CHANGING DIPLOMACY

Otago Daily Times, Issue 23556, 20 July 1938, Page 12

CHANGING DIPLOMACY

PART IN WORLD AFFAIRS ADDRESS BY MR DOWNIE STEWART BRITAIN’S ATTITUDE TO LEAGUE DEFENDED “Diplomacy, Past and Present,” was a subject which gave Mr W. Downie Stewart scope for a comparison of methods of negotiation between the nations of the world and led him into a defence of Great Britain’s attitude towards the League of Nations in an address which he delivered to the Dunedin branch of the League of Nations Union last evening. The League could never realise its policy of collective security while there were so many great powers outside it. he emphasised. Dr E. N. Merrington presided over an attendance which filled the board room in the Public Trust Building. As world affairs become more complex and intricate year by year, diplomacy, or the art of conducting relations between Governments of independent States, became more and more important, Mr Stewart said. Hence the task of diplomatists, ambassadors and Ministers became constantly more onerous and the decisions arrived at more fateful and far-reaching to millions of people. The word “diplomacy ” was often loosely used. Some writers talked about French or German or British diplomacy when they were really discussing the foreign policies of those countries; but foreign policy was a statement of the aims and objectives of a country in its dealings with other States, and diplomacy, on the other hand, was the machinery or methods it adopted to give effect to that policy. With the growth of democracy and, more particularly, the coming into existence of the League of Nations, great changes had taken place in older methods of diplomacy. The League sought to create what was called a New Diplomacy, which was to be frank, open and carried on in public view. It was hoped thus to avoid the evils of secret treaties and the intrigue which was regarded as a sinister feature of the old diplomacy. To understand these great changes, Mr Stewart said, it was necessary to review earlier methods. According to Professor Mowat, there had been three great historical periods. The first lasted up to the c-oout the Renaissance, say, the 16th century. Before that, there were no organised permanent diplomatic missions, but merely occasional visits of special envoys to end a war or arrange a great dynastic marriage. Career Diplomatists With the rise of sovereign independent States, the way was ppened for the professional or career diplomatists. This period lasted down to the Great War, and even now those diplomatists played a part in world affairs. The third period began with the League of Nations, although even before that the work of the career diplomatist had often been done by Foreign Ministers or Prime Ministers at great, conferences. “ But the old diplomatists still plav a great part, as can be seen In the ambassadors and diplomats maintained by every great Power in all the capitals of the world,” he continued. “They form, or until lately formed, a highly exclusive profession, drawn usually from great aristocratic families, and, indeed, were at one time the direct personal representatives of the sovereign. They had A 0 be well educated, good linguists with a good social appearance, and they were required to have private incomes. In fact, they were a caste, and entry was by special nomination, not open to equal competition. This was altered in 1914.” Advantages of System For his present purpose, Mr Stewart said he could note only one or two of the advantages and defects of that system compared with the present-day method. First, diplomatists evolved a careful, set form of diplomatic language which enabled each country to put a precise value on everything said by a diplomatist, which was a great safeguard against hasty action or misunderstanding. Mr Stewart illustrated each of his points with historical references, the instance in this particular being President Monroe's famous message to Congress that his Government would regard the intervention of any European Power as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition to the United States. That message was well understood that ho would go to war if intervention occurred. Secondly, these diplomatists were trained to exercise the greatesi patience, self-restraint, and caution. As far as possible everything was done in writing, and after each interview each ambassador wrote down from memory a record of what had been said, and sometimes had it confirmed or initialled by his vis-a-vis. Needless to say, the diplomatist who kept his temper always had the advantage, and many amusing instances of this advantage were on record. The old diplomatists were able to take long views and maintain a steady purpose, and it was said that this policy was helpful in avoiding war, because othe r Governments came to know the fixed policy of a Government, and to take it into their calculations. Some writers argued that war was more probable when foreign affairs were directly controlled by popular assemblies liable to passionate and capricious changes, which bred fear and uncertainty. The old school was sceptical about the results of spectacular visits to foreign capitals by Ministers temporarily ’in office because those hectic visits were too often made in the full .glare of publicity, with bands playing and-endless banquets and much speechmaking. “ It was inevitable, however, that the old diplomacy was bound to make way for modern conditions,” Mr Stewart went on. “Nations naturally came to resent the idea that their destinies and welfare should be decided by negotiations of which they were entirely ignorant, and that secret treaties should be entered into which might commit them to wars of whose merits they knew nothing. Democracies justly demand to know what is being done. Even if they make mistakes and find themselves at war, they feel satisfied that their cause is just and right, and at least the result of their own decision It seems to have been the rule, however, for the old diplomatists to avoid war if at all possible, for war was a confession of failure, and usually meant for the diplomat instant dismissal and the end of a hard-earned career.” Influence of League of Nations The coming into existence of the League of Nations exercised a profound influence on this Old World diplomacy. The great ideal that President Wilson had in view was that the League of Nations should be a forum or clearing house at which all nations should meet to confer and discuss their common nroblems He anticipated that all nation? would become democratic, and he demanded open covenants openly arrived at. Diplomacy by conference had, of course, been used at intervals through the nineteenth century by the great Powers in what was known as the concert of Europe. It had also been used successfully by the Allied Powers during the Great War. President Wilson’s idea, which was also independently worked out by the British Foreign Office, met wdth ready support from war-weary nations. “ While popular opinion has almost wholly centred on the hopes of peace and security promised by the League of Nations, it is wise to .remember tha 1 - in the preamble diplomacy or consultation comes first as the primary ob ject to promote international co-opera-tion,” Mr Stewart said. But President Wilson’s hope that all nations would become democratic was, of course, not realised, and this had

had far-reaching effects in present-day diplomacy. Moreover, his dream that open diplomacy would replace the old secret diplomacy had only been partially feasible. President Wilson himself came to see that while the results of negotiations could be made public, the negotiations could seldom be treated in the same fashion. It was obvious that if a nation put forward its demands in public it was almost impossible to recede or compromise. President Wilson finally said that treaties should be made public after they had been negotiated, but that secrecy was indispensable in negotiating them. Harold Nicholson seemed to draw the proper line when he said that a nation’s foreign policy should be known to the world, but that the negotiations to apply it had to be carried on privately Attacks on Great Britain Turning to the diplomatic machinery of the League of Nations, Mr Stewart said that its methods of conference and the old diplomatic methods still co-existed. He discussed that machinery rather than the League’s policy of collective security sanctions, and restraint of an aggressor. It was true that public attention centred round the failure to prevent war in the Far East, in Abyssinia, and elsewhere, and it was over those breakdowns that the fiercest attacks were made on Britain’s foreign policy. She was denounced for tailing to take a firm stand, for not giving a lead, for abandoning the League covenant, and for adopting an attitude of resigned fatalism while her security was undermined It was often said that there was nothing wrong with the machinery of the League, that all that was required was that the nations. Britain in particular, should show more enthusiasm and faith in carrying out their obligations under the covenant. “ There has been a . constant stream of articles nearly all throwing the blame on Britain for the blow after blow that the League has suffered.” he continued. I believe that these constant accusations of vacillation and timidity against British statesmen have little justification if I am right in believing that it is the weakness of the League that is at fault. League diplomacy can never be strong and effective while its membership is so weak and while so many great Powers are outside the League If its diplomacy is inadequate, its policy of collective security must remain unattainable. The , enforcement of sanctions always involves the risk of war. and if there is war, there needs to be adequate strength.” To emphasise that Britain’s attitude towards the League had not been the result of recent panic or timidity, that it had not arisen from any craven willingness to submit to blackmail, he said that her present policy was laid down deliberately years before the Far Eastern crisis or the Abyssinian crisis was dreamt of. and that it was based not on any lack of faith in the ideals of the League, but on the fact that the League, as planned, had never come into being. President Wilson was the chief sponsor of the League. Yet America refused to join it, and it was significant that one of her chief reasons was that she objected to automatic obligations to use force to restrain an aggressor or to impose sanctions. Mr Stewart said he was not criticising that decision, but it came as a crushing blow to Britain. So also did America’s refusal to give a joint guarantee with Britain to use their Joint naval pov/er to blocade any aggressor in Europe. Both those events changed the entire situation because Britain had joined the League in the assured belief that America would be by her side in the new attempt to form a world authority for collective security.

Britain’s Change of Policy “ Britain now discovered that the League was not the League she had agreed to join.” he said. “ How could she use her sea-power to vindicate a decision of the League whose authority and very existence America refused to recognise and with whom in consequence she might be involved in a disastrous war?” No doubt Britain had the right to withdraw, but she decided to make the most of a bad situation in the hope that the League would grow. It was then, however, that the whole League policy was changed. It was then that she saw clearly that when any great power flouted the League, it would not be possible for the League with inadequate strength to restrain the aggressor. It was not under the reign of Baldwin or Chamberlain or after the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931 that she changed her policy. “As far back as 1925 she foresaw what must happen if a powerful aggressor challenged the League,” Mr Stewart said. “ She warned the League and the world, and her warning was clear and emphatic.” He quoted Lord Balfour’s statement as the key to many later events which have puzzled and dismayed believers in the League—" The League in its present shape is not the League designed by the framers of the Covenant. . . They never supposed that so many of the most powerful nations would be outside the circle of the League. Least of all did they see that one of them would be the United States of America. The League could be no guarantee of the security of its members aeainst an upheaval such as the Great War.” With ordinary misunderstandings. Lord Balfour said, the League was admirably fitted to deal; but to prevent wars arising from deep lying causes of hositility between great powerful states was beyond its strength. “Nothing could be clearer than that.” Mr Stewart said. League Machinery Inadequate The frequent statement that the League machinery was adequate if nations would only fulfil their covenant was therefore incorrect. It was far from adequate. Since then Germany, Italy, and Japan had left the League. To ask Britain to lead the League in restraint of one of those without the help of America, and with' possibly ail those great Powers against her,, was to ask her to commit suicide. Was Britain alone and unaided to seek to restrain Japan from seizing Manchuria, with the practical certainty of defeat in distant seas, while the League merely talked and oassed resolutions? Perhaps Sir John Simon was tactless in his attitude to Mr Stimson, but Mr Stewart said that the popular belief that Mr Stimson offered effective cooperation was a myth. The same sort of myth had grown up about the tragedy of Abyssinia. There, as usual. Britain got all the risk, and all the blame, and as Sir Samuel Hoare said, “ not another nation moved a man a gun. or a ship.” Both Mr Eden and Mr Chamberlain had repeatedly made it clear that while they still believed in the league, it was a fact that Britain could not in its present weak state commit their country to come to the aid of any and every country that was attacked She had to judge each case as it arose, and see what other nations would assist The League’s diplomacy and policy were closely related and both limited by the fact that the League as it was planned never came into existence Mr Stewart discussed the two schools of thought as to what should be done to remedy matters There was no other forum where national problems could be debated. If the League were restored as a centre of diplomacy and conference of all nations, it could achieve great results: but it could not be a world policeman while so many great Powers remained outside it It did appear that the League’s greatest value had been in educating public opinion on world affairs and on the need for peace. Diplomacy both at Geneva and elsewhere, had now to keen touch with democracy and all the currents of public opinion and that raised the immense question of how democratic opinion could be organised effectively to cope with the highly-mobilised activities of the totalitarian States and their steady encroachment. Power of Public Opinion “The chief ground for optimism.” he concluded, “ i.s this great and growing body of public opinion that the world can never be safe until the rule of law replaces the rule of force between nations as between individuals. In due time collective security will become a reality Public opinion is coming to realise tnat war is not merely a crime but the crime, the evil par excellence Public opinion is the greatest force in the world, and it will finally abolish war

as it has abolished duelling. In spite of all the slaughter in the East, in Spain, and elsewhere, a great authority like Sir Harold Nicholson has the confidence to say that more progress has been made toward the abolition of war in the last 15 years than in the preceding 500 years.” Mr Stewart answered several questions. and was thanked by acclamation on the motion of Mr Willi Fels