NAVAL RIVALRY

Otago Daily Times, Issue 21984, 20 June 1933, Page 6

NAVAL RIVALRY

The announcement last week of the intention of the United States to embark upon a 238 million dollar naval building programme might well have been regarded as a rather curious commentary upon the Disarmament Conference discussions as well as upon the official American attitude towards disarmament as an ideal. It is calculated to attract most attention, however’, in its promptly manifested repercussions. From Tokio already comes the intimation that “ in response to the American naval plans ” Japan has adopted a 440 million yen naval replenishment programme which is to be carried out, like that of the United States, in three years. The message goes on to state that the American aircraft carriers, two of which are projected, are regarded as a special menace. Clearly this readiness on the part of two great Powers to spend large sums on the strengthening of their navies spells competitive building, whatever else it signifies. The programmes may consist largely iri. the replacement of vessels that have become obsolete, and are presumably framed in conformity with the provisions and .stipulations of the Washington and London naval treaties. But the promptitude of the Japanese Government’s reply to the announce-

ment of the intention of the United States to build to the full capacity of her shipyards is indicative of a watchfulness on its part bom of suspicion and distrust. These rival programmes convey rather too plainly the suggestion that if there is to be a naval storm-centre in the future it is likely to be found in the Pacific rather than in the Atlantic. According to an American writer, unrestricted Pranco-Italian rivalry to-day sets the standard for Britain’s navy and, as a result,/or the American and Japanese fleets. The suggestion that the British navy is an incentive to heavy expenditure for the strengthening of the American and Japanese fleets is, of course, far-fetched in the light of the incomparably larger naval responsibilities of Great Britain and of the considerable and even dangerous leeway in respect of naval construction which British experts wish to see made up. Britain’s voluntary reduction of sea-power has apparently had only the effect of creating a fresh problem for herself. It might have been expected that an American decision to launch a new naval building programme would have waited upon a determination of the outcome of the attempt at Geneva to reach agreement upon a definite and universal scheme of fleet retrenchment.