THE SITUATION REVIEWED.

Otago Witness, Issue 3348, 15 May 1918, Page 15

THE SITUATION REVIEWED.

THE WEEK'S OPERATIONS. The following telegraphic review of military operations has been received by the Governor-General from the Secretary of State for the Colonies : Operations on the western front since the enemy's drastic re poise on the Lys sector on the 29th April, only minor operations have been carried out., namely : Before Locxo, westward of Morlaincourt, and the southward arm of the Ypres salient. All were repulsed heavily. Otherwise, apart from raids and local shelling of back areas, the week has been ominously quiet. The position now is that the Germans, determined to concentrate every available unit on one enormous offensive, are draining the country dry to force a decision before it is too late, while

the Entente are so confident that, given the choice of a small immediate American army for defence or waiting till they are reinforced by a complete, powerful, and American army, have chosen the latter. The sledge-hammer uses of masses by the enemy Allies are being opposed by the strategy of meeting the blow with the smallest force capable of standing up to the shock, while keeping the strongest reserve possible. Troops on the wings are permitted to give ground within limits whenever the enemy have been made to pay a greater price than the ground is worth, the Whole aim being to reduce the enemy to such exhaustion that the reserves at the right moment can restore the situation In the present operations the British have played the part on the wings, and have withstood many times their own weight of enemy masses and retired slowly, exacting the fullest price. Meanwhile General Foch holds the bulk, of the French in reserve, sending units only to points that are hard pressed. This strategy has been justified, in that in three weeks the enemy have been brougfit to a standstill without a single strategic objective being fulfilled, and their losses are so immense that their reserve is in danger of proving inadequate to their policy. The German commander, seeing how nearly he is to delivering himself to the Allied reserve, has been compelled to accept a temporary failure and call a halt. His position is tactically exposed in two dangerous salients on waterlogged ground. His countrymen are dangerously dissatisfied at the immense price paid for failure to terminate their sufferings. His allies are on the verge of ouarrelling daily ; and exhibit their growing dislike and distrust cf their taskmaster, who "robs them of their lives and food. His reserves are nearing complete exhaustion ; those of the Franco-British armies are still in being, while American preparations develop and time draws closer when defeat will be inevitable. Therefore he must renew the offensive. His preparations proceed feverishly, but as it takes months to properly organise such ah offensive he must be satisfied with Avhat he can do in weeks. We may, therefore expect a renewed furious onslaught before long, as the enemy command is so committed to strategical plan. We may await his main blow on the ArrasAmiens front, while necessity compels him to try and improve his position in the Lys sector. The Allies may have complete confidence in the result. For the enemy the issue is a desperate endeavour to avoid defeat; for the Allies the issue is only that of victory deferred. The coming battle may be a repetition of Verdun oh a larger scale, and if both sides be exhausted, the Allies have vast powers of recuperation, while Germany has drained her resources already.