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THE SPANISH TRAGEDY

PART OF ITALY AND GERMANY

SOLDIERS ON GOOD PAY WAR CORRESPONDENT’S ARTICLES Rank and file German soldiers in Spain appear to enjoy themselves. They receive approximately 10 times their domestic rate of pay, and spend freely, it is noted by H. R. Knickerbocker, in the fourth of his articles written as a war correspondent. They admit that they are not particularly happy to be fighting in Spain in a quarrel which is not theirs, but they add: “Who are we to say? If the Fuehrer orders us here he must know best, and we are glad to obey.”

By H. R. KNICKERBOCKER (World Copyright)

I lived for a week in an hotel in Vitoria, which is the headquarters of the German General Sander, who is in command of the “Legion Condor,’ the name given the German contingent in Spain. The men of this German legion, numbering around 10,000, from regular German army units, can by no euphemism be described as volunteers. Most of the Reichswehr soldiers assigned to this duty did not know whither they were bound until they were aboard ship. . Besides their special task of doing most of the air bombing, the Germans in Spain are entrusted with the maintenance of the major lines of communication and with anti-aircraft, heavy artillery, tanks, and special machine-gun units. Their field radio sets in big, speedy lorries are to be seen everywhere in rebel Spain. Their “gelaende wagen” or special motor-cars for crosscountry work, swarm on every road. The common soldiers get an equivalent of six shillings a day. The best restaurants in Vitoria are crowded with German soldiers eating comparatively expensive food. I have seen husky German corporals stowing away a dinner they never could have afforded at home —hors d’oeuvres, soup, fish, with mayonnaise, omelet with mushrooms, mutton chops, ice-cream, and coffee. Italy and Germany have decided to support at least one more colossal drive by Franco to win the war, and they have pledged themselves anew to go on fighting there together It does not mean that they will necessarily stick it out forever. It means that at this moment Mussolini is determined not to withdrav’ his 50,000 troops from Spain until the Italian defeat at Guadalajara has been revenged. He has persuaded the Germans to keep their 10,000 specialized troops there at least until Bilbao is taken and another determined attempt made to cut off Madrid. TWO WEEKS’ BATTLE The Italian defeat at Guadalajara was nothing like such a rout as would seriously discredit Italian arms. The dimensions of the _ defeat were smaller than many previous engagements in the war. The causes were, in relative degree of importance: Bad Spanish staff work, Spanish jealousy of the Italians, Italian over-confidence, unfavourable weather, superior aviation by the Government forces. Why the Spaniards let the Italians down can be ascribed to faulty generalship and to the lamentably bad spirit between the Spaniards and their allies. Being near their permanent asphalted air base, the Government aviators were able to take off in the rain, but the rebels’ temporary airdromes were so muddy that their planes remained grounded throughout the battle. It was a painful setback for the Italians, but gave evidence of imprudence rather than cowardice. In the opinion of important expert eyewitnesses, it would be unjustified to rake it as any proof of what Mussolini’s army could do against European troops. Nevertheless, Europe called it a second Caporetto, and cries about “organ grinders,” “ice-cream peddlers” and “wops” grated with intolerable harshness on Italian ears. Mussolini has built his whole prestige in Europe upon the belief that he had made the Italians into a superior race of warriors and that his army is to be feared. Whatever the truth about Guadalajara, it became necessary for him to wipe out this legend. Hence the decision of Mussolini to go on in Spain. Now the question is, can he force a victory there without sending more troops, thus risking French retaliation and the possibility of a general war. (Next Article: Cost of the War.)

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ST19370618.2.46

Bibliographic details

Southland Times, Issue 23229, 18 June 1937, Page 7

Word Count
674

THE SPANISH TRAGEDY Southland Times, Issue 23229, 18 June 1937, Page 7

THE SPANISH TRAGEDY Southland Times, Issue 23229, 18 June 1937, Page 7

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