FRANCE AND ENGLAND IN ASIA.

Otago Witness, Issue 2045, 4 May 1893, Page 15

FRANCE AND ENGLAND IN ASIA.

It would be difficult to over-estimate the importance of the work by Philippe Lehault, "La France et l'Angleterre en Asie," the first volume of which has just seen the light (says the Westminster Gazette). Even the most superficial reader will see how thoroughly the author has mastered the subject, and that he has left no stone unturned to gain reliable information. His aim in so doing is to rouse France to a 'sense of England's gradually weakening hold upon India, and to insist upon the advisability of concerted action with Russia in driving her,back from her outposts, if not to oust her altogether from Asia. It is possible that M. Lehault is still under the influence of the Russophile wave which swept over France a short time since, and that with the "Tarasconnerie" which, according to Daudet, is a national trait, he exaggerates the importance of the French possessions in Cochin China; but, far as we are from being easily frightened by the Franco-Russian bogey, we cannot pass lightly over the serious tone of the warning and appeal to be found in this work, which, be it borne in mind, is written, not for us, but for Frenchmen. We cannot do better than give a few extracts, taken almost haphazard, from different parts of the work :—: — "During the campaign waged against the passing of tn~e Ilbert Bill in India, the following appeared in the native papers: — 'England thinks us unworthy; but what she does not recognise— and that is her great political mistake — is that the best rampart she can oppose to Russia in Afghanistan is the hearts of the whole Hindu race from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas.' The deed is now accomplished, and if ever, through a nobler inspiration, the British population in India were to make honourable amends for the scandalous outrage of political morals, the native Hindus would not be misled by such a tardy reparation. They are mistakes which cannot be repaired. That is why Russia in Central Asia, on the frontiers of Mongolia, of Manchuria, and the Corea, imitates the French in Algeria, in India, and Indo-China in pursuing a policy of assimilation which has already had happy results in Turkestan and Alghanistan. When it is found necessary to get rid of any obstacles, it will be Manchuria and Mongolia which, welded into one mass with the Savel element, will lend the supreme effort. Is not the simultaneous movement of, Russia, England, and France towards points not the same, but situated in the same political circumference, extremely eloquent? Russia is pushing her railway from Samarcand eastwards. England is about to extend hers to Mandalay towards the north-east, and France is laying down rails in Tonkin. But be it in the east, or north-east, or nortb-west, all the railways—Russian, English, and French— abut upon China. As in Europe, Russia and France have nothing to fear from e^ch other in Asia. But it would seem that their respective situations might one day weigh heavily in the balance of the destinies of that continent, and especially in China. Mr Neil, the representative of England at the Persian Court, wrote to his Government in 1838 : ' Should Herat fall, Russia will become mistress of the political and commercial destinies of Central Asia, for England, finding herself thrown back upon the Indus, Khiva, and Bokhara, will be forced to submit if attacked, whilst Persia and Afghanistan will already be in the power of Russia.' In epite of the resistance of Herat, the prophecy of Mr Neil has been fulfilled. Central Asia is in the power of Russia, Persia is its vassal, and we are asked with whom Afghanistan would side in case of a war between England and Russia. In my opinion, England will find itself doubly encumbered in Afghanistan, for the Indian army will have much to suffer from the climate and from difficulties of the soil, which will not terrify the Cossacks. On the other hand, it appears certain that Afghanistan will discount the future and choose the stronger of the two for her master, Russia having, in her eyes, the advantage over England, for the Afghans do not forget the forward march of the former and the retreat of the English after the defeat at Maiwand. . . . But it is probable that little will be done in the future by fighting. Russian push is stronger than powder."