DIVORCE

Otago Witness, Issue 3510, 21 June 1921, Page 15

DIVORCE

A PECULIAR CASE. . j W ELLINGTON, June 14. J he question of the application of section , 4 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Causdi 1 Amendment Act, 1920, were placed before Sir John Salmond at the Supreme Court tc-dav, when William George Lodder sought a dissolution of his marriage with Cecelia j Rutherford Lodder, for whom Mr Neave appeared, on the ground of desertion. The : , respondent admitted the allegations made i by the petitioner, and merely objected to the court’s exercising the discretion given it by the Act of 1920, consequently a jury was not called. Section 4 says it shall be lawful for tho court, in its discretion, | on the petition of either of the parties to a decree for judicial separation or to a j separation order made by a stipendiary ; magistrate, or by a resident magistrate, or tc a deed or agreement of separation, or separation by mutual consent, when such decree, order, deed, or agreement is in full force, and has go continued for not loss than three years, to pronounce a decree of dissolution cf marriage between the parties. In making P uch d cree. and in all proceedings incidental thereto the court shall have the same powers as it has in making the decree : of dissolution in the first instance. ; The petitioner stated that he was married to the respondent in Glasgow in 1882, and came to New Zealand shortly afterwards, i his wife fo’lowing him a year later. Thera ! were continual disagreements. In 1903 the | parties separated under a deed of separa- ; ticn. Under cross-examination petitioner admitted that much of the trouble had arisen . through his attention to another woman. | 1 At present lie had no intention of marrying j again. His salary, he said was £IO9O a ! : year. _ _ j Respondent, in giving evidence, admitted i the allegations made by the petitioner. She said that her married life had been happy, but some years before separation her husband commenced paying attention to another woman, to which she took offence. She had never given her husband cause for instituting divorce proceedings. Aloreover, she objected to divorce en religious grounds. She was willing to go hack to her husband should lie wish it. Since tho separation her husband had allowed her £l2O per annum, and had stipulated that she should live outside the Wellington district. ‘T think it is hard, that after 39 years of married life, I should be branded as a divorced woman.” said the respondent. “But you must, understand,” replied his Honor, “that as the law now stands divorce may be obtained without tho commission of any offence by either party, but simply because husband and wife have lived apart for a long time.” “That may be all right for young pepole,” replied the respondent, “but I have been 39 years married, and when I did marry nothing but adultery could break the marriage tie._ I have given rnv husband no cause to take divorce proceedings.” Mr Neave said he thought this was the first case in which proceedings under the section had been opposed. He contended that the court h’ad it entirely in its discretion to grant or refuse divorce under Ibis section. He submitted that the court should not exercise discretion against an unwilling party. There was no urgent reason why a decree should be pronounced, unless there was some valid ground of public policy for it. ITe suggested that the Act ore-supposed that both parties desired divorce. If one party objected the court should not exercise its discretion against it. A party ground of public policy would be the probability of the parties wishing to enter into further contracts to marry. Viewing their ages, there was little probability of either marrying again. An important ground was that of proprietary rights. The wife had certain statutory rights, and fn a ease where the husband had nroperfy this was to be considered. To divorce the respondent in this case would he to cut her off from her right to wha* might be a substantial estate. ITe submitted the court had not a proper reason for doing that. His Honor said it was obvious that if a divorce were granted some substantial provision would have to !,'e made for the wife, not only as a maintenance order, but as a charge against the husband s estate. Judgment V'as deferred.