THE YELLOW BOSPHORUS

New Zealand Times, Volume LXXVI, Issue 5199, 13 February 1904, Page 12

THE YELLOW BOSPHORUS

THE RIVAL AMBITIONS OF RUSSIA AND JAPAN. In tho “Fortnightly Review” Mr Al- i frod Stead writes an article full of use- 1 ful information, with quotations from tho diplomatic documents which cover tho Japanese question of Korea. The article is coloured, perhaps by the strong Japanese sympathies of the writer, which lead him to accept tho common Russo- : phobist assumption as to tho Machiavellian persistent purpose of tho Russian Government. Tho facts of the case arc very simple. According term eminent Japanese statesman, quoted by Mr Alfred Stead, “Korea is like an anew with tin; point aimed at our hearts.” To maintain tho independence cf Korea. :;r. failing that, t-a secure Korea for Japan, is iloe-lared to be the settled purpose and the burning passion of the people; a Japanese' Korea is regarded as a guarantee* of the safety of the Japanese nation. On the ether hand, the Russians regard the iueirpendonce of Korea from Japanese influences to bo ef vital importance. ; “With Korea in llic hands of the Japan- ' esc,” says M. Lovitolf tho editor of tho “Novi Krai,” the official Port Arthur newspaper, “thcro will bo an end to tho IMPORTANCE OF VLADIVOSTOCK j as a trailing port, whereas if Russia held tho Straits cf Korea it woule! be- j come the leading naval power of tho I Far East.” It is probable that both j of these disputants exaggerate the im- ; portanco of Korea. If thcJYollow Bos- i phoni-s were hold by the Japanese tho importance of Vlaflivostock as a trading port would not he impaired, and yet, j

undoubtedly, as a naval base St would be somewhat in the air. Even according to this article the Japanese have largely themselves to blame if at present their position in Korea is endangered. After the Chinese war the Japanese were supremo in Korea, and for two years the country was practically their own, but their Government was not equal to its opportunity. They sent a now Minister to the Legation at Seoul every tour months; they underrated their unpopularity with the Korean nation, and they overrated their ability to introduce reforms. The desire of Japan to monopolize all chances of moneytnakiiig in Korea led tho other Powers to support the Korean Government against Japanese ascendency. The Japanese, losing patience, put a soldier in office who was absolutely without diplomatio experience or skill. He planned a kind of Jameson Raid or Napoleonic ooup d’etat, the object of which was to seize the King and Queen of Korea and keep them in the Japanese pocket, in order that the other Powers , might have no opportunity of preventing tho Japanese ascendency. Tne deadly cornplot failed miserably, tho Queen was murdered by a Korean mob. and the King captured, but later escaped: and sought the protection of THE Rt SSI AN LEGATION. This marked the downfall of the Japanese ascendency, and who can deny that the Japanese in some degree at least,- deserved tho disaster which befell them? Their coup d’etat had miscarried as badly as tho Jameson Raid, and with a similar result. In February, 1896, Russian ascendency began, tho Japanese rule was cut off, and Japan was herself definitely deposed for the time being from the position which sho had previously exercised. All that could be done was to endeavour to recover as much influence as possible by means of diplomatic negotiations with Russia. The situation is now governed by three conventions; tho first, known as tho Waebor-Komura Momoradum, gave the

Japanese tho night of maintaining Japanese guards in tho Japanese settlements and in tho capital, the Russians being also allowed to keep a garrison, not exceeding tho number of tho Japanese, for tho protection of their Legation. In Juno, 1890, a formal trinity was drawn ' up between Y'amagata and Prince Lobauow. This treaty confirmed to Japan the right to administer telegraphic lines in Korea, but reserved to Russia the right to establish, a telegraph line from, tho capital to the frontier. : The last between tho two States was signed at Tokio on April 2oth, 1898, between Baron Rosen and Baron Nilsson. In this convention both Powers recognised the sovereignty and entire independence of Korea, and mutually agreed to abstain from all internal interference'in the affairs of the country. To avoid any misunderstanding, they further agreed not to take any measure, such as tho appointment of military instructors or financial advisors for Korea, before having come to a mutual agreement between themselves on tho subject. Lastly, in view of tho great development of Japanese commercial industrial ENTERPRISE IN KOREA, and tho many Japanese in the country, tho Russian Government bound itself not to tlnvcit tho industrial relations boj tween Japan anil Korea. Being thus J guaranteed tho right to carry on the li" auci.al and industrial exploitation of the country, .Japan lias covered the country : with her banks, -she la;a made railways, j controls tho finances, and owns 80 per I cent, of tho ship's that enter the Korea" ! ports. At tho present moment tho 1 Japanese havo a garrison of four hundred ini'ii in tho Korean capital, a number which tho Russians havo a right to i‘equal should they so desire. Mr Mc-

Lcavy Brown, tho Koreanised Briton, is at tho head of the Korean Customs, and Great Britain is bound by a Treaty of Alliance with Japan, who recognises her right to conduct such measures as may he indispensable in order to safe-guard-their interests in the country if threatened by the aggressive action of another Power.

The present trouble between Russia and Japan appears to have arisen out of a timber concession credited by the Russian Government to a Russian snbiect un 1896, two years before the conclusion of the Nissen-Xlosen Convention. Tin* Convention gave the Russian merchant in Vladivostock the .right of felling lumber and planting trees, on the Korean bank of the Yalu and Tinmen rivers in North Korea. The concession prov'id'V that worksheets might be put up in the immediate vicinity of the forests covered* by the concession. Seven years after the original concession was granted, sixty Russian soldiers in civilian uniform, crossed the Yalu, in the neighbourhood of the original concession, and bought twelve acres of land in Vcr.v-a.mpho in the name of two of their Korean .employers. The Korean Government objected ta this Russian settlement of thedr territory, but the Russians went on steadily; they male a stone embankment along twenty-one miles of the Yalu, put up a factory and other stone buildings. which are said to include a fojrt duly furnished with munitions of war. The timber concession! sts have exte M their operations beyond the limits of the concession. The Russian Government, meantime, appears to hav< pressing the Korean Government to the lease of the territory upon which the Russian subjects had been erecting the buildings and extending their tim-ber-cutting operations. The Japanese Government on August 25th sent an ultimatum to the King of Kgrea. declaring that if the lease were granted they would consider it equivalent a suspension of diplomatic relations, and hold themselves free to act on the assumption that the whole of the Korean

territorios had been opened to the world. They then demanded that the Yalu port of Wiiju should be opened. Tho Korean Government, delighted at tho prospect of sheltering itself behind a European Power, replied that it would bo delighted to comply with Japan’s request, but Russia objected. “This,” says Mr Alfred Stead, “ is virtually a broach of tho Xissen-Rosen Treaty.” That, however, is to tako for granted tinVi tho Korean Government had justification for imputing to Russia any action in the matter. This might bo so if tho only evidence wero tho uncorroborated statement of THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT, which, liko most Oriental Governments, does not regard scrupulous veracity as an indispensiblo element of good diplomacy. In this case, however, the Japanese claim to possess proofs of Russian pressure brought to bear in Seoul. There Is nothing to show, as yet, that tho question of Ycng-ampho is not capahlo cf diplomatic settlement; and, excepting on tho ground that conflict between tho two Powers ils inevitable some day, and that as Japan is relatively stronger in relation to Russia at present than sho is likely to bo in the future, sho had: bettor precipitate the conflict rather than wait until tho chances aro more heavy against her, there seems to bo no reason for anticipating an immediate appeal to arms. If the Japanese aro prepared to recogniso Russia’s position in Manchuria, tho Russians aro not likoly to make any casus belli out of Urn refusal of the Korean Government to grant them a rc-loaso for their settlement on Yong-ampho, a settlement which Air Alfred Stead admits is of no value from tho military point of view. It is cf interest to note, however, that popular opinion in Japan rejects the

Manchuria for Korea argument on tho principle that while Japan has every right to stand for Korea, where Russia has no material interests, Russia must recognise that if Japan gives us any claim to tho fulfilment of Russia’s promises with regard to Manchuria, she relinquishes many material rights granted to her in her treaties with China. In the matter of Manchuria, Japan represents in this mattew the Americans and the British, as wall as all nations who stand for the “open door” in China. This fact, renders her opposition to Russia a much more serious affair than if she had been standing only for her own hopes in Korea. A TRIBUTE TO JAPAN’S FDEFT In the “North American Review - ” Mr A. S. Hurd writes enthusiastically of “Japan’s Growing Naval Power.” Ho says;—

The Japanese are sailors by instinct. They are secured by conscription, and do not voliurteer for service, as is t£e case in England. Japan has a fishing population of about two million men, and from bill's section of the community she draws her best seamen, men of dnteMigenee, resource and sea-lore; and capable of quickly acquiring sufficient mechanical skill to enable them to control the complex mechanism of their i .iiodern meh-of-war with complete success. They desire no pampering, and they can live on the simplest food and sleep anywhere; but in their new ships they have more alir and, in some respects. greater comfort than axe to be found on many, if not most, British men-of-war. They keep their vessels as spotlesslv clean as British or American ships-of-war; than this no higher praise can be paid. But in the men of the fleet one also notices some remnant of the savage fighting qualities which have made these proud little people the dominant military factor among Far Eastern nations. THE POSITION OF JAPAN. Mr Henry Noi-mau, M.P.. writes very ably in this month’s ‘'World’s Work” on

the Far Eastern situation. He says:— In tlio pest and at the present fctmo Japan is unquestionably stronger than Russia at sea. and the command of the sea nrou'd virtually decide the issue of any war. Japan, however, has practically reached tho limit of her naval expansion. She is as ready as she is likoly to be. Russian naval strength in the Far East, on the other hand, is steadily growing, and when her new and old battleships, now on their way to the China Sea, have reached their destination, Japan would have but little reason to expect a result favourable to herself from the arbitrament of war. It is, therefore, for her a case of now or never, and in tin’s fact lies tho urgency of the dangei. What Russia wants, nobody knows. For Japan, on the other band, an independet Korea, or one controlled by herself, is a matter of lifo and death. And for this she would and must, under any circumstances fight. A TRYING- SITUATION.

The position of Japan, indeed, is a trying ono. Owing to her alliance with ourselves, which would compel England to tako up arms if Franco should sui>port Russia, every pressure is being brought to bear upon her by England to prevent war,’ just as undoubtedly Franco ‘is doing all she can to restrain Russia. But meantime the Russian naval reinforcements are on their way, and when they have arrived Russia wiill bo able to say that sbo can no longer bear this uncertainty, and that the matter must bo settled by war if necessary. IS THERE A SOLUTION ? The best solution to bo found would bo for an irresistible combination of Powers, in which England and the United States would be the chief, to announce that they could not tolerate

the occupation by Russia of any Korean territory at any time or under any circumstances. But there is a rooted conviction in European Foreign Offices that America will never go beyond the -writing of despatches. Therefore, for some time to come, peace in the Far East will hang by a thread. Perhaps the best hope that the thread will not break lies in the fact that in case of war between Japan and Russia, China would undoubtedly side with the former; that this would almost inevitably drag in other Powers, one after the other, and that in the end neither Japan, nor certainly Russia, could expect to gain anything from a terrible and devastating struggle. “Blackwood” gives the first place to on account of the relations between Russia and Japan. The writer states very decidedly that the Japanese have only themselves to blame for the loss of their moral prestige in Korea, which, he says, is entirely due to their grievous blundering, unscrupulous and high-hand-ed method of dealing with the Korean people. The writer hopes that a modus vivendl may be found which would enable peace to be preserved.

THE RUSSIAN NAVAL STRENTH. There has been so much uncertainty as to what Russia's naval strength in the Far East actually is tnat a table' given in the cr Dniited Service Journal" is of value. This gives the number of first-class battleships as six—Petropavlovsk, Poltava, Sevastopol. Peresviet. Retvisan, Pobieda. Of armoured cruisers of the first-class there are throe Hoasia, Gromoboi, and Rurik—while the first-class cruisers number five—Askold Bogatyr, Pallada, Diana, Variag. Thero axe four third-class cruisers—Norik. Boyarin, Djigit and Zabiaka. The gunboats and -other small vessels number eight, and there are twelve torpedoboats.'' It is pnobablo that there are many more torpedo-boats on the Far Eastern stations, since the three ships at Port Arthur have seldom been, vacant during the last few years. En route

to the Pacific are the following vessels; battlesJi.ps—Osliabia, Cesarewitch; firstclass armoured cruiser—Dayan; train-ing-ship—Okeau, torpedo-hoats—2l2, 213, 321 and 222. THE CHLYiTE ARMY. General Frey egr jbntcs a careful, and what tho Freni-.■'call documented, study of the Chinese Army to the “Revuo dos Dieux Mondos.” Unlike most of those commanding tho Allies during recent operations in China, ho was very much struck by the marked improvement which had taken place in the Chinese military organisation ever since 189-1. At the present moment an. immense effort ia being made to improve tho Chinese Army, and several of the most notable statesmen in Pekin and in the provinces are giving up an immense portion of their time to this question. To give an instance, tho Viceroy of Pc-ohi-li has laid down a number of rules which have been strictly followed. That section of the army raised by him consists entirely of young men from twenty to twenty-five yearn of age. Before a man can enlist he has to prove that ho can read and write, and he must also bear with him, from his native place, a certificate of character and morality. He touches lightly, but with significant emphasis, on tho question as to who among tho European nastions will bo chosen hy China to help her to reorganise her array. ■ Several of tho Mandarins have actually thought of asking her old enemy, Japan, to send instructors and officer's; but, ho says, this proposal has met with violent opposition. General Frey would naturally like to see France become the guide, philosophy and friend of 'the Chinese military authorities. Russia has also a claim to bo considered, and Germany has long been tho favourite military teacher of Eastern nations. Tho French military writer dreams of seeing the Fran co-Russian Alliance strengthened by the addition of China, and he goes so far as to say that such an event’s coming to pass might bring about an era of concord and universal peace.