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NOTES ON THE CABLES.

By Shrapnel.

COSTLY GERMAN EFFORTS.

A double purpose aofcuates the Germans in their attacks upon the plateaux near Craonne—one, to win 'back the very important observation points gained by the French, and the other, which influences them in a secondary degree, to wipe off accounts to balance the heavy defeat on tho. heights of tho Mouse. M. Marcel Hutin, tho Parisian journalist, who is a sound military observer and critic, characterised tho struggle north of tho Aisne as one of tho most desperate battles, and probably tho most merciless of the war. It terminated south of Corny, in an incontestable victory for the French infantry and a bloody defeat of tho best German troops, represented by the Brandenburg Guards, which comprise some of tho crack divisions of the purely Prussian armies. Though M. Hutin says the battle terminated near Cerny, yet, according to tho latest advices, the Germans, after a very brief respite, have renewed the struggle. It is admitted in a French message that, after sustained assaiulta, in which too Germans suffered severely, the enemy occupied a section of tho French first line. It is unsatisfactory to record that tho gallant French soldiers have been forced to yield ground; 'but, if tho Gormana have been made to pay an excessive price for then- slight gain, the laurels of victory must be accorded not to the enemy 'but to the side that exacted a costly penalty' for the enemy's positional achievement. We are certain that the course of action of the German commanders is being carefully scrutinised by the Allied Staffs, and that, as long as the British are comparatively quiescent, the struggle so far is going as those staffs desire it should. The strategical aim of the Germans is governed by tho belief that by these attacks they will bo able to destroy the French army as a fighting force, and that then they will be able to give their undivided attention to the British before the Americans can have an army sufficiently great to save either Franco or ttteir British ally from exhaustion so great that the respective Governments might deem it useless to look for the defeat of Germany. Wrapped up with this distant aim is one that is more immediate. The authorities at Berlin have noted that the sanguinary defeats of the Germanj-| at Arras, Lens, and Messines strengthened the hands of tho Provisional Government of Russia, and have well weighed tho reply of the Workmen and Soldiers' Committee to their assertions that the Allies are exhausted, and wish to throw their burden upon Russia. The Russian reply -was that they knew of the successes of the Allies on the west front, and that they were also well aware of the number of divisions that had been withdrawn from she Russian front to stem ttio successful tide of the Allies' assaults upon tho German line. It has been conceived in Berlin that, if tho Germans can inflict a gm.T.ghin.r defeat on the western Allies, the hands of their friends and agents who are engaged in seducing the Russians and undermining the national spirit of unity will be immensely and influentially strengthened. The battles in France are elements in tho long and able play of Prussian stagecraft, and are therefore, in regard to the whole war, of great strategical importance. That point should never be disregarded. It is much easier to read the workings of the mind of the German militarist camarilla at Berlin than it is to see what the plans of the All wo can presume on the latter point is that the more numerous the attacks -that the Germans make against the brilliant French tacticians and the unyielding British, tho better it will be for tho Allies as a whole in the long run. They will make a big hole in the two million reserves which file Washington correspondent of the New York World credits the Kaiser with. collecting to meet the combined attacks of tie British, French, and Americans in 1918. If the Kaiser fess the power ' arid resources to . raise too million men in 1918, he should be able €S> put a million in -file field on the west at once. He is wasting great opportunities. A RUSSIAN DEBACLE. Too many cooks spoil the broth. The pusillanimity of the doctrinaires and the sedition of the extremists have destroyed the discipline and morale of the Russian troops on one of the most important sectors of the southern flank fronts—that east of the Brody-Tarnopol line. Tarnopol is doomed, as tho Russian report admits a debacle,—and not only• a debacle, but the. despair of the Russian authorities. In the face of such an astute enemy, doctrinaire committees and divided authorities are useless, and worse than useless, in the time of a national crisis. A ruthless military dictator would seem to be the only saviour > that Russia can hope for. A dictator and a i song may yet save Russia from falling under the heel of Prussia and from seeing Czardom restored. Only that and nothing else can rouse Russia to save herself and exert her might Perhaps, just perhaps, the danger now confronting tho Russian people will call forth the man and tho arms which will cause a return to discipline. The debacle may possibly be necessary as a chastisement for failing to recognise the outlook and the great danger that now threatens to engulf the whole Russian people. Tho defeat of the Russians may go much farther \than the borders of Galicia. Russian can, however, still suffer a smashing defeat and recover. B; is that or a disgraceful peace that are her alternatives. If M. Kerensky is hot the man of■ the hour, then it is for the world better that the revolution should go by the board, and that the one man that may save Russia should be called from confinement in the Crimea—namely, the Grand Duke NicholasLoyal fighting regiments would rally round that redoubtable and able leader, who is Russia's Kitchener, if she ever had one, and a man that always favoured a constitutional Duma against the Czaristio bureaucrats and corruptionists. Workmen's committee's and soldiers' congresses may be all right in their place, but'only if thoroughly patriotio and determined to use their influence to consolidate the authority of tho Government of the hour. No academic or doctrinaire proclamations can weld the diverse parties in Russia into acting in unison while traitors and astute and unscrupulous well-educated provocateurs from Germany are hoodwinking the illiterate, simple-minded mujiks, soldiers, and working classes of Russia. They are simply as putty in the hands of tJie suborned revolutionaries and their German directors. Maximalist doctrines have been inculcated m the ranks of tho southern armies that were under General Brusiloff, and where the present retreat will halt no one can tell. When Tarnopol is taken, the forces of General Korniloff that penetrated Galicia will bo in danger of envelopment and annihilation. Bukowina will be recovered by tho Austrians at one stroke. All that the Austro-Germans will have to do after reaching Tarnopol and the Galician border will be to swing south to meet forces pouring through the Carpathian passes, and the Russians in Bukowina will bo lucky if they escape.. There is a grave risk that tho whole of General Brusiloff's great work last year will bo undone, and if that happens who can say what will bo the final outcome? No faith could be placed in tho results of a so-called peaceful revolution. In war timo a peaceful revolution vis a sign of weakness and of laek of spirits. The kind of revolution that Russia really required was tho creation of * military despo'ism for tho period of tho war. That and nothing else can keop down anarchy aiiA restrain an ignorant peasant population from inviting national suicide. A gleam of hope comes from military sources. Delegates from- tho Preobajenslty Regiment, a crack regiment of the army, pj.esumably containing men belonging t! powerful families, and delegates from 1 ' the armies at the front (possibly mostly from the no.chcrn front) have carried a resolution • favour of M. Kereaskv assurm'n.* a dictate rship. Tho present Frcruier has shown that ho knows how to deal wiiii extremists and traitors. In Pobograd &« has done well. Ho has already signs of tho kind of administratiaa lhat i& required for the hour. Is he so vs to be an Horatio in a state that is so obviously undermined and rotten m its construction? If Nicholas were not a Grand Duke, tho two—M. Kerensky and he could, one as statesman and tho other as general, pull Russia out of chaos, but it is doubtful whe'iwjr thoso who adhere to republican idme would tokcate th» fl-.~j

Duke even as a saviour of the ccratry. Unless Russia collapses and seeks peacei however, it may yet be necessary toreegl] him from exile for the armies of Russia?

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ODT19170724.2.36

Bibliographic details

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17064, 24 July 1917, Page 5

Word Count
1,483

NOTES ON THE CABLES. Otago Daily Times, Issue 17064, 24 July 1917, Page 5

NOTES ON THE CABLES. Otago Daily Times, Issue 17064, 24 July 1917, Page 5

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