WAR NOTES.

Oamaru Mail, Volume XLVII, Issue 13047, 10 January 1917, Page 1

WAR NOTES.

The sovereigns of the Quadruple Al-lianc-o are about to put their heads to-gether-in Vienna, possibly this week, the' exact - date not having been disclosed. • For what, purpose we could not expect, t-o learn from"' them. At the same time the: Foreign Ministers of all the Central Powers-will meet in Berlin. while in addition the Parliameutary Presidents will confer, and added' to all this'a special session of the Reichstag will be held' in the middle of this mouth,-it is-said, to consider the refusal 'by the Allies of Germany's peace note. It must be something important that brings all these notabilities together. The Kaiser (if ho is still fit and well), the Emperor Charles of Austria, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, and the Sultan of Turkey;.-are expected to confer, and' wo may safely assume that the subject—and the only subject —that will be discussed is that which will give them peace. The cables have earned u reputation for themselves'of startling inaccuracy, but. we may take it lor granted that-the Central Powers have let it be known that the of peace is not to be allowed to shrivel up and fade away, and to further the j project of securing it at as early a. date a.s possible all the most prominent men of the four kingdoms are to converge on Vienna and Berlin. The surmise may not be an inaccurate one, that the meeting of monarchs has been called, by the Emperor diaries to let .his brother potentates know that he. cannot and does not intend to continue the 'war on Austria's behalf, that his friends may do the best they can for themselves, but that he personally, 011 behalf of Austria, intends to back out. If all the stories are true, and we can understand that they are to a large extent, Austria seems to "have been hitharder in the food problem than Germany. "What the Bulgarians and Turks are -living on no one seems to know, nor do the Turks and Bulgarians say anything about it. Both are usually in a condition of famine in times of peace, and t-lieir training for semi-starvation will liave been of a more complete character than that of their co-ad'jutors. In any case, the meeting is certain to d'eal 'with the question of peace, and the terms that Can be offered- the Allies to bring the war to a speedy conclusion, and, recognising that the offer may be rejected, how the Ceiitral "Powers will act to save themselves from demolition.

It .may have been conceived ja-" Germany that the Allies would! accept- the offer made to discuss peace terms, and; that the terms to be submitted would hare caused 1 confusion in'the. ranks of the Allies, for the reason _ that what was offered one or two might be all they had' ever and what might be offered others might fall fpr short of that desideratum. The Allies saw through this, and decided l that they would stand or fall together. The re-' ply might easily convey the impression that they could; not trust each other, and if that was the reason it is as. easily applicable to the Central Powers, for they obviously do not trust each other. " Were France, for instance, offered the restoration of her conquered territory and part or the whole of Alsace and Lorraine, it .is conceivable.that, without quitting the Entente, she might advocate a .general cessation of hostilities. The same thing; might apish" to Russia or even Italy. Germany and Austria know that with all the bungling that lias followed the opera, t-ions of the Allies the big battalions will win in the even if- the British "NTavy has riot wen the battle already. \Ye have recovered from the shocks of Gallipoli. Kut-el-Amara, the great Russian retreat, Loos, Neuve Chapelle, the Salonica muddle, and even the Roumanian disaster, and yet. with an almost.entire absence of" military acumen, we can go-on and win, even if it is by tlio process of attrition, which might continue for years, if Germany and Austria had food 1; but as Germany and Austria are short of food, clothing, and other essential material, we can win if we allow time to do it for us. German organisation has been -better than ours, but even the Germans have made great and disastrous blunders. The time to be allowed need not necessarily be long, as it is surmised' we shall learn- soon after the various meetings and conferences referred to have taken place.

We have experts, newspapers, and individuals who, unfortunately, are stilly at larcre, urging the abandonment of the Macedonian campaign, so that General Sarrail's army might be utilised, on the West front to obtain the decisive engagement that Is to win the war. The winning of the war by a decisive engagement is a T>roblematical' thing, and merely a conjectural hypothesis of the irresponsible, because the Central Powers need not accept a decisive bat. tie on the West front as the knockout blow. The occupation of' Berlin and Ivrupn's works at Essen would! undoubtedly "bring final destruction on the. Germans, but Hind'enburg says it will take 30 years to get there at the present rate of progress. Furthermore. General Sarrail's army is composed ot Italians, Greeks, Servians, Russians, French and British, and it is_ improbable that more than the men of the.two latter Powers would be .allowed to proceed to the West front. If General SarraiFs army "were withdrawn, itwould liberate the whole of the Greek army, now under the command of King Constantino, and these, linking up "with the Bulgarians and Germans now fighting against the Salonica army, could proceed- to the assistance of the forces opposing the Russo-Roumanian in Roiiniania. The muddlement of the Allies in Macedonia and Roumania is no justification for making the muddle worse by a base desertion of the Serbian cause. General Sarrail lias not achieved his object, because his forces wero inadequate for the purpose he was sent to accomplish. That was due to a. wane, of co-ordination amongst the Allies; in. short, to the indisposition of Britain and Italy to render proper assistance. But the army is there, and, we are informed. lias been strengthened, and it that is so it can do more good in a state, of inactivity at Salonica than in the trenches 011 the Wogt front.

One dav the Greeks are repentant and the next defiant, or rather is it that the cables are distorted and inaccurateon both days. It seems never known, in what positipn the Greek crisis stands whether King Oonstiiiytirici has hauled down his colors or nailtnl them to the mast. He was reported to have agreed to the Allies' terms to transfer hit troops and guns to the Peloponnesus, so that they would be out of harm's way, and must actually have started to fulfil his nromise. inasmuch as 7000 men and 30 guns are reported to have been dealt with. Wc have never been t-old the actual strength of the Oreo* urmy, but it is estimated at- between | three and four hundred thousand men. The 7000 men who have been moved across the isthmus are therefore negligible number. Since the first news of" the King's compliance with the Allies' demands comes further news that instead of the ultimatum being complied with the Greek troops, or those who control them, talk of declaring war <m the Allies, and have got out of . hand. A reign of terror is said to exist. The peoplo_ are faced with starvation, as there is little food in the. ■ country, and the position is fine of unI certainty and danger. As long as the people are fed they could endure the terms imnosed by the Allies, but since a shortage of food has manifested itselt the neonle have risen in revolt against the blockade. I'rom this we can assume that- hunger is beginning to teiJ on the Greeks, but it is not, expected that they will resort to national warfare against the Allies, for the blockado that has brought 011 the fit of recalcitrancy will before long subdue it again, and make the Greeks as meek as lambs. There is nothing like hunger for subduing the spirit of even thjs mest>

redoubtable_ warrior, and the Greek is | a very ordinary warrior. One reason why King Constantine will do his best, to curb the insurrectionary spirit of his. 1 people is the knoweldge that if he goe-s too far he "will lose his crown. The Allies may have muddled the wholeaffair, and giv-en both the King and his people reason for believing that if tliey rebel the Allies will bend, but. the. position would take on a different- complexion were war declared, against theAllies. King Constantino is well aware if that takes place he will before long bo able to visit his royal brother-in-law, the Kaiser, for the Greek as a--soldier does not even rank wit-h the Serbian and Bulgarian, and ho will not hold .out long against the Allies;, especially as he may not- be able to obtain a sufficiency of munitions, and certain!}' very little food'. It is peculiar that as the Germans, Austrian*, Turks and Bulgarians want peace owing to a. shortness of food., the .Greeks are "looking for trouble'' owing to the same thing.