THE GREAT POEWERS AND ENGUSE COLONIAL POLICY.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 7191, 4 March 1885, Page 4

THE GREAT POEWERS AND ENGUSE COLONIAL POLICY.

aio ieai bsriringa .qf tiia. attacks of tftQ&roat Powers upon tha Imperial interests cf England do not yet appear to b» adequately realised by the public, owing apparently to a want of clear appreciation of the expansion of our Continental rivals and (bo inability to conceive a condition of things when this country will be unable to hold her own among the great nations of the earth unless vigorously supported by her Colonies, Ourthreo great rivals in Europe are Russia, France, and Germany. We have already described their general attitude towardß us in our article on " Five Years of Liberal Foreign Policy." We now propose to deal with the probable expansion of each,* and indicate some of the problems which this country will bs compelled to confront in the immediate future. Those'problems are rendered all the more disagreeable, because it is in vain that we look about Europe for allies of any great value. Broadly speaking, the strongest and most powerful elements on the Continent are opposed to us. Russia, under no conceivable ciroumatances, seems likely to be other than a bitter rival for many years to come. She cannot advance her border anywhere without injuring some of our intereats and menacing others. The aggressive policy pursued of late years by France, and the resentment it has naturally provoked on the part of England, has estranged that country from ub to such a degree that we cannot regard her as a possible ally, and can only hope that she may refuse to be drawn into open enmity to us. The hostility of Germany, although quite recent, is too pronounced and too likely to increase to be ignored. These three Powers we must look upon as vigorous rivals and possible foes. Unluckily, they are well supported by allies, Austria purßuea no hostile policy, and has no interests at stake clashing with our own; but her maintenance as a Great Power is too closely dependent on the goodwill of Germany for her to play the rOle of a friend to us, and it would be difficult for her, perhaps, to refuse to act with Prince Bismarck as an enemy. In excess of this consideration, Mr Gladstone has gone so far out of his way to excite Austria against Liberal statesmen that we can never depend upon her support while they are in power. ,Turkey is our traditional ally, and our interests at stake in the Ottoman Empi'e are such that, decrepit aa tho Sultan's power is, wo ought to cultivate the closest relations with the Porte, A far more useful friend might bs Italy, on the value of whose alliance we have already insisted in those columns. The other States are either too small to render efficacious assistance against a coali-' tion of tho Great Powers, or are too atagnant' or selfish to bo reliad upon in a case of diro emergency, The territorial expansion of our empire in Europe has long ago been at an end. The United Kingdom supports a population of over 36,000,000, and we aro credibly assured that an increase can take place without serious inconvenience until a total of 00,000,000 is reached. We will not question this possibility, because every year the population is increasing, and there is no knowing when a decisive check will take place. But we would point out one very important fact — the population has already outstripped its supplies, and is becoming yearly more and more dependent upon food conveyed to the United Kingdom from every part of the globe. Thus, really speaking, we grow weaker as we increase in numbers, because the larger the population the less time they could live without extraneous support, and the quicker they would have to yield to any Power or Powers that might succeed in severing the food supply. It is not difficult to conceive a condition of things which would compel thia country to yield to a hostile coalition without firing a shot. By maintaining a strict blockade over the principal portß the population would rapidly be reduced to such dire necessity that a surrender would be difficult to avoid. But if matters ever came to a blockade an army would be landed, and we should have to contend with masses to which we have been hitherto unaccustomed in warfare. It may be said that we will always succeed in keeping our coasts clear of the enemy, but this is a hasty and ignorant assumption. Our rivals are developing their naval strength more rapidly than we are, and will probably continue to do so, .In 1870 Germany had no fleet. Our naval rivals then were simply France and Russia. To-day Germany is a stronger naval Power than Rußsia, and if she continues hor rapid growth - she will ultimately become our equal. Hero is an instance of naval expansion close to our shores against which we cannot set any equivalent. In 1870, again, Italy had but an insignificant fleet. To-day she has very powerful squadrons of heavy ironclads, and it requires little argument to convince the public that if our statesmen allowed hor to drift into becoming a rival, or the ally of a rival, wo should find her 20 armour-plated men-of-war, her 15,000 seamen, and her army of 2,000,000 men on a war footing a very awkward barrier lying ready to be placed across our Mediterranean road to India. France, Germany, Russia, and Italy all are becoming Btroneter naval Powerß every year, and as this expansion promises to continue unchecked we shall be fooKsh if we rely Bolely upon our own fleet to meet any possible coalition, even if we develop our navy more seriously than we are doing at present. In a word, we shall have to look abroad for naval allies. Those allies we shall not find among the timorous minor States of Europe, and we shall consequently have to seek them among our Colonies. Yet we are trifling with thoße Colonies, in Bpite of their being England's great mainstay of the future, in a manner that will amaze posterity. After ourselves, France is the next Great Power whose territorial expansion in Europe is apparently at an end. Her population does not increase, and thus she escapes to a large extent the serious danger of being drivento extremities by the severance of her foreign food supply. Recognising her inability to expand at home, Bho has done her utmost of late years to increase her territories abroad. It is sometimes asserted that she is weakening herself by doing thio, that she is wasting her home resources, This is a fallacy. The French are famous for their frugality, and as a nation grow richer every year. For their surplus savings outlets must be sought somewhere or other, and are found in Tunis, Tonquin, the Congo, and elsewhere. When Tunia was annexed the majority of English critics hastened to assure France that the conquest was a barren one and a disastrous blunder, because the people would recoil against French rule, and the Republic would be involved in endless wars. Quite the reverse has been proved by events to be the case, and the Republic haß had plenty of energy to spare to continue the career of conquest in Tonquin. In all human probability France, in the long run, will acquire a great and growing hold upon the Indo Chinese peninsula, giving her the opportunity of creating a minor India for herself, and will gradually derive a large trade and revenue from the possession. Nobody whose opinion is worth a grain of salt pretends that we are poorer for possessing India, notwithstanding that it is a huge dependency to control with a handful of men; and we venture to believe that tho public will find France in the long run waxing rich with the possession of her Indo-Chinese possessions. From a Continental point of view such activity is pro ferable to stagnating like Holland and Spain, and it is obvious that if a nation does not grow in numbers it is better for it to secure native levies abroad than to increase its wealth at home without increasing the means of defending it. In point of population, both Germany and England are leaving France considerably bahind in the race of numbers, and the time is not far distant when the latter Power will experience the inconvenience of .having as a next door neighbour a rival with double or treble the inhabitants she controls. But it is woll to bear in mind one fact: Francs takes care to cultivate good relations with all her possessions, and to infuse them with loyalty. Sho doe 3 her best to bind them more closely to herself, and she jealously guards them against blunders of the Angra Pequena and New Guinea description. Thus, while we are contemptuously treating our Colonies and doing our best to alienate them from us and confront Europe alone, France is striving to establish abroad elements of strength that will a«sist her in any future conflict. This is excellent policy; but there iB one other aspect of French aggression. Means of doing mischief to one's neighbours abroad constitute a formidable weapon for preserving paace at home. Thare may be drawbacks to the conquest of Tonquin, but already the movement of the French towards our southeast Indian frontier has inspired alarm, and events fmay yet ripen in tha Indo-Chinese peninsula to an extent that may cause us to be as apprehensive of the French on one side of India as of the Russian on tho other. Thiß aspect is persistently ignored by critics of French expansion. Wo conduct campaigns quite as costly of those of France, but there is one very essential difference between ours and hers At the close France always secures something for her trouble, while we take the utmost pains to deprive ourselves of all benefit. A nation that threw £18,000,000 into Afghanistan and scuttled out at the end of the war only to have to pay £10,000 a month, after awhile to be allowed to sueak in again, is hardly the nation to point the finger at French expenditure on foreign wars. There is a peculiarity about the expansion of the Great Powers that, while outside Europe their aspirations do not in the least clash with one another, they all clash with the interests of England Russia's annexation of Afghanistan Persia, or Asia Minor would make no difference to Germany or France, or injure any of their interests, real or sentimental. Neither Germany nor France would probably oppose a Russian annexation of Corea, and still less coucern themselves about the seizure of Kashgaria. Russia can thus expand in a variety of directions, all harmful to England, without hurting French or German intereats, and if she supports their annexations'she need anticipate no difficulty in securing their support to her own. France, again, does not clash with Russian or German aspirations either in North Africa, the Upper Niger, Madagascar, or Tonquin. It is easy, therefore, for her to support Russia against England, in return for receiving support from the Czar in her various nnnoxations. Finally, Germany has not oxcitod any feeling in Russia or France by her receut proceedings in Africa and New Guinea, and can afford to purohase their moral support by giving them her diplomatic aid in their Colonial enterprises. Thus, then, bo long as the throe Great Power? persevere in their undertakings abroad, and agree to suspend for a while their rivalry at home, they practically form a coalition "against our interests, requiring a.Foreign and Colonial Minister of genius, foresight, and resolution to counteract or break. After the experience of tbe last few yews it would be abiurd to sup-

tm #».»t th.es* PADgjtou ara fulfill*, either in tjis pjerSoft bf EoHl (Sranville" or Lord Ile.tby, or, in shajf), in any individual member si tho present Cabinet. If England were ruled by Ministers of the Continental description her policy would be directed by them to sow dissensions among the three Powerß in Europe, so db to check their undertakings against-her out of it. Intrigue, however, is distasteful to the English people, and thus the Powers can rely on pursuing: their designs undisturbed by the'machinations of the nation against which they aro directed. Since Continental Ministers cannot be fought with thair own weapons, nil the more reason why they should be opposed more vigorously by means accessible to English statesmen. Morally exoluded from European compacts, England, must rely upon the co operation of her Colonies in the protection of her interests, By her geographical position Canada is admirably placed for assisting in the defence of England against European assailants. Her vast tariitorios, collectively nearly as large as the entire Continent 'of Europe, can accommodate 300,000,000 or 400,000,000 people, or more than a match for any future European coalition. Even to-day the H. 000.000 Canadians, with a mercantile marine already ahead of that of the loading European States, would 'prove an ally in any war hot i o be treated with indifference or disrespect, The.rapid development of the population of the United States to 52,000,000 affords a demonstration of the'growth that we may reasonably expect to see in Canada in the course of a couplo of generations. With 32,000,0000f Canadians ready to backup the Mother Country, there -is jio European State that would not hesitate before declaring war. Australia, again, is admirably situated for defending our Asiatic interestß. The territory it owns is larger than European Russia, Germany, and Franca combined. Without difficulty it could afford sustenance for 200,000,000 or 300,000,000 people. The geographical position of the country marks it. out as our natural ally in the defence of our interests in India, China,, and other parts of • the East; and there is not a European State who would not think twice before attacking them, if 20,000,000 or 30,000,000 of Australians were on the gui vive. Herat is often spoken of as the key of India. In reality, the key of our Asiatic Empire is Australia; 'and if we trifle with the feelings of the Australian people r.a we have recently .done over the New Guinea business, we shall undermine the fabric of our dominion far more assuredly than if we allowed the Russians to occupy Herat, Candahar.and Cabul. ,;■

How to bind our Colonies together and, form a league or federation is a problem now occupying many minds. We have not space to doal with it on thia occasion, but will content ourselves, with insisting that ■English Foreign policy for the future must ba dominated by one great principle—less solicitude for conciliating the Great Powers, more genuine anxiety for cultivating the closest relations with our great Colonies. England must think more of Canada, Australia, and the Capo, and less of Russia, France, and Germany. If she has to choose between offending Germany and offending' Australia, the former country must go to tbe wall. To ensure the love of the Colonies towards the Mother Country there is no better! policy than to give the world clearly to understand that England will cultivate no Continental alliances at the expense of her Colonial interests.—Morning Post.