Patea & Waverley Press FRIDAY, JANUARY 14, 1921. VICTORY BUT FAILURE.

Patea Mail, Volume XLV, 14 January 1921, Page 2

Patea & Waverley Press FRIDAY, JANUARY 14, 1921. VICTORY BUT FAILURE.

The trouble that the Allies are having in regard to the enforcement of the Peace conditions agreed upon with Germany serve to point out clearly and unmistakeably the fact that the Allies should have entered Berlin, if only to impress upon the German people that they were a beaten nation, and must carry out the Peace terms agreed upon. As it was, thanks to the influence of the politicians and . others, the German troops were allowed to return to the Fatherland with their rifles in their hands, giving the German people the impression that they had never been defeated, and that the Allies were as anxious for a cessation of hostilities as the Germans themselves. Everyone knoAvs that had Germany triumphed the Avhole of the people of the civilised nations of the Avorld would have been compelled to pass beneath the yoke, and Avould have been made to feel the conqueror’s heel. From what has since been divulged, the German Peace conditions Avould have been unendurably harsh, and Avliat is more, would have been enforced by an armed force, for Avhich the conquered people Avould have been compelled to pay. The Allies, contrary to the. advice of their military leaders, \\ r ho Avere in the best position to advise, made the Peace terms Avith Germany not only far too lenient, but failed to provide for their enforcement by the presence of an armed force. As a consequence, the German authorities have set the Allies at defiance since the Peace Treaty Avas signed, and uoav the French GoAmrnment is talking of sending an expedition to the German capital to obtain fulfilment of the Peace conditions agreed upon. Had the Allies taken the adA’ice of Marshal Foch there is no doubt Germany Avould not have dared to play the game she is playing to-day. Speaking to a reporter recently Avith regard to the matter, Marshal Foch said:— “The peace that it Avas proposed to sign—l spoke of it to you at the time —seemed to me a . bad one. I summarised it in the Avords: ‘Neither frontiers nor pledges.’ For the safety of France the Rhine frontier Avas essential as a military frontier and not as a political frontier. As to the reparation due to France, I asked for the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine until the complete execution of the Treaty, because in my opinion that Avas the only means of obtaining reparation. In April—on the 7th, I'think—l succeeded in beingheard by the Ministerial Council. I had vainly asked to be heard by the French Peace Delegation, and had been refused. I remember well this Ministerial Council. I came there Avith M. Jules Cambon and M. Tardieu. As I had put my observations in Avriting 1 gave a copy to each Minister, and then spoke, deA r eloping my thesis —that if there were to be no guarantees there Avould be no security. M. Poincare supported me —the only one, I must admit. After that avc Avere asked to AvithdraAV, and on leaving I said

to M. Tardieu, in the presence of M. Jules Gambon: ‘There will, perhaps, come a clay when a High Court will judge ns because France will never understand why we allowed failure to come out of victory. On that day lam determined to appear with an easy conscience, and with my papers in order.” The Marshal goes on to say: ‘‘l made one more attempt at the plenary session of May 6, when the Allied Powers were handed the Treaty that had been concluded overnight. I once again stated my view. No one said a word, and the sitting rose. As we were takingtea in the next room I said to M. Clemenceaic: ‘I should like an answer.’ I saw him talk for a moment with animation with Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George. Then he returned and stated to me, ‘There is no reply.’ I answered: ‘M. le President, I am wondering whether I should go with you to-morrow to Versailles. I have the gravest question on my conscience in my existence. I repudiate the Treaty, and in sitting by you I am determined not to share the responsibility of it.’ M. Clemenceau was upset, and urged me to come. That evening he sent me M. Jean Dupuy, who spoke with real emotion. Then I argued: ‘The Allied Governments are appearing before the Germans to impose a Treaty on them. Is it possible that they can appear there without the leader of their armies? I have not* the right. It would be to weaken them before the .enemy.’ At Versailles I was beside M. Klotz, the Finance Minister. When the ceremony was over, I said to him, ‘With such a Treaty you can go the Treasury of the German Empire and be paid hi “monnaie de singe.” ’ M. Klotz replied bitterly to me, ‘That is not what I am used to.’ ‘You get used to it.’ 1 answered. Those were the people to whom I had said: ‘Make the peace you want and I will guarantee to impose it.” The pity of it is that Marshal Foch has not been given a free hand to see the conditions of the Peace Treaty carried out. _ As it is, the Allies gained the victory, but so far it appears to be a victory that is very near akin to failure.