GENESIS OF THE WAR

Otago Daily Times, Issue 18990, 11 October 1923, Page 8

GENESIS OF THE WAR

FIXING THE RESPONSIBILITY. ON THE EDGE OF THE PRECIPICE. By the Right Hon. 11. H. Asquith (Copyright. Rights of publication secured by the Otago Daily Times.) XXVIII. To fix the ultimate responsibility for the a-ar a study of the officially published diploaiatic correspondence is in itself still sufficient. The despatches reveal with a dramatic interest rarely attained by such papers the motives, emotions, and designs of the Central Powers which wore sweeping them, in spite of all the efforts of all the peace-makers, towards the catastrophe of which Sir Edward Grey warned the world. Blue-books are commonly supposed to bo dry as dust, but the note of impending tragedy running through this collection of diplomatic documents presented to Parliament at the time appeals to the deepest instincts of the reader. Considerable additions have since come to light to the Notes and despatches which rushed so rapidly across Europe and have filled in the pictures with fresh lights and shades. But they have left even less doubt than existed before as to the true apportionment of responsibility. Sir Edward Grey, ns soon as he learnt the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, initiated mediatory negotiations. The merits of the dispute between the two countries were not the concern of his Majesty’s Government. He “concerned himself with the matter simply and solely from tfie point of view of the peace of Europe.” To maintain peace was (he object on which he concentrated hi.s unswerving and unflagging efforts. He pursued it from first_ to last with unsurpassed patience and assiduity. Complaint was made in Berlin that the British Minister did nothing to localise the conflict. That was the professed object of Germany. Her demand implied nothing loss than that in future Austria alone was to have any effective say in the Balkans. Russia was faced with the alternative either to submit, as she had submitted two years before, or to prevent the subjugation of a State in whose interests she was intimately concerned. If she intervened by arms she was to be resisted by Austria's ally. Bcthmann-Hollwegg has since alleged that Germany “earnestly advocated in Vienna the acceptance of the mediation desired by Grey, and in spite of the strongest pressure failed.” Kautsky. after his examination of the documents in the Berlin Foreign Office, asserts that “Austria rejected all mediation proposals that were made, none of which emanated from Germany. The latter was satisfied with simply transmitting the proposals of others, or else refusing them at the very outset as incompatible with Austria’s independence. Even the most urgent questioning could not lure a proposal from her, whilst England and Russia vied with each other in trying to find a way out of the muddle.” Szogyeny, the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphs to Berchtold; _ “State Secretary declared to me explicitly in strict confidence that England’s proposals for mediation would very shortly be brought to the cognisance of your Excellency by the German Government. The German Government most exolicity states that it in no wav identifies itself with these proposals, is "even decidedly against their consideration, and transmits them only in deference to the request of England.” Once more the aged Ambassador, at a later date and when the war was in progress. was given the lie. Bethmann-Holl-weg and Jagow both declared to a commission that his despatch could not possibly bo correct. This is on a par with thoir repudiation of his account of tho Kaiser's reply to the Emperor Francis Joseph’s letter of July 5. _ Whatever may fiave been his age and his infirmities, there s no reason to believe that he was incapable of understanding what was said to nim on the most vital affairs, still less that he was capable of inventing what was deliberately untrue. SOMEBODY LIED. The negotiations, so familiar to most readers, require only a brief outline. On July 24, the day after the Austrian ultimatum was delivered, Sir Edward Grey put forward the suggestion that the four Powers —Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain —nono of which had direct interests in Serbia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg. Next day Lichnowsky expressed himself as personally favourable to mediation, and Jagow stated in Berlin that if tho relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with the proposal that the four' Powers should work “in favour of moderation.” . On tho 26th, after the Austrian Minister had left Belgrade, and our Ambassador at i Vienna had reported that was was thought to he imminent. Sir E. Grey went a step further and proposed that the representatives of the four Powers should meet in London immediately for the purpose of devising means for preventing further complication. France and Italy promptly agreed, and Sazonoff, on behalf of Russia, intimated that, if direct explanations with Vienna were to prove impossible, he was ready to accept this or any other method that would bring about a peaceable solution. The situation was not in itself more difficult, nor did it seem —after the Serbian reply on July 24 to the Austrian ultimatum, in which every essential point was conceded —less susceptible of .accommodation, than that which had been_ successfully handled bv similar procedure in 1912-15. The German Ambassador assured Sir E. Grey on the 27th that his Government accepted “in principle” mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. Either ho was misinformed as to tho real attitude of tho Gorman Government or a sudden change came over the atmosphere in Berjin. For the same day Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador there, telegraphed to Grey: “Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration, and could not, in his opinion, bo called together except at tho request of Austria and Russia. He could not, therefore, fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace.” Bethmann-Hollweg writes in his hook; “Tho French take the view that after the Kaiser’s return (on Monday, the 27th) there was a change for the worse in tone. _ I saw nothing of the kind, though I was in constant personal touch with the Kaiser. Quito tho reverse. lie would not hear of any step being omitted that might be conducive to peace. Our strong pressure on Vienna corresponded with his innermost conviction.” . , Ihis presentation of the Kaisers attitude is completely at variance with the contemporary documents. On Lichnowsky’s report of Sir E. Grey’s suggestion that tho four Powers should undertake negotiation between Russia and Austria, the Emperor wrote: “This is superfluous;, as Austria has already made matters clear to Russia, and Grey can propose nothing else. I am not intervening—only if Austria expressly asks mo to, which is not probable. One does not consult others in matters of honour and vital questions.” According to Bethmann-Hollweg’s own argument, tho proposal for an Ambassadors’ Conference was “an attempt of the Triple Entente to bring tho dispute before tho tribunal of Europe or rather before that ot the Entente.” Every possible endeavour was made by Sir E. Grey to dispel any such misapprehension or misrepresentation of ■ the proposal and to commend it to Austria’s ally, whose co-operation he considered essential. Tho conference, ho explained. “would not he an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to he acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective Allies.” GERMANY REFUSES TO “PRESS THE BUTTON.” The idea of a conference was temporarily kept in reserve while an effort —encouraged by Sir E. Grey, who urged that Austria, should not meantime precipitate military action -was made to promote direct negotiations between Austria and Russia. Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers on tho merits of tho dispute between herself and Serbia, and in this uncompromising attitude she was, to say the least, not discouraged by Germany’s apologetic manner of transmitting Grey’s suggestionfl and inviting her views on Sazonof’a

desire for direct negotiation, “If vye reject every mediatory movement,’’ said the Chancellor in a telegram to Tschirsckv, “it will have the effect of making impossible our position in the country where wo must appear in the light of having the war forced on us.’’ It seemed for a moment as though direct conversations with Russia might be less disagreeable to Austria than European intervention. but the proposal came to nothing. The suggestion of the Russian Government that the means of the conflict should be discussed between Sazonof and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg was, in fact, declined by Vienna on tlio 28th. Austria refused to delay her military action. She declared war on Serbia on the same day (the 28th), and immediately thereafter began to bombard Belgrade.. Her despatch of troops to the front was followed by mobilisation by Russia in her four southern conscriptions. Information of this partial mobilisation was given in pacific and frank terms to Germany. it was directed only against Austria, and was intended, as the Czar’s representative at Vienna informed Sir M. de Bunsen, as a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Serbia. Proposals for mediation by the four Powers were therefore at once _ resumed by Sir E. Grey, and pressed in every available quarter with the utmost urgency. Ho was ready, as he informed Berlin on the 23th, to propose that the German Secretary of Slate should suggest the lines on which the principle of mediation should h'' applied. "iho whole idea of mediation or mediating influence,’’ ho said in a telegram to our Ambassador on the 29th, “was ready to be put into operation bv any method that Germany could suggest, if mine was not acceptable.’’ In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation “bv any method that Germany thought possible if only Germane would ‘press the button’ in the interests of peace.’’ His offers, suggestions. and appeals, fully supported by France, were fruitless. Bethmann-Hollweg has asserted that Germany “could not. save peace because St. Petersburg was recalcitrant. And St. Petersburg refused because England did not curb its bellicosity.” Not only did England endeavour to curb bellicosity wherever her influence could reach, but Russia continued to express her own desire for peace if that could bo secured consistently with her duty and interests. Sazonof stated on the 29th that any arrangements approved by France and England for a conference would bo acceptable to him. “and ho did not care what form such conversations took.” “Down to the last moment.” ho assured the French Ambassador on the 50th, “I will negotiate.” BERLIN HURRIES THE WAR ON IF ONLY THERE HAD BEEN A DELAY! XXIX. A remarkable letter, published after the war in the Deutsche Politik, was addressed by the Kaiser to Betbmann-Holl-weg on tlio 28th July, 1914. The Kaiser practically admitted that, with the Serbian capitulation, every reason for war fell to the ground; but ho went on to say that, in order that the fine promises and undertakings of the Serbs might bo made good, it would be necessary for Austria to exercise a douce violence by a temporaril} - military occupation of a part of their country. 'This, ho held, was also, necessary in order to afford the army an external satisfaction d’honneur which he declared to be “a preliminary condition of my mediation.” This was the man who has subsequently represented himself as a mediator whose efforts had been frustrated. The sentiment expressed by the Kaiser was shared by the German Chancellor. On the 29th he informed Sir Edward Goschen that he had despatched a message to Vienna, in which “he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Serbian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure, guarantees that Serbia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience.” Ho advised them, however, to speak openly in the sense, already conveyed to Russia, that they had no territorial designs. On this point Sir E. Grey’s comment to the Austrian Ambassador was that it would he quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Serbia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal State. "It had, of course,” as Lichnowsky subsequently wrote, “needed but a hint from Berlin to induce Count Berchtold to be satisfied with a diplomatic success. But this hint was not given. On the contrary, the war was hurried on.” (It was urged on hv the advice of the Kaiser and the Chancellor with regard to the necessity of guarantees.) Lichnowsky recorded that "the impression is becoming more and more firmly established that wo wanted the war in any circumstances. No other interpretation could be placed upon our attitude in a question that did not concern us directly at all. The earnest pleadings and definite declarations of M. Sazonof, later on the positively humble telegrams of the Czar, Sir Edward Grey’s repeated proposals, the warnings of the Marquis San Giuliano, and Signor Bollati, my urgent advice —all wore useless.” RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA MOBILISE. The attempt personally to influence the Czar was, according to Bethmann-Hollweg’s book, the consequence of the Kaiser’s own initiative in his telegram of the 29th. It has been shown, however, that before the Kaiser’s telegram—although prepared two or three hours earlier —was despatched from Berlin early in the morning of the 29th, a telegram had arrived from the Czar, imploring William, in the name of their old friendship, to prevent his ally from going- too far. The Kaiser’s telegram was to the effect that if Russia mobilised against Austria his position as mediator would become impossible. Nicholas replied that the military measures put into operation by Russia were taken solely by way of defence against Austria’s preparations. He suggested the submission of the Austro-Serbian dispute to The Hague Conference, but the Chancellor telegraphed to the German Ambassador that that would bo out of -the question. Prom the exchange of telegrams, as the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg stated, the Czar had received the impression that Germany did_ not wish to pronounce at Vienna the decisive word which would safeguard I peace. i On the 30th there were symptoms of a | momentary detente, and Germany seemed ' at last to be disposed to tender conciliatory I advice. Perhaps she was influenced by the ! warning, given by Sir E. Grey io LichS nowsky. that Germany must not count upon j Groat Britain standing aside in all circum- : stances. “Faced with a conflagration in which England might go against them, and, according to all indications, Italy and Rumania not with them,” the Gorman Government represented to Vienna the danger of the refusal of any interchange of opinion with St. Petersburg. The Austrian Cabinet, while refraining from going into the merits of the English proposal, decided to “show complaisance in the form of its reply.” Another telegram from Bethmann-Hollweg was sent off on the evening of the 30th urgently recommending Austria to accept Grey's proposal; otherwise it would he hardly possible any longer to shift the guilt of the conflagration on to Russia. ’JTiis telegram was, however, cancelled. There were, as this momentary wavering shows, two currents of influence at Berlin, the polilica! and the military. “Two coni Aiding tendencies,” says K.-mtsky, “were lighting for the decision which depended on the unstable Kaiser.” As the lender-secre-tary of State informed an ambassador, the military authorities worn very anxious that mobilisation should be ordered, because delay made Germany lose some of her advantages. Early on the morning of the 30th the Gorman Ambassador at St. Petersburg had an interview with the Foreign Minister, and “completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable.” He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which ho could telegraph to his Government, as a last hope, and M. Saznnof drew up a conciliatory formula as follows; “If Austria, recognising that her conflict ■nlfh Serbia has assumed (ho character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready In eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Serbia. Russia engages to slop all military preparations.” The same day Sir E. Grey suggested that if the Austrian advance were stopped after the. occupation of Belgrade, he thought the Russian Minister’s formula might ho changed io read, that the Powers would examine how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Serbian sovereign right or independence. The formula was amended in accordance with this proposal. On Julv 31 Russia and Austria mobilised against ear-h other. Conflicting statements were issued ns to which Power took the first step in substituting general for partial mobilisation. Austria, according to her

intimation, was “compelled to respond” to Russian action. Chi tho other hand, tho Russian order was described at SI. Petersburg “as a result of tho general mobilisation of Austria and of tho measures for mobilisation taken secretly, hut continuously, by Germany, for the last six days.” Bethmann-Hollweg has asserted that tho statement regarding German measures was an invention. Secret mobilisation, ho says, was out of the question in Germany. An extra edition of the Berlin Lokal Anzeiger on the 30th “falsely” reported that tho German army had been mobilised. “So far a.s could bo ascertained from tho official inquiry that was at once instituted, it appeared that employees of this paper had been instigated by quite unconscionable excess of professional zeal.” A curious explanation. GERMANY’S ULTIMATUM TO RUSSIA. On tho eve of the war the tension between R ussia and Germany was much greater than between Austria and Russia, “As between the latter,” wrote our Ambassador at Vienna, “an arrangement seemed almost in sight.” On tho evening of tho 51st tho Austrian Ambassador in Paris announced that his Government had officially advised Russia that it had no territorial ambition and that it would not touch the sovereignty of the State of Serbia. Discussions, as Sir E. Grey learned with great satisfaction, were being resumed between Vienna and St. Petersburg. He still believed “that it might be. possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can bo gained before any great Power begins war.” Austria, at any rate, was apparently anxious to remove the impression that she had banged the door on compromise or on conversations. “Unfortunately,” as Sir hi. de Bunsen wrote, “these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia, Germany intervened by means of her double ultimatum to St. Petersburg and Paris, Meantime there was a final exchange of telegrams between the Czar and the Kaiser. In a telegram on the 31st the Czar gave his solemn word that as long as the negotiations continued his troops would undertake no provocative action. This message crossed one from tho Kaiser, who said it rested in the hand of the Czar by discontinuing military preparation to avert the misfortune which threatened the entire civilised world. Germany intimated the same day that “the state of danger of war, ’ which she had then declared, would be followed by general mobilisation if Russia did not undertake within 12 hours to demobilise. It was remarkable that, just when Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have presented this ultimatum. The compiler of the German White Book states that, although no reply to it was ever received in Berlin, two flours after tho expiration of the time limit on August 1 the Czar telegraphed to the Kaiser recognising Germany’s right to mobilise, but requesting from him the some guarantee which he himself had given to William—that tho mobilisation measures did not mean war. The Kaiser, in reply, declined to enter upon that, subject, but asked the Czar without delay to order his troops not to commit under any circumstances the slightest violation of our frontiers this telegram did not reach the Czar till after tho Note declaring war had been handed by tho German Ambassador to tho Russian Goveinment. , , , The reason of tho haste has been confessed. Bethmann-Hollweg writes: We were not in complete agreement among ourselves ns to how we were to proceed officially. The War Minister, General von Falkenhayn, thought. it was a rmstako to declare war on Russia, because ho feared that the political effect would bo nvojud.dal to us. The Chief of tho General btaff. General von Moltke, was, on the other hand, in favour of declaring war . because our hope of success . • • was dependent on the extreme rapidity of om movements. I myself agreed with tho view of General von IVloltke. The appropriate comment was rnaclo by Sir M do Bunsen in his survey of the negotiations at Vienna. “A few days’ delay might, in all probability,’ he, saved Europe from one of tho greatest calamities in history!’