radio announced that British ships were already on their way to the Persian Gulf. But the mountainous country between Iran and the Armenian frontier does not favour the creation of a practicable supply route. The strategic problem would at once be simplified if Turkey entered the war as Britain’s ally. Although road and rail communications in Anatolia are fairly primitive they are much bettei- than those of Iran, and they provide direct access to the Black Sea territories under German control. A British attack on Bulgaria might not yield spectacular results; but it would certainly relieve the military pressure on the Ukraine. These possibilities may have occurred to the Germans, for there are further reports of panzer units on the frontier of Bulgaria and Turkey. Events may shortly make speculation unnecessary. Yet a study of the remorseless facts of geography does not encourage the view that the Russians can be supported in the Middle East. If offensive action is to be taken it may be necessary to strike through Belgium or Holland, where short supply lines and friendly populations offer a reasonable chance of success. But the risks in such a move could be faced only if the United States were prepared to take over the battle of the Atlantic. And at the moment there (-re no signs that America is ready for a full belligerency.