SATURDAY, APRIL 10, 1920. MORE GERMANICS

New Zealand Times, Volume XLVI, Issue 10560, 10 April 1920, Page 6

SATURDAY, APRIL 10, 1920. MORE GERMANICS

Voh Hindenburg makes tho latest reported comment from tho enemy side on the war. Tho groat position this general filled during a considerable paut of tho war and the eminent services he performed in the opening phanes on tho Eastern front against the Russian armies justly entitle his comment to the respectful interest of all students of tho war. According to tho cabled notice of his book, “'Out of My Life,” hie commentaries mainly concern tho East front, whore he commanded in 1914, 1915, and 1910. His 'account has, of course, been anticipated by von Ludendorff’s book, but to what extent it is not possible to judge until tho book arrives hero. Nevertheless, 1 the accounts by the Commander-in-Chicf can scarcely be inferior in interest to those of the officer who was his Staff Chief. From tho latter wc have definite ideas of the tactics which, in the tooth of possible disaster, won the great battle of Tnnncnborg; of the subsequent strategy in East Prussia and Poland and of the great drive which began by forcing tho passage of tho Donajec; wont on to drive the Russians out of Poland and Galicia; and, after great manoeuvres in -Russian territory, failed at last in securing a definite military decision. It will bo interesting to know if tho Commander-in-Chicf corroborates all that his brilliant lieutenant has. set down. As to tho origin of the war, both these officers have thought it necessary to deal with that subject, but as their province was the fielcjj their remarks and contentions about matters exclusively concerning the Cabinet naturally carry no weight whatever, except as repetitions of the statements of other men. The value of both books is military only. According to tho summary, von Hiudenburg agrees with the Australian General Monash's estimate of the Australian capture of Villors-Brctonncux as one of the turning points of the war, and, with iLudcndorff, regards the groat Allied victory of August Bth, 1918, known as tho battle of Amiens, as "Germany’s Day of Doom,’’ calling it plainly "our first great disaster from which there was no recovery.’’ With regard to tho first, a third authority is in agreement, no less.than Marshal Foch himself, who, in his foreword to Captain Ellis’s story of the Australasian Fifth Division, says of tho loss, "the important position’’ of VillersBretonneux had "imperilled in ttys highest degree the defence of Amiens,” clearly implying the ’ danger'' of the' separation of tho French and British armies. It is plain that the Marshal rated the exploit of the recapture by the Australians at a value no less than that put on it by General Monash and Marshal von Hindenburg. As to the estimate by the two German commanders of the value of the great Allied victory of August Bth, that can truly be described as most illuminating. It is as illuminating as Ludendorff’s admission of tho great success of the tremendous, British -Somme campaign, which compelled tho Germans to retreat to the Hindenburg Line, a success not underrated by tho British and French Governments, but com-' plotcly -unsuspected by them, so com. plotcly that, as General Maurice has recently shown, they put a stop to tho plan arranged by Joffrc ancl Haig for continuing the pressure which Ludcndorff says he dreaded, because he knew it would fatally deprive the Germans of tho rest and defensive preparation and collection of munitions so urgently required. But hdw different these two successes 1 The Allies spent months of time, and hundreds of thousands of men, and countless munitions for their Somme victory, whereas the groat disaster of August Bth, from which no recovery was possible, was inflicted in a single day, with absolutely trifling loss. Tho confessions .of the German commanders are a tribute in tho earlier case to tho extraordinary valour and persistence of the Allied troops, and in the later to the skill of the Allies in devising and executing a completely now system of tactics, specially adapted to the character of open war that tho campaign had assumed. Tho enemy had from the first prayed for open war, declaring the absolute superiority of their troops for the freedom of that mode of fighting. They got it on August Bth, 1918, and th© first day of it proved, by the admission of their own chiefs, to bo "Germany’s Day of Doom.’’ It iq interesting to know that the new tactics of that day were the invention of tho Australian General Monash, to whom belongs the credit of inflicting on the enemy their "Black Day of Doom.’’ It has been truly said that in war it is the unexpected that often happens. Six years 1 ago who could havo expected to seo Australian troops in European battle? And who could havo expected that an Australian commander would have invented a system of tactics which inflicted disaster, immediate and hopeless, on tho most formidable of the armies of Europe, with a tremendous “battle tradition behind it? And who could have expected to road tho declaration of Germany’s greatest soldier, that "tho colonial troops wore the elite of the British Army” in the greatest war ever known ?

The German Marshal speaks of tbo German soldier as “the lord of tho battlefield.’’ So much, perhaps, ho owes to tho armies ho did not lead to final victory. But even in the perform-

ance of that melancholy duty—for which no generous enemy would dream of reproaching him, for every generous soul approves of the soldier who recognises his sympathetic obligation to the' men who taco death and hardships at his command —oven fn the performance of that duty, he is obliged to admit that in the end “there was a deterioration." Thus his claim of “the lordship of the battlefield” is limited to the first part of tho war. That was the universal opinion of tho German soldier on tho day of tho declaration ol war. But was it justified after the men ban begun to march and the guns had begun to roar? The answer is spread decisively over many battlefields. Mens, Lo Gateau, Mczieros, Guise, Vittori, the five battles of the river known us the "Battle of the Marne,” the battles of the Aisne, the group of battles known as First Ypres, tho battle of Second Ypres, the battles of the Somme, Arras, Verdun (that great scries of combats) —-these historic fights do not sustain tho theory that the German soldier is tho "Lord of the Battlefield.” Hindenburg talk* of French artillery superiority, and other thingsr But in all these fights the German soldier was in superior number; he had vastly greater weight of artillery; far larger supply of munitions; and he was, nevertheless, beaten. Of tho lordship of tho field in the Ypres series no question of the personal ascendancy of tho Allied soldier is possible in the face of tho facte which are as overwhelming on the side of tho Allies as the superiority’ of num. hers, weapons, and munitions ought to have been on the side oi the Gormans. In the great Battle of the Marne—the five great battles of that gigantic combat—tho superior strategy of Joffro was the deciding factor; but tho troops ho commanded,' fought with inferior numbers, and everywhere prevailed. For example, in tho battle of Nancy, Do Castelnau’s men heat twice the number of the enemy fighting under the eye of the Emperor; Sarrail’s men beat nearly three times tho number under the Grown Prince; Do Laugle'e men boat superior forces under tho Duke of Wurtomburg; Forbes’s men absolutely gravelled more than twice their number at Fere Champenuso; and the men of French, d’Esproy, and Manoury met superior forces and beat- them. Ludendorff, who was pot connected with the battle at all, for he was fighting at the time in East Prussia, strives to account for tho immense Gorman defeat by claiming tfie withdrawal of certain forces East from the German armies invading France. Frankly, we doubt his statement. But, if it were true, the withdrawals could have made no difference, for the Germans were beaten in spite of their far superior numbers. The superior French strategy would have neutralised the presence of tho withdrawn forces had they been in the,line. For the quality of the German soldiery, no - one denies that it was great in tho first years of tho war; no one denies that the Allies had to .fight hard to beat them. But no one can acknowledge that they were the “lords of the battlefield.”