THE TRANSVAAL CRISIS.

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume XXVI, Issue 8634, 2 October 1899, Page 4

THE TRANSVAAL CRISIS.

THE SITUATION RKVIEWKD. THE FORCES AVAILABLE. In the Fortnightly Review f. r 'Yugust, Mr Bryden, analysing the populations ami efficient combatants of the various Stales of South Africa, summarise* his statistics in. the following table :— AVAILABLE SOUTH AFRICA S KOKCES— BRITISH AND BUTCH. British. Dutch. Cape Colony " 17,000 50,000 Orange Free State ... 1,000 18,000 TransV.ml 3.000 22,000 Natal 6,000 l,;> 00 Britirthßechuanaliiiid... 500 500 Rhodesia 2,000 300 Imperial troopsin South Africa at that time, cay 10,000 —

39,500 92,300 •Mr Bryden estimates that we should require, in addition to the British fighting men now in Africa, an army corps of at least fifty thousand suitable equipped. He also quotes with groat force the words uttered by Mr Selous at a public dinner only a year or two back. "We will suppose," he said, " that you have sent over a big army and crushed the Dutch. That would not givo you the peace you wished for. Would you not, knowing the strong and determined nature of these people, reasonably expect to have insurrections constantly cropping up in the future, and a general state of unrest and suspense before you?" Mr Bryden thoroughly and completely endorses Mr Selous's prophecy. Counsels of caution are always worth listening to, (remarks the Spectator) but in considering Mr Bryden's figures we must not forget that if the total male population of South Asrica is taken, the British, population outnumbers the Dutch. His figures are necessarily only guesses, and re3t on the supposition that country people fight more readily than town people. That may be the case, but in the American Civil War the town sent plenty of regiments to the front. We very much doubt if the Boers could put more than twenty thousand men into the field, and these twenty thousand, though individually brave, would be almost entirely unorganised. The London Times says :— lt is understood that the Government will accept, not only in principle, but in fact, the offers of colonial troops. The excellent material of which these troops are composed was demonstrated to English satisfaction on the - occasion of the Diamond Jubilee, and the experiment of employing them in the field will be watched with the greatest possible interest. Native troops from India or the Crown colonies will not be used, a decision arrived at, it is npderstood, partly in deference to South African opinion. But India none the less, will contribute her quota by depriving herself of tho presence of the 11,000 or 12,000 British troops which have been got ready to start immediately if required ' from Indian ports. The proposed Indian and colonial' contingents, added to the British troops already in Cape Colony and Natal, would brine the force in. South Africa to a total of 25,000 strong. To these in case of necessity it is understood that 30,000 more from this country will be added, bringing the whole force to a total of about 55, 000, which will be placed under the command of a general selected for South African experience. The expense of mobilisation and equipment for active service of such force will necessarily be considerable, and it may ho urged in some quarters that the strength to be employed is somewhat out of proportion to that of a State of which the total adult male population is only 48.Q00. It is the essential inconvenience of resorting to military measures for the settlement of questions involving the vindication of authority that a steam hammer must be set in operation for the oracking of a nut. TRANSVAAL INHABITANTS : THEIR NUMBER AND POLITICAL STATUS. The Staats Almanak (Transvaal State Almanac) for 1899 contains information as to the white population of the Transvaal, ■which is very instructive, and has a particular interest at the present moment. The burghers, both first and second Raad voters, according to the latest lists of the Field Cornets, published fn the Almanac, number: — Males from 18 to 34 years of age 15,G96 Maleßfrom 34 1050 years of age... 9,050 Maleß below 18 and over 50 years of age „. 4,533

29,270 This includes all males, and not merely, as " v often Buppnsed, heads of families. The Boer grandfather of 60, his son of 40, and his grandson of 16 (says the London Critic) are all burghers, and in one family there may be 10 or 20 burghsrs. Assuming, however, that within the census of 29,279 males only those of 16 years and upwards are comprised,, we can allow , a third additional, a most liberal allowance, for males under 16, and so have a gross male burgher population of 36,038. If we allow further that females are equal to the malea, we arrive at a total Boer population of 78,076 Proof that this eatimate ia most liberal as regards the burghers is to be found in the Blue Book C 7633 of 12th February, 1895, where her Majesty's agent in Pretoria, Sir Jacobus de Wet, after carefully acquiring all Boer figures, returns the Boers in 1894 at 69,333, all told. Turning again to the official almanac, we find the Government census of all whites ia the State to be :— Males 163,400 Females 122,350 Total 288,750 Deducting from this the estimated Boer population arrived at above .„ 78,076 We get an Outlander population of 210,674 That is, Outlunders are 74 pur cent, of the white inhabitants of the Transvaal and the Boers only 27 per cent. On the basis of the male population alone we gut the following result : — Government official estimalo of white males 166,400 Government official estimate of Boer males 16 years and upwards, plus a third for males under 16 39,038 Leaving aa Outlauder males of all ages 127,361 Equal to 77 per cent, of the total white male population. . The reul present position in the Transvaal then is that a section of the people, representing about a quarter of the white population, arrogate to themselves the exclusive privileges of taxing and exploiting tho whole of the inhabitants of the country for ever.

kimbebley's danoer. Last week we wero told by cable of the dispatch of infantry and artillery to Kimberley. The special jeopardy in which that place stauda is explained by "Rooinek" in the following paragraph in the Sydney Daily Telegraph :— ln the event of attack, Kimberley is in an exceptionally unfortunate position, and it must be admitted that it would be a perfectly legitimate object of Boer Imte. Mr Rhodes is tkei'r bete noir, and Kimberley is npw-a-days Mr Rhode's pet pocket borough. As chairman of the l)e Beers Consolidated Diamond Mines, ho controls the great diamond centre, and out of, say, the twenty millions sterling there invested, something like four millions may be taken to represent diamonds in hand, surface machinery, and buildings. In other words, a successful Boer raid on Kimborley would probably cost European capitalists four millions sterling. About twelve hundred white men and five thousand mixed natives are employed in the mines, and of the formor perhaps two hundred are volunteer members of the Diamond Kields' Horse. But the natural defences of Kimberley are absolutely nil, and a force of some three hundred insufficiently armed volunteers would have small chance of defending the place against a strong Boer riding party. The town is situated in tho Free State Border, iv a portion of Cape Colony known as Griqualand West, and on the main trunk line between the Cape and Mafek ing. It is about six hundred and fifty miles from Capetown, and stands on a rolling or undulating prairie, in tho midst of a considerable Dutch-Afrikander farming and pastoral population. In the event of war, a few men could easily tear up the railway lines, say, fifty miles below I Kimberley, and having thus prevented the rapid arrival of reinforcements, a Boer force might reduce the town and work untold mischief in a very few hours. Again, Kimberley district of itself does not produce enough food and forage to keep its population for two days out of the twelve months. Il lias hud hitherto to depend upon a Boer supply. Kven if astraiumilitary force hus already Icon hurried into the town it will be a diilirult t.isk to provision them oiiue war breaks out.

m.ui.'kim; and vkyiii'Ki;. At Vryburg, the capital of the British Protectorate, and Mafeking, on the Trims. vaal-Bechmuialand bonier, the position is not, perhaps, quite so bad as at Kimberley. They are admittedly nearer to llie Boer centre of operations— roughly, about 1,10 miles west of l'ictori.i-lmi stores and troops have been Imriii-il thither forwouk« past, and, in addition, theie are no great diamond mines to pillage and destroy.

Evidently, too, the Boers might count upon meeting with tough opposition in that vicinity. They have just lately finished a survey of this part of _ the hurdur, where, according to tho official report, waters and topographical features have been mapped out, and arrangements made for the establishment of hcliographic signal stations. Burghers have also been wurned not to send cattle into either the iMufeking or Vryburg markets, and, in retaliation, the export of cattle from Bechmmalaud has been prohibited. When tho last mail to hand left South Africa, great activity prevailed at both at Mafeking and Vryburg. Military stores were arriving daily, and being warehoused in premises specially acquired for the purposo. A number of Imperial officers had charge of arrangements, Lieu-tenant-Colonel Hoare being iv command, and Major Godfrey acting as adjutant. It was estimated that the regiment would be formed 500 strong, and equipped by September Ist. In order to prevent any possible friction with the Cape Colony Government, where the Dutch element is now in power under Mr W. P. Sclireiner, tho men were encamped, not at Mafeking, but seventeen miles north thereof, in the Protectorate. Major Vivian was in charge of [the camp. Towards tho end of August it was rumored that a strong force of Boers were in laager (or camp) about midway between Mafeking and Vryburg. It is possible, however, that this was merely a Boer meeting place, where the burghers foregathered under orders from their fieldcornets, Boers never laager unless when travelling, when holding a meeting of any sort, or when lying in wait for an enemy.