The Southland Times PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING Luceo Non Uro. FRIDAY, JULY 12, 1918. THE DELAYED OFFENSIVE.

Southland Times, Issue 17833, 12 July 1918, Page 4

The Southland Times PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING Luceo Non Uro. FRIDAY, JULY 12, 1918. THE DELAYED OFFENSIVE.

Military critics in Paris are naturally very dubious about the reports, circumstantial though they be, that Ludendorff proposes to abandon the offensive in the west in order to concentrate his energies and his forces in a great attack upon Italy. That an attempt will be made to retrieve the position on the Italian front is almost certain. The serious condition of Austria almost demands it. The offensive not only failed but it ended in something like disaster, discouraging the people, shaking the morale of the army and increasing the difficulties of the Government. The position of the Hapsburg throne, never very strong, is at the present moment more than usually precarious. The people are in dire straits for food, sick of the bloodshed caused by the war and hostile alike to the Germans and to their own Government. The country is full of disorders and wranglings and bitterness w'hich failure causes, and since Germany must keep Austria-Hungary in the war Ludendorff will probably endeavour to restore public confidence by winning against Italy another such victory as that of October, 1917. At the same time the war lords of Germany cannot abandon the offensive in the west. They must go on fighting. It is true that the loud cockcrowings with which the offensive was heralded in the early part of the year have been moderated. Indeed it is now the policy of the Government to throw out hints that the war may not end this year, nor even next year. Despite, all the feeling that his speech excited Kuhlmann did not speak as a private individual when he told the Reichstag that Germany must prepare for the indefinite prolongation of the war. German Ministers do not rashly speak their own minds in such matters. Wc are told that the Pan-Germans are incensed and demand Kuhlmann’s dismissal, but obviously it would never do for the Pan-Germans, or even for Ludendorff and Hindenburg, to accept at once the Foreign Minister’s view. They know quite well that the promises and assurances with which the Germans were buoyed up at the beginning of the year are still fresh in the minds of the people. It would be very bad policy to admit at once that these promises were only so much “hot air.” The Germans were told emphatically that their armies this summer would march to complete victory, that Germany's enemies would be “smashed,” and that very soon the bells of a triumphant peace would be ringing throughout the country'. How can the Pan-Germans and the military leaders acknowledge now, when the offensive is only four months old, that they were completely mistaken, that they over-estimated the powers of their own armies and under-estimated the strength of their foes, and that, so far from peace and victory being near at hand, Germany must settle down for another two years of war, and perhaps more? The Pan-Germans were bound to be angry with Kuhlmann. They must protest that Kuhlmann is a “pessimist" and a “croaker,” and demand that he should give place to someone who has a more robust faith in the might of the German sword. Nevertheless, it will be observed that significant facts are being allowed to leak out, as, for instance, the strength of the American forces in France. The Pan-Germans are making a great show of resentment against Kuhlmann, but it is only part .of the process of breaking the news gently since the admission that victory cannot be won this year must be made sooner or later. The continuation of the offensive will also be part of the process. Such operations as those to which Ludendorff and ‘ Hindenburg committed themselves in .March .last, cannot, be, broken off.

There is no alternative to success or failure in a major offensive designed to force a decision. It either succeeds or it fails, and when it fails the failure is complete. If Ludendorff breaks off the offensive in. the west he admits at once that he is beaten, and that is nn admission which he is not yet prepared to make. The offensive in the west must also be continued for Austria's sake. From Austria’s point of view military successes in the west are almost as important as successes on the Italian front. Furthermore, Ludendorff still has the men to carry on the offensive. The crisis on the western front is not'over. It is still in the power of Germany to put the Allied line to the severest test, and we know that Britain, France and America are straining every nerve and muscle to get men to the front as August and September are expected to be months of great anxiety. The pause on the western front does not mean that the offensive has been abandoned, and though the troubles in Austria may embarrass Hindenburg to some extent another blow will certainly be delivered, and it will be a very heavy one. Germany is under the relentless pressure of circumstances, and both the political and the military situation compel her to make desperate efforts this summer to win, or, if she cannot win, to bring the Allies to the point at which they will consider peace by negotiation.