THE WAR.

New Zealand Times, Volume LXXVI, Issue 5199, 13 February 1904, Page 7

THE WAR.

WHO IS TO WIW P STRENGTH AND RESOURCES OF THE COMBATANTS. (By “A.IX.K ”) Speculations as to tho possible winner in the forthcoming struggle b'etwoen Russia and Japan ale at lever lisat, and if public feeling is to be relied upon, as a criterion, then there can only be ono ending to tho war, and that ending a disastrous one for Russia, It is an historically acknowledged fact that Russia is the natural political enemy.of Great Britain, consequently the sympathy of tho whole English-speaking race is with Japan. On the other hand the question must iorcc itself upon every right ami fair-thinking mind, whether Russia should deserve to lose, and whether everything written, and said againyt her is true. Furthermore it may bo asked to what extent the world at largo uDuld profit should Japan oomo out victorious, or would it be bettor for tho political asi well as the commercial world if tho white race, instead of tho yellow, should provo itself tho bettor of tiro twp. If the actual physical fighting capabilities of Iho two nations are carefully weighed, and reasoning from tho following facts, and figures, it can safely ba assumed thait Russia has five chances to Japan's on o as a victor. Tho total fighting strength of the Russian army on a perfect war footing is 76 030 officers and 5,100,000 men, not counting Iho third and emergency reserves, which are only sent under fire in very urgent cai’cs of necessity. Pioneer corps .aro not included likewise. Against these figures must bo placed Japan's whole army of 10,800 officers, with 510,000 men all told, or roughly speaking, just about one-tenth, of Russia’s strength. Now. coming to naval, matters, wo havo tho following figures and statistics to rely up«n:—Russia's actual naval fighting strength now at the scat of war comprises vessel?!, classed as follows:—Eight first-class lino of battleships, twelve armoured heavy cruisers, ton pifDtectcd cruisers, fourteen gunboats of modern build, twenty-four torpedo boats, six torpedo destroyers, with a fair average speed of fifteen knots per hour. There aro also on tho naval station at Vladivostook and Port Arthur secondclass protected cruisers, but these are of ancient build and si-ow speed, although they cany modem ordnance. All the above enumerated vessels are’ of modern construction, -well armed willi first-class Kmpp quick-firing and Armstrong heavy guns, and are manned by a total of 28,500 ( men and 1760 officers, including the engineering department. Besides these, vessels no doubt have by this time been ordered from the Baltic and Black Sea : squadron as well as from the Pacific StaJapnn has a total naval strength of 72 vessels, which may be relied upon as effective! Her navv is made un as follows:—6 battleships, 7 armoured cruisers, 12 protected cruisers, 09 tornedo boats, S torpedo boat destroyers. All these vessels aro of good average speed, are armed with Tvrupp guns, both heavy and light calibre, and mostly modern typo, and are manned bv a total strength of 29.700 man, with 2SOO officers, Regarding the naval efficiency of the two nation’s, wo havo nothing to judge the Russian navy by, and can only assume that nothing has been loft undone to make it as efficient as her land forces. Japan, oil tbo other band, bas given an exhibition of her fighting, capabilities some ten years ago; but whether that exploit against the Chinese fleet may be counted in favour of her efficiency is a matter bettor ■ loft to public opinion. That tho actual naval fight at Yaln was not of a very serious nature, can be gathered from tho loss in killed am! wounded—Japan’s loss amounting to 115 killed and 103 wounded, and tho Chinese loss in actual fighting being 100 killed anti between 250 and 300 wounded. It will therefore be seen that the loss on the Chinese side was even smaller than on tho Japanese side, although China was at a great disadvantage from the onset of tho battle; and considering that some 25 or more vessels wero engaged, the loss will provo tho seriousness of the battle. Whether or not Japan will bo able to maintain herself against a modern fighting antagonist will, perhaps, by this timo havo been proved. Anyhow, whatever the issue of a naval engagement may bo, whether victorious or otherwise, Japan would still have the army to contend against, and if the Russian soldier, handled and led by his officer, and generalled by an old veteran soldier, is the same to-day as he was at the time of Frederick the Great, or Napoleon tho Groat, or even later, nt the battle of Plevna, then Japan will find, to her astonishment, that it is ono thing to boat China, but a totally different thing altogether to try and beat Russia; and taking into consideration that Japan would havo to fight on, as it were, foreign ground, whereas Russia is on her own ground, with all her retreat well secured, the future issue must be obvious. Coup-, ling with this the fact that Russia can put now strength into tho field whenever required (a tbing’Japan would be unable to do after a little while), it may justly be reasoned that Japan’s success is far from a certainty.

Now, would European nations profit should Russia lose, and would it be profitable to let tho yellow man win? Comparing Hanchnria, tho bone of contention, in its present state with the Manchuria of ten years ago, prosperity will be found where formerly was only very primitive agriculture and little dr no road communication. To-day, some of the heaviest wheat crops are reaped in Manchuria; large flour and oil mills have been erected at great cost; the hemp dressing and spinning industry is a speciality; machinery, which formerly had to be imported, is now manufactured on the soil; tho mineral and mining industry is in full swing, and everything has the appearance oi a happy and prosperous state of existence. To this may bo added that under no conditions whatever, has Russian immigration been admitted for the purpose of driving out the original inhabitants. If, then, such a state of things points to a rapid and astonishing improvement, under present administration, why should there be a desire on a European nation's side to see the yellow man step in, and bring devastation and ruin with him, where the white man has established a prosperous state of things. Manchuria has been at the beck and call of anyone who would have chosen to take possession of her years before ever Russia thought of settling it. Now that the hardest part of colonising has been performed, and Russia is just about to reap a return for her labours, Japan, who in no way can bo interested, but probably is prompted by greedy merchants and capitalists, wtio, perhaps are anxious to possess themselves of some of Manchuria's rich fields and mines, attempts to boldly dictate to a nation like Russia as to what shall or shall not bo done.

.Would-the .political world-profit if the

Trans-Siberian railway lino were totally destroyed, and all bridges and public buildings of importance wore levelled to the ground? Should .Japan be victorious iu this present struck*, her next move would bo to try and regain in China what she had to let go her hold of in ISJ3. And, in the event of China joining with Japan—and recent cable messages amriu such supposition—should these two nations be victorious, what protection would the rest of Asia have against a victory-drunk horde of 400,000,000 Chinamen led by Japanese officers ?

That Russia should follow the example of other nations by acquiring territory is no national crime, and it is far better for her to make mi outlet towards the East rather than to disturb the peace of Europe by falling upon Turkey or some of the Balkan states. It is a world-wide acknowledged fact that Great Britain stands foremost as a colonising nation, and wherever the British colonist settles, prosperity and comfort follow. If the same thing can bo said of Russia in Manchuria, why should nations be so anxious to thwart her? Only a few days ago a great meeting was hold in this city to cry out against the importation of Chinese into the Transvaal, which would starve the white man out; and this is more keenly felt considering that many of our colonials lie buried in South Africa- Js it not quite as possible that thes G rich men mav not .do the same, supposing that China and Japan should take the field unmolested? It would prove disastrous to these colonies, and white people in particular, were the ye-Mow races once allowed to run loose amongst us, because no white man would find employment as long as a yellow man could bo found. It would" be just ns disastrous to assist Japan and China to beat Russia as it would be wrong to assist the Ottoman Empire to overrun Europe. Perhaps these anticipations are premature, and so far there is no danger of Russia losing even though all the Mongolian tribes rose up against her. If it took three powerful European nations two years to take one town from Russia, it may safely be argued that it will taiie China and Japan, even giving them assistance, a great deal longer thin ihat la drive Russia out of Manchuria. And, ns far as the money question is concerned, it is an astonishing fact how Russia and Russian bonds have always commanded the highest price in the money ni'.rkot ami if Russia wanted money tomorrow, she could raise it just as readily in England as anywhere else. Ar present, I think she could lend instead of having to borrow, and as she has fur years, and step by step, surely and ?e----caroly forced her way into Manchuria, leaving nothing undone to make her stay certain, there is only one conclusion to draw, and that is that Russia is in Manchuria, and she is going to stay there; and however long the struggle to drive her out may last, everything points to Russia coming out the victor.