THE PROPOSED IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

Otago Witness, Issue 801, 6 April 1867, Page 9

THE PROPOSED IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

-,«. Mr > ■ -.{Saturday Reuiexe.~) . America is passing through a revolution r -«f Which the Confederate war was but the first! Stage. Political philosophy might have r foreseen from a very early period the almost inevitable necessity of such a revolution • "but the.framers of the Constitution were not political philosophers. Partly tp.aypid dissensions in their own body, and .partly perhaps because they did not discern the Vast practical consequences that turned pn the point they left unsettled, they forbore to determine in express words where that, sovereignty w^s to reside, which in .every 1 political society must have a fixed place, or must find one. It may be that they left this -undetermined in words because, if they had determined it, they must have acted in opposition to their own views and hope?. The majority of the statesmen of the^War of Independence were strong Federalists, as the word wa9 then used in America ; that is, they desired as much as possible to render the Union a nation, and -the States' municipalities. But the great .majority of the people were Republicans, or State.-rightß partisans; they were attached each to the independence and dignity of his own State, and utterly averse to any act which would merge the State in ■ a larger community. It was necessary, therefore, to leave the States in possession of the sovereignty they were re - solved to keep. Any open encroachment -thereon would have ensured the rejection of the Constitution by Virginia herself, then tbe first State in the Union, and, consequently, its total failure. But the Contention avoided an express recognition of State" sovereignty; and, by exacting an oath of allegiance to the Union, and by some ambiguous measures — such as the provision made for indefinite amendments i of tbe Constitution— did their best to I imply that there was a power to which the several States owed an unlimited obedience. Virginia dimly discerned the danger, and formally reserved the right of secession. But from the first the Union contained the seeds of revolution. A conflict between State-rights' and Federal power was ultimately certain. But that conflict might have been praduil, peaceful, political, and have €nded in a general acquiescence in the Federal sovereignty. This was probably what the Fedtralists expected. That it did not so happen was due to two changes which they did not foresee — the vast expansion of the Union, and the sectional division between North and South. The new States of the North had none of the o'.d traditional State feeling ; and Federalism became the faith of this section tbe more easily, because it was the stronger in the Federal Government. The new Southern States, for •various reasons, acquired all the old State pride and passion of Virginia and Scuth Carolina. Thus the contest between Federalism and State sovereignty was identified with a geographical' line of separation, as well as vcith a difference of social character and economical interests ; and the prevalence oi either, when their rivalry was brought to an issue, could only be decided by the sword. Not peacefully and gradually, but by sudden violence, the revolution was accomplished, and the sovereignty claimed by the States was transferred to tbe Union. But another question of the same character remained to be settled, and has been brought to a crisis by the circumstances attending tbe settlement of the former. In whom, is the Federal sovereignty vested ? During the war, large usurpations were made both by Congress and by the Executive ; the issue of the war left the usurped powers in their hands, and a difference of policy, radical and irreconcileable, soon brought them to a struggle for tbe division of those powers. The President used his executive power to reconstruct the Governments of the Southern States. Congress claims the right -to undertake the same office in virtue of its legislative authority. The Constitution as clearly refuses such power to Congress as it refused to the President the authority tvhidh be has exercised by right of conjquest. But the President's course has been to restore the Constitutional system, and the illegal acts which he baa done are pa3t and gone, and have been constitutionally ratified. He therefore stands on a present basis of constitutional right; while Congress^ is acting in formal defiance of the Constitution, and seems inclined, according to the latest accounts, to set the Constitution aside altogether, and to assert ' for itself the omnipotence of a British Parliament— the right of alteriag ali „ -laws, whether fundamental or incidental, . whether pare of the oiiginal compact of Union or mere measures of Congressional legislation, by a simple majority of both ■Houses. Unquestionably, it cannot legally •do this;' and legal means of _ preventing it are provided by the Constitution-, It is tbe duty of tbe Judiciary, and particularly of the Supreme Court, to set aside all Acts of Congress which directly or indirectly infringe any clause of the Constitution, and ■declare them "null and vqid. But who -shall guard the guardians ef the fuuda-

mental law?- Who imn-~entrare that [the Supreme Court wirY do its^draty? It may be packed with-partisans ; and, in fact, ftne of the most violent "of the Radical leaders has been placed at, its. head.. - Congress probably knows ..that it has no check to fear from this quarter; ; . , ,<, A much more serious impedhnent to the meditated usurpation of , tbe Federal Legislature is the independent status of the President. So long as the Executive re* mains, as at present, a power wholly apart from Congress, able under certain circumstances to control it, but-liable to no control within bis own department, .Congress cannot hope to seize the sovereign power at which it aims.. And, it is' this aspect of the relations .between the co-ordinate au- j thorities, rather than the incidental divergence of their views on the questions I immediately in hand concerning the future government of the, South, which gives so grave an import to the threat of impeachment which has of late* been frequently uttered by the chiefs ofthe dominant part3 r . The impeachment of Mr Johnson would be the accomplishment of .a . revolution in the Federal Government, not lefs fundamental than that effected in the balance of power between that Government and the States by tbe overthrow of the Confederacy. Mr Johnson is not really accused of treason or malfeasance,. of dishonesty or incompetence. His ' worst enemies do not really doubt that tie has dmje his best for tbe public interests -of the Union, according to his own views. . The charges againt him, correctly estimated, amount simply to this — that in the exercise of his executive power he has set at nought the wishes of Congress, and acted upon bis own judgment ; that he has carried" out his own policy, and not the policy of a majority of the two Houses. And it is plain, not only that an impeachment on such a ground as this would be a gross abuse of a remedy intended for a very different purpose, but that it would totally alter the existing relations between the Executive and tbe Legislature, and subvert the present Constitution of the Federal Government.

The position of the President differs not more in form than in essence from that of a constitutional monarch and from that of a party Prime Minister. He is not, like the former, a personage invested with dignity rather than with authority, the depositary of powers which others are to exercise. He i?, on tbe contrary, 3D actual and very powerful ruler, invested for a short time with an authority which is thus limited in duration precisely because it is so extensive while it lasts. He does cot act through his Ministers ; he is not represented by them. They are truly his servants and subordinates, as were the Ministers of Henry VI LI, or as are those cf Napoleon 111. He, and he alone, is answerable for what they do. He may take their advice or neglect it, he may be guided by them or govern them, but his acts are essentially hi?, and not theirs. In tbis respect he is rather a first or sole Minister than a King. But he j differs from the Minister cf a constitutional j monarchy in this— that he exercises an independent and .personal authority, neither derived nominally from a Sovtreign nor really f»om a Parliament. He is not the servant of Congress, but the representative of the Union. • He embodies ! the executive authority, as Congress does the legislative, of both States and people. Like tbe Senate, he represents the former ; like the House, the latter. Tbe mode of his election not only symbolizes but ensures the independence of his position ; for only he, as directly as Congress, represent* tne nation he rules. He owes no fealty to Congress, nor again, has be any recognised influence over it. In a Parliamentary system, the executive and legislative functions are closely blended ; it is the function of the Legislature to control snd change the Executive, and of tbe Executive to guide the deliberations and initiate the measures of the Legislature. The American system | separates the two powers entirely. The President has, indeed, a veto on the Acts of Congress ; but a two- thirds majority can overrule that veto. He has no voice in its deliberations. His Ministers cannot sit in either House. For the legislation of the country the President is inno degree responsible. So, again, Congress has nothing to do with tbe Administration, if we except the concurrence of the Senate required to confirm appointments aud treaties, and the reservation to Congress of the right of declaring war. The Ministers of the President cannot be called .to account in Congress ; they cannot be questioned there ; they cannot i' efend or exolain their acts; and, therefore, it does not lie within the range of Congressional functions to approve or to censure their, policy. Indeed, votes of censure have before now been treated by the President as an encroachment and an offence. In short, instead of making tbe concurrence of the two Powers essential to both, and securing it by an intimate connection between the Minister and the Parliamentary majority, the American Constitution studies in every way to keep the President and Congress— I the Administration and the Legislature — J

apart and tndependerit,* that neither may have a chance ~fiT becoming absolute { it being" tbe' purpose' of the ' Convention which created tbe Union -to guard as much against the despotism of an assembly as against that of an individual . Thia purppse would be, finally defeated if President , jojmson were v successfully impeached and deposed on the ground that he has followed a policy, opposite to that of Congress. Such a precedent Wduld establish, once for all, the rule that the Administration is dependent on" the Legislature, and must either'change its feourse pr resign upon a vote of' censure. , In other words, the American j Constitution would be assimilated to 1 that |pf England, with two important and most inconvenient differences — first, that there would be no irresponsible, and irremovable head of the Government, free from political disputes^nd liabilities/to check the violence of faction, to preyent.an ißterregnum, and preserve the formal unity of 1 the Government ; secondly, that as Ministers have no seat in Congress, they .would -be, tried and condemned in their absence, and without the opportunity of self-defence, Thus the-eondemnation would often fail to carry public opinion with it ; and Congress would control the Administration", without "in its turn being subject to the' influence and control exercised by,an English Ministry over the debates and votes of Parliament.

Even if these difficulties were avoided by a change in, the Constitution, there are other and more radical reasons why a system w.hich has .worked admirably in England should not be hastily substituted for one, in itself inferior, which has been lonp established in America. It has yet to be seen whether Parliamentary Government is compatible with democracy. It is very certain that its success among • ourselves has been facilitated in great measure by the non- democratic elements in our electoral system. The corruptions now so notorious in« Congress, would acquire increased force and increased power of mischief if the purcbaseable members controlled the administration as well as the legislation of the country ; if, besides printing jobs, railway jobs, and contracts, they conld influence all the vast patronage ofthe Executive. And, judged by its past history, the House of Representatives appears very unfit to be trusted with powers that may safely be vested in our House of Commons. The vote of thanks to Admiral Wilkes ; the Morrill tariff passed on the instant that Secession gave the opportunity, in the hour of extreme danger to the country and extreme need for unselfish conciliation ; the scenes daily recorded in the newspapers ; the honours paid to the Fenians ; the ascendency of a man like Butler : these are facts that augur ill for the fitness of the popular branch of Congress to become the governing power in the Union.

To abuse laws directed against "political crimes in order to punish political opposition, to construe unsuccessful resistance to a majority as treason, and to visit difference of opinion with ,the penalties of maladministration or malfeasance, has ever been the temptation of -men. engazed in the stormy conflict of a period of revolution. Impeachment, in particular, is a weapon which in our own history has often been abused, not to punish the crimes, but to effect or complete the ruin, of an ob noxious statesman, But the authors of that abu'e had an excuse which American Radic ds cannot plead ; for no legal and written definition confined the use of impeachment to any particular class of political misdeeds, and it might seem as fairly applicable to heinous errors as to actual crimes. But the Federal Constitution has explicitly made known the purpose for which this formidable weapon may be drawn. It was never meant to enable Congre-s to get rid of a political opponent. Had it been intended that Congress should be able -to remove a President for political reasons, a machinery less cumbrous aud less cruel would have been supplied. The purpose of the iramers of the Constitution was, as we have seen, that the President should be equal to and independent of Congress. But it was necessary to provide some power of punishing and removing a-criminal, a traitor, or a madman. That power was provided in tbe form of a political prosecution involving penalties, in the belief that public opinion and a sense of right would prevent its being turned to the use. of party, or employed to get rid of an unpopular but honest chief magistrate. The pow'-r of prosecuting was natura'ly vested in the House of Representatives, both from English precedents, and because it could be vested in no other body equally able to act and equally popular. At the same time, the iramers of the Constitution expected that that House would bear "a much closer likeness to the House of Commons than it does. The duty of trial" was entrusted to the Senate, probably because the Supreme Court is filled up by the nomination ofthe President: But Washington and his contemporaries fancied that the Senate would always consist of grave and eminent statesmen, whose ' honor' and wisdom would alike prevent their convicting

of* misconduct in office ' one whose real offence waa only that of differing front them. The impeachment of Mr Johneon for agreeing in policy mth the nine ia every 4 twenty Northerners Who are ' Conservative, rather than witH the- eleven: Radicals, would' be a monstrous and palpable departure from the spirit and intention of the law which provided this extreme remedy for an extreme danger. The unconstitutionality would rally all Conservatives round the President ; the personal injustice would restore to him the nupporfc of many who have lost the old American reverence for the Constitution, And it would at the same time drive the South to desperation, and Mr Johnson to extremities. He could then only save bimself- by taking up the position that the present Congress is illegal and its acts. invalid; that is, by engaging in civil war. Toforce the chief magistrate into that position,, at the same time that they put iiim almost in the right before the people by their .excessive bitterness against nira, would be a policy hardly congenial to' the prudence of the more experienced leaders of the cal party, howeve.r agreeable it might be to, the savage, temper of General Butler. The division on the reading of the message | has already shown that a certain section of the party is indisposed to violent measures ; and it is to be hoped that the threat of impeachment will prove as empty as that of assassination, more" than once insinuated from the Mess and pulpits of the extreme Republicans.

Steam Power on Highland , Roads. — The steam-engine has penetrated into the very midst of the' splendid Highland forests of Aberdeenshire, apd has given a new sensation to the qut-of-the-way dwellers ia the upper straths of Deeside. The extension of the Deeside Railway past the confines of the Royal Palace at' Balmoral, andL on to Braemar, having for various reason* been last year departed from, and the terminal station fixed at Ballater, Messrs Richard Cormon and Co., shipowners and wood merchants, Aberdeen, determined to make the experiment of bringing Ehe produce of a large extent of the overgrown, forest of Invercauld, of which they had become purchasers, to the railway by means of steam along tbe turnpike. The idea was quite a novelty in the district — traction engine power as applied to labor on the common roads being unknown, in the north of Scotland. Securing one of the fine 10- horse power engines of Messrs Aveling and Porter, Rochester, which won the prize medal at the International Exhibition of 1862, Messrs Cormon and Co. commenced their experiment,, and have continued it every day since, and the result is a decided success. Within half an hour of starting, the engine, which has been very appropriately named the " Forester," ascended the hill- road of Craigendarroch, an ascent ef 1 in 16, with a burden of about ten tons with the utmost ea3e at a rate of two and ahalf miles per hour. On the level road the journey of 15 miles was made at a speed of from four to five miles per hour, not a hitch occurring tbe whole way. The coming of the eugine being known, the Highland dwellers along the route turned out in large numbers, and seemed alike surprised and pleased at the manner in which the "Forester" accomplished its work. It was feared that the noi3e ofthe engine would prove a serious, if not dangerous, obstacle to horse traffic; but the experience of the week has in a great measure dispelled this fear, and there is good reason to believe that the enterprise of Messrs Cormon and Co. will not only result in a large saving ia carriage expenditure, but "inaugurate a new era in. Scottish turnpike locomotion. It is a fact that until now this firm could import timber all the way from America at less cost as to carriage than they could bring it from Braernar. The "Forester," 'it is calculated, will easily draw loads of 2S to. 30 tons at a time.

At tbe late Impev' 1 Fete in France, a great number of works of art were distributed amongst tbe various local museums and galleries by the Imperial Gavernment. Many of these were purchased at the last Paris Exhibition, while others' are original works, or copies of the old masters, specially executed on commission for the purpose. The portrait painters received orders during the year for full or half-length portraits of the Emperor and Empress for 38 ' subprefectures, 34 hotels de ville, the Polytechnic School, and the Asylum at Chareaton. In addition to all these, pictures were presented to churches and cha'pe'ls-ia 52 departments in France. At a moderate calculation} therefore, the number ot works ordered or purchased by the government for public institutions during a single year could not have been far short of 300.

•lir-CHOiR Within. — We are assured by the editor of the Journal" tbufr thy reason whyv no cathedral is considered ■complete without a couple of dozea choristers in white aurplicas is, that , Jthere must alway* b* twenty-four sheets iv a quite) or place wheret they sing.