WAR IN MANCHURIA.

Putaruru Press, Volume XI, Issue 511, 2 March 1933, Page 5

WAR IN MANCHURIA.

CHINA AND JAPAN. Attack on Jehol District. Out of the maze of contradictory statements about the present crisis in the Far East emerges the simple fact that the Japanese are determined to take Jehol. Plans have been matured to place the new State of Manchukuo on a sounder basis, territorially as well as politically and economically. The acquisition of Jehol has been part of these plans as, little by little, the Japanese troops, aided by their Manchurian allies, have gained ground against the bandits and insurgents of the new State. Where is Jehol? Jehol Special District, a division of Inner Mongolia, which was under the influence of the Manchurian authorities, was converted into an additional province and came to be regarded as part of Manchuria. It has an area of about 60,000 square miles, a population of about 4,500,000, and lies to the south-west of Manchukuo. Latterly Jehol has been under the control of Governor Tang Yu-lin. From the very creation of the new State it has been mentioned as part of Manchukuo. But Tang seemed to lean more towards the Government of China than towards Hsinking, and the Japanese army leaders, finding persuasive words insufficient, finally decided to employ force to bring him to terms. With the inclusion of Jehol, the lines of the new State are fully delineated. What China Thinks Of It.

Naturally, China has riot viewed this new move by the Japanese to take further unoccupied territory with any great resignation. Jehol is important to China as a base for operations for the recovery of Manchuria, and in December the Japanese suddenly made charges that China was concentrating forces in the province and was seeking to create a united front again Japan. Early in the New Year Japanese aeroplanes began bombing Chinese troops withing range of Jehol Province; a few days later Lieutenant-General Kotaro Nakamura, commander of the Japanese forces, stated the position in unequivocal terms. “By continually ignoring our warnings and steadily bringing up reinforcements to the Shankaihuan area and into Jehol, the Chinese authorities are inviting the most serious trouble,” said the general. Japan he declared, had no intention of occupying North China, but if the Chinese persisted in mobilisation where they would be a menace to Manchukuo by way of Jehol, effective steps to meet this menace would become a necessity. The general evaded questions following the reminder that another general, Shigeru Honjo, had said a year ago that Japan must eventually occupy the Penking-Suiyuan railway to outflank Russia’s hold on Outer Mongolia. In December, General Nobuyoshi Muto said that Manchukuo must handle Jehol unassisted and declared that the Manchukuo armies were strong enough for the task. General Nakamura denied this and unhesitatingly said that Japan would aid Manchukuo and would, if necessary, also take action in North China to relieve the pressure on the new State by way of Jehol. Much Opposition to Japan.

While the Japanese military act without check in Manchuria, the Japanese civilians have encountered considerable opposition. They have run up against the resistance of the Chinese to being governed, not so much by outsiders as to being governed at all. Therefore, many political adjustments have had to be made.

At first, all management was ill the hands of Japanese* Centralised iri the personage of Tukuzo KPmaiy king resident in Manchuria. As Director of the Bureau of General Affairs, Komai held in his hands all the strings of government, put his agents in every office, and kept every person of note under surveillance. But it was found that this was not the way to obtain Chinese co-opera-tion. So Komai was promoted to the Manchukuan Privy Council, where he would have a less active role, and it was decided that the Manchukuans should more and more manage their own affairs, so long as they did not disturb the economic or srtategicmc disturb the economic or strategic advantages obtained by Japan. The general tone of the Government is once more Chinese. The provincial Governors assert themselves as the rulers of their areas; they have a large voice in the administration of the country, and an effective control over revenues.

This is not to say that Japanese influence no longer is the dominant factor. Most of the offices of the Government have retained Japanese advisers, and in some instances Japanese hold high office. Yet Hsinking maintains unchanged the semblance of a capital of an independent State, though only Japan has officially recognised Manchukuo. To end China’s administrative relations with Manchuria altogether, the Customs, salt gabelle, and postal telegraph services have been taken over by Manchukuo, completely eliminating every vestige of the influence of Chinese origin. Debt of China. Manchukuo has also decided to recognise and to make arrangements to meet outstanding obligations for goods purchased by the old regime. This decision is important, for it involves one of the principal questions at issue between Japan and China, namely, the repayment of China’s indebtedness to Japan. Manchukuo has already assumed her share of this debt.

The economic stabilisation of Manchukuo is now a major problem, for the average Chinese in Manchuria will hold the Japanese responsible for conditions in that area, no matter what the de facto form of government may be. Perhaps it can be said that the people will favour or hate the Japanese in proportion to the improvement of the currency system, the reduction of taxes, the revival of trade, and the development of means of moving crops. In this direction specific steps have been taken. A budget has been prepared in which military expenditures are reduced; a central bank has been organised. The Manchukuan Government has already borrowed about 50,000,000 yen (about (£2,000,000) from Japan for the purpose of building roads and stabilising currency. Economic Relations. Already definite steps have been made by Japan to consolidate her economic relations with Manchukuo. A special committee has been appointed under the chairmanship of the Japanese Minister of Overseas Affairs to plan the economic developments in this region. The completion of two short railway lines, one from Taonan to Solun on the west and the other from Tunhau eastward, will mean direct transport across all of Central Manchuria to the Korean coast. The process of binding all the railroads of Manchuria (except the Chinese Eastern, in which Russia has the dominant voice) into a unified system with the South Manchuria railway as the backbone is meanwhile giving Japan a tremendous economic and strategic advantage.

In other .fields for example, in the unification of electric light and power plants, in the development of co-operative commercial enterprises between Japanese and Manchukuans —there have been marked developments. But when it comes to- trade, Manchukuo is embarrassed, first her cause of the world depression and secondly because of unanticipated opposition in Japan. The Japanese capitalists assumed that, like the Japanese soldier, they would have a free hand in the exploitation of Manchukuo. But they found that Japanese Fascists pnd the military were opposed to an increase of their power. Thus, the last Diet passed a tariff Bill providing a surtax of 35 per cent, on pig iron and agricultural products from Manchuria, and the South Manchurian railway, which owns the Fushun collier-

ies near Mukden, finds itself in conflict with the Mine Owners’ Federation of Japan, wnich demanded and obtained a restriction on the import of Fushun coal. Will Japan Benefit ? These are but a few instances to indicate a tf@nd, .There is an inevitable difference ef opinion as to how Japan’s new relationship with Manfiliukuo, how the investment Ot Japanese capital in that country, are to affect Japan’s industry. Is Japan to develop in Manchukuo a competitor for Japan’s mills and factories, or is Manchukuo to be the granary, the store house for raw materials, the market for Japan’s manufactured goods? This difference of opinion deeply affects the officials at Hsinking. It is now their task to prove that they will enhance the livelihood of their people, that they are to be preferred as rulers to Chang Hsueh-Liang, the ousted Governor, that money will be silver and not paper, that the soya bean will move to distant lands as before the depression, that this new State will be a veritable “ paradise.” Yet they must await the outcome of decision between Japanses capitalists and Fascists as to how Japanese money is to be invested in Manchukuo, for in the present situation the capital must come from Japan.