BATTLE OF JUTLAND.

Otago Witness, Issue 3757, 16 March 1926, Page 15

BATTLE OF JUTLAND.

ADMIRAJi TIRPITZ’S CRITICISM. BRITISH ADMIRALS’ REPLIES. (Fbom Our Own Cohreßpondent.) LONDON, January 7. As an indication of its usual enterprise the Daily Express ha s induced Admiral von llrpitx to write a long article on the German naval policy during the war with special reference to the Bottle ot Jutland. It is a sober and reasoned expression of opinion, but several statements in regard to the British Navy have given rise to further comment, as no doubt they were intended to do. “Though the German Fleet,” writes Ad iniral von Tirpitz, “was numerically far inferior to tbe British in 1914-15. the German ships, taken singly, were superior, and the training of individual crews and the as a whole was, perhaps, better. This view does not detract from my high esti motion of the British naval officer, whom 1 have had many opportunities of meeting. During the Rattle of Jutland this superiority ot our? proved so effective that the British Admiralty were forced to effect a number of alterations to their ships in older-to prevent losses, such as, for instance. the blowmg up of the Queen Mary “When the German Fleet came out on May 31, 1916, the main object was not to bring about a battle—it had another purpose. Hie same may be said of the British Fleet. Tbe meeting of the two fleets in

battle «vas caused by chance arid was a surprise for both sides. As the German vanguard was too far ahead and had to fight with far superior forces, the admiral in command, Seheer, pressed forward with his fastest ships to relieve the German battle cruisers. As he had no news of the position of the British Grand Fleet, he struck it in rather an unfavourable formation. At the same time Admiral Jellicoe was not correctly informed by the admiral commanding bis battle cruisers. Con.-ideraLJe lime would have been lost il he had attempted to altei the formation of his ships. “As chances would have it the tactical position of the German Fleet was. because of its faulty formation, so unfavourable that alteration was unavoidable. 'lbis alteration was carried out under the fire of the British line of battle, without a hitch, by turning every single ship under cover of an attack by several flotillas of destroyers. ADMIRAL JELLICOE ACTED I CORRECTLY. “In considering the plans representing thia phase of the battle it may seem rather surprising that the enormous British fleet turned away when the German destroyers attacked, and thus lost sight of the German High S:as fleet. In my opinion, Admiral Jellicoe acted correctly. If he had turned into the torpedo attack he would have lost several battleships, and undoubtedly t .eral more would have been severely damaged. \/hen Admiral Seheer renewed his attack against the British fleet darkness ended the action. At this time the British fleet was south of the German and barred the way back to its harbours, so Seheer was forced to alter this situation, specially as he did not know whether his line of retreat would not be cut off by mines. He therefore broke through towards the south and expected the enemy at dawn north of Horn's Reef. But Admiral Jellicoe had passed the German fleet, steering west. He intended to avoid battle, as he had reason to fear the superiority of the German fleet in a . ’gilt engagement. So it happened that the German ships on their way south passed the British rearguard. That it was only the rearguard was not realised by the German command on account of Ihe darkness. When day broke nothing was to be seen of the British fleet. RESULT OF A DECISIVE BATTLE. “A decisive naval battle in the first two years of the war would have created the possibility of a peace of conciliation before the nations of Europe had been bled white and the hatred of the masses, fostered by the unheard-of sacrifices and ruthless propaganda, had reached such bitterness that the statesmen, in the exuberance of victory, forgot any regard for the interests of life on the Continent, a..d at the same time negle. ted the interests of their own people. This t ag3dy would have been prevented by a naval battle in the first year of the war." DEMAND FOR INQUIRY. Following upon Admiral von Tirpitz'a article, Vice-admiral Sir Cecil Lambert. K.C.8., who was Fourth Sea Lord at the time of tl Jutland battle, makes a demar .1 for a naval inquiry. In reviewing the German admiral’s statement he says* “The lack of success at Jutland was due mainly to the fact that, ship for ship, gun for gun, engine for engine, there was a higher standard of efficiency in the German fleet than any which the British fleet could claim. The great asset on wh.ch the British admiral could rely was the incomparable personnel ->f bis ships; otherwise it . as indeed a melancholy experience to find at the outbreak of war tuat all the public money which had beer. ~'i by Parliament on the assurance that they were getting the best that money ar.d science could provide had produced such meagre results. “If we look for the cause it is probable that the explanation would be found in the obsession for secrecy .. those expert departments which deal with the highly technical details of ships and armaments. Whatever tne cause, it was certainlyproved that the Geri 1 artillery and torpedo fire was of a higher standard than any with which we could reply to them. Our guns lacked range; our torpedoes lacked accuracy of fire and efficiency in detonation. Wireless had to be revolutionised after war was declared, and errors in ship construction remedied amid all the haste and expense inseparable from a war in progress.