ORDERING LIQUOR BY TELEGRAM.

Otago Witness, Issue 3212, 6 October 1915, Page 15

ORDERING LIQUOR BY TELEGRAM.

POLICE v. W. CROSSAN. TELEGRAPHIC ORDER INSUFFICIENT. Some time ago tho police proceeded against William Grossan, licensee of the Waterloo Hotel, on a charge of sending liquor into a no-license district without having a properly signed order. At the hearing tho facts were admitted, and the police contended that a telegram was not on order. Mr J. R. Bartholomew, S.M., before whom the case was hoard, delivered his reserved judgment in the City Police Court on Friday as follows: The transcript telegram produced set out tho name, occupation, and address of the sender. Mr Hay, for defendant, contended : (1) That tho transcript telegram was an order within the moaning of tho section. (2) That the defendant did not supply liquor intended to bo taken in by tho purchaser or his agent. (3) That the original telegram handed in at the telegraph office is a sufficient order. Mr Hay’s first contention is that tho order docs not require tho nsrsonal signature of the purchaser, and tliat tho Telegraph Department became the purchaser’s agent to eign at tho destination, and that the signature by such authorised agent is sufficient. In in re Whitby, 32 Ch. Div. 337, Bowen, L. J., stated: “In every case where a statute requires a particular document to be signed by a particular person it muct be a pure question on the construction of the etatuto whether tho signaure by tho agent is sufficient.” Counsel, in reply to tho court, submitted that any other agent could similarly sign on behalf of a purchaser. This contention is, of course, a logical corollary of counsel's argument on this head. Section 8 of the Act of 1914 must be construed in tho light of the earlier legislation. Under section 147 of “Tho Licensing Act, 19C8,” subsection (a), “every person who gives any order (whether verbal or in writing) for any liquor intended to bo sent or taken into tho district shall notify the person to whom tho order is given that tho liquor is intended to bo so sent or taken, and shall give to such last-mentioned person a statement in writing of his name and address, and (whore the order is given on account of any other person) tho name and address of such other person.” And subsection (o) (hi) states that “every person who, knowing that any liquor is being supplied in breach of this section, delivers such liquor to any resident of a no-licenso district, is guilty of an offence.” The whole object of section 8 of tho Act of 1914 is to make more stringent provisions regarding tho introduction of liquor into no-lieenso districts. It was. a common experience for liquor to bo ordered in fictitious names, and also for an unauthorised use to be made of tho names of residents in no-licenso districts. Now, by the Act of 1914, an order is required, signed by the purchaser, who is defined as tho person on whose account or to tho order of whom or to be delivered to whom liquor is taken into a no-license district, or from a railway station in a nolicense district. The whole trend of the legislation is to impose as complete a check or record as possible on liquor sent or taken into no-license districts, to identify tho actual purchaser, and to trace the liquor into his personal possession. Under tho . principal Act an agent ordering liquor had to give a statement in writing or his own name and address, as well as that of the purchaser. The 1914 Act requires an order signed by, and stating tho occupation and address of, the purchaser. If counsel’s contention is correct, the agent could eign for the purchaser without giving his own name and address, and the amending Act would be lees restrictive than tho principal Act, though its object is manifestly otherwise. In view of the history of tho legislation and the well-known abuses which were aimed at, I thing the intention of the statute is sufficiently clear, and can only be given effect to by giving tho words their natural meaning—i.o._. that there must be a personal signature by tho purchaser. Mr Hay’s further contention is that the oi-iginal telegram handed in at the Telegraph Office (of which tho transcript is prima facie evidence by virtue of section 141 of “ The Post and Telegraph Act, 1908 ”) is a sufficient order. The liquor was no doubt supplied in pursuance of the terms of such telegram. But section 3, in my opinion, requires something more. It enacts that liquor shall only bo supplied on and in pursuance of the terms of a signed order, and that all such orders shall be kept and filed by the supplier of the liquor. For liquor to bo supplied on a signed order which shall be filed by the vendor it is necessary for the original order to bo in the vendor’s hands. Otherwise he does not supply on the order but on tho telegram, which is only evidence of the order, nor is ho in a position to file- the order. Tho requirement of the section that all orders shall bo kept and filed sufficiently indicates that the section is to be read literally, and to supply liquor on a signed order is a different matter from supplying liquor on evidence that an order is in counsel’s argument were to be upheld it would follow that the original orders need never be in tho hands of the vendor, who would not bo guilty of supplying without tho necessary order provided that there was a proper order in existence, the contents of which had been communicated to him. Such an interpretation would do violence to the language and defeat the obvious intention of tho statute. Counsel’s further contcntion_ was that defendant did not supply liquor intended to be taken into tho district by the purchaser or his agent—that tho taking must bo by the purchaser or his agent. The expression “taken” is used in the various subsections of section 8, and subsection (1) defines “ purchaser ” as, inter alios, “any person to bo delivered to whom liquor is taken,” etc. The expression hero cannot refer to tho personal act of tho purchaser, but would bo applicable in tho case of all other persons. Similarly in other subsections all that the expression “ taken ” denotes is the physical removal of tho liquor. I can see no reason for putting a restrictive meaning on the expression in subsection (5), and am of opinion that it denotes the removal of the liquor into tho no-license district by whatever agency. Defendant will therefore bo

convicted on the charge of selling, but aa this is the first time the question has been raised, and defendant cannot be said to have acted unreasonably, he will be merely ordered to pay court costs. Mr Hay said that as the matter was of importance to the licensed victuallers, they desired to take it to the Supreme Court, and he would ask his Worship to fix th© security for costs.

His Worship fixed it at £lO 7s. Sub-inspector Broberg eaid that thcr© was another similar charge against the same defendant. Mr Hay and he had conferred, and ho would ask the court to allow that the other case stand over for four weeks.

His Worship asked if it was necessary to proceed any further with that other case in view of the decision.

The Sub-inspector: I prefer at this stage that it should stand over instead of being withdrawn.

His Worship: Very well; you are within your rights. Tha case is adjourned to the 15th October.