The Southland Times FRIDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1939. Nazis' Transport Weakness

Southland Times, Issue 24011, 29 December 1939, Page 4

The Southland Times FRIDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1939. Nazis' Transport Weakness

r? should not be surprising if there is a great deal of wishful thinking about Germany’s internal weakness, for the evidence seems to justify a belief that a collapse is ultimately inevitable. This need not mean that the Nazi regime will crumble quickly from within, that the Germans will refuse to fight in major battles, or that the Allies can win simply by tightening the blockade. All these things are possible; but there is no way of knowing what physical and spiritual resources are available for a supreme war effort. Experienced military leaders—including Major-General Freyberg—are inclined to reject the theory that Germany can be conquered easily. It may be nearer the truth to assume that the conditions of collapse are already there, but that only largescale military action will bring them to a crisis. In the meantime the evidence of weakness is accumulating, especially in the economic field. The most recent indications that forced production and the heavy reliance on ersatz or substitute materials are beginning to take effect can be found in the growing list of railway accidents. These have occurred with a tragic frequency during the Christmas season, but they represent an accentuation of tendencies that were at work long before the beginning of the war. Complex Economy

Efficient transport has usually been taken for granted in Germany; uncertain time-tables, inferior and inadequate rolling stock and the break-down of freight services are more in keeping with the railway muddle in the Soviet Union. Transport weakness in Russia is mainly the result of what seems to be a congenital inability to organize; but the Nazi failure comes from an entirely different cause. The Germans have always been natural organizers. Perhaps it is true that under the Nazis they have suffered from a surfeit of organization, for the complexity of the Four-Year Plan (a misleading name for a permanent war-time economy) has done more than anything else to tax the railway system beyond its strength. Vast quantities of raw materials—coal, ores, tar and coke—have been transported long distances to factories erected for the manufacture of synthetic products. Basic materials of an inferior nature are being used in industry, and this means that larger quantities are required. While the railways have been struggling to cope with these extra demands locomotives and rolling stock have been wearing out, and replacements are inadequate. Before the war the Institute for Economic Research stated that Germany needed 5000 new locomotives. A four-year programme for the construction of engines, trucks and passenger coaches has been started; but the thousands of vehicles needed will not be available in their full number until 1943, and meanwhile other rolling stock is steadily deteriorating. The problem would have been bad enough in peace time. But now the situation has been altered. An immense new strain has been superimposed on the strain of the Four-Year Plan. Munitions and war supplies are needed in a steady stream at the Western Front, while at the same time the country’s industry wants raw materials more urgently and in greater quantities than before. The railway accidents may not mean that the system is collapsing, but they are at least an indication of the severe and increasing strain to which it is being subjected.