THE NAVAL STRENGTH OF ENGLAND.

Otago Witness, Issue 803, 20 April 1867, Page 16

THE NAVAL STRENGTH OF ENGLAND.

The Telegraph compares the naval strength of England and Prance : England has afloat thirty effective vessels, and three building ; while France, with a total of fifty-nine ironclads of all sorts, Las an effective force of thirty-one afloat and thirteen building. Bat since four of our eighteen first-class armor - elads are only partially armoured, they are not a match for an equal number or the other lisc Moreover, the French are building four first-class ironclads to carry 7-inch armour, and to mount 10-inch rifled guns ; and these are to be at sea in 1870, or sooner if required. We are building two,, and contemplating a third, all of which might be ready in 1869. Consequently, in 1870, we should have twenty -one first-class ironclads, and France twenty. Further, while we have two second-class ironclads— the Pallas and the Favorite — the French have only one — the Belliqueuse. On the other hand, as we are building one and the French are building seven of this cla3s, surely prudence enjoins on us a proportionate increase by 1870. Our four turreted vessels undoubtedly are more than a match for double the number of French ships of the same class, and three or four others are fitter for general service ; ia short, we have a relative superiority in the particular kind of craft. But, on the whole, we are still inadequately supplied with ships wholly adapted for coast and harbor defence, and it is held desirable to reinforce this section by at least four-turreted vessels by 1870. Our great rivers are now undefended, and these are vulnerable points which, if most easily assailable by ironclads, are most easily defensible by that real floating battery, the turreted man-of-war. Such being the relation in which we stand to France, and such our slight superiority, it follows that the weakest Power in Europe combined with France woutd turn the scale the other way, and there are several Powers whose ironclad fleets are by no means contemptible. On the friendliness of France we may safely count. Still we should be dependent on no State for security ; we should trust to our own arm, and to it alone. But no such trust is possible so long as we are not prepared for a state of things that, in* the present critical state of Europe, may happen at no distant day. As a naval power, England is not where she was even ten years ago. Whatever party holds office, this grievous defect in our position must be repaired, or shall we court disaster ; and the Admiraltty itself might, at least in great part, furnish the reparation by a process of retrenchment and by rigorously economical administration.