Poverty Bay Herald PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, WEDNESDAY, NOV. 3 1938. CONFLICT IN CHINA

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LXV, Issue 19777, 3 November 1938, Page 6

Poverty Bay Herald PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, WEDNESDAY, NOV. 3 1938. CONFLICT IN CHINA

Wit h the Japanese successes In Canton and Hankow it would appeal - , on the face of tilings, that, the conflict in China is approaching its climax. Appearances, however, may be rl ocoptive and it is not at all imp .ssil.de that the Chinese will maintain their resistance indefinitely Prom the Japanese point of view, recent gains in the south are undoubtedly impressive, but it remains to be seen just how far they will be effective. It is probably true that the Chinese, with their shortage of

troops and lack of arms and ammunition, could not have resisted the iuvadhrs successfully, and in these circumstances the evacuation of important cities was probably more of a strategic retreat than an incontinent

(light. It has been said that “He who lights and runs away, may live Vo tight another day," and these lines of Goldsmith’s are not by any means impplienble to the tactics of the Chinese. Their opponents may be capturing towns and cities, but the real question is how far they have progressed towards achieving their objective of subjugating the Chinese. They have spared no efforts to en-

torcc a victory before the winter sots in, but unless the Chinese morale is broken down and the Government is compelled to sue for peace it is possible, for more reasons than one, that difficult times lie ahead.

The real test of Chinese strength has yet to come, and it will be decided far less by military feats than by

the spirit of the nation. In recent years there has been a remarkable reawakening throughout China and almost amazing development. The credit for this is largely due to Chiang Kai-Shek and this, in turn, explains the determination of the Japanese to discredit the generalissimo in the present situation. If the Chinese lose faith in their leader, Japan may succeed, but if they face up lo the reverses with the characteristically Chinese unconcern there may be an entirely different story to tell.

Invasion is nothing new to vhc Chinese, and their traditional policy

towards invaders is to apparently yield to manifest force but to maintain continuing hostility in a less obvious, hut none the less effective, manner. In the past, this system has succeeded; invaders who, like the Japanese, have been victorious in

open warfare, have ulitimately been submerged by sheer weight of num-

bers. With the Chinese taking to the lulls, consolidating their forces, and conducting incessant guerilla operations, this fate may lie in store for the Japanese. It is one thing for vast armies to occupy important centres without serious opposition, but it is something entirely different to bring a people like the Chinese under domination. From the purely military viewpoint, therefore, it cannot yet he said that Ihpre is anything decisive in the struggle. Further than this, the outcome of tiie war will depend far more

on political and economic factors than on any clash of arms. The first consideration under this heading is the attitude of the Chinese themselves. If they become tired of the conflict they may capitulate, and already there arc reports of disaffection and dissatisfaction with Chiang Kai-Shek.

These reports, however, are largely inspired from Japanese sources and must be regarded with suspicion, particularly when it is remembered that surrender would he foreign to the naturc of the Chinese. The economic strangulation of the Chinese is another possibility, hut there is no other nation which is less susceptible to economic influences than the Chinese and this factor is not likely to weigh heavily. On the other hand, the economic pressure on Japan must he becoming severe in the extreme, and the Japanese people are far more likely to he affected in this way than the Chinese. Reports from Tokio suggest that internal dissension is not entirely lacking and that (he patience of the people is becoming exhausted. With all the propaganda in the world, it is doubtful whether the nature of the campaign can inspire

the Japanese with either the sincerity or the urgency of the mission in China, and it is at least possible that the campaign will end through JapVanese recognition of the sheer futility of it.

The Japanese Cabinet has this week restated its policy in regard to China. There is unconscious humour in the declaration that one of the objects is to crush a regime that is '“plunging millions of Chinese into dire distress.” Clearly this is a case where Hie disease is infinitely preferable to the cure, for whatever distress was suffer-

ed by the Chinese previously pales into insignificance compared with that, which has been brought to them by the bombs and guns of the invader. Equally absurd is the Jap-

anese claim to a desire to reconstruct China on a basis of peace, because there could he no more unstable foundation for peace than that which the Japanese army is endeavouring to construct. The real Japanese aim, unquestionably, is that set out in the most recent Cabinet statement—-" East Asia for the Asiatics.” Here again, the methods adopted will defeat their own ends, because the first requirement of any such policy obviously is the willing co-operation of the Asiatics, and the Chinese will never

be forced lo co-operate. On top of this is the fact that the ravaging of China and the depletion of Japanese resources will make the East more than ever dependent for assistance from the West. In the meantime. Japan is further alienating the Western Powers with interests in China,

so that still another possibility is that

Japan will find herself confronted

with opposition, at least of an economic nature, from other quarters,

Whatever the outcome of the conflict, therefore, the one thing that does seem certain is that the Japanese ambitions can never he fulfilled.