THE GREAT PEACE CONFERENCE.

New Zealand Times, Volume LXXII, Issue 4608, 12 March 1902, Page 7

THE GREAT PEACE CONFERENCE.

[All Rigiks Reserved.]

SPECIAL ARTICLE.

(15y J. Harold Ivloorc, Ji.A., LL.Ii.)

In tho month of May, 1899, a unique assembly of delegates of high rank representing tho civilised and .some of tho uncivilised nations of the worldmet ai tho ilaguo. Tho objoot of this great Convention, stated broadly, is disclosed by its title—tho furtherance of universal peace amongst nations. The Convention was summoned at tho instance of Nicholas 11., Emperor of Kussia-; and hero history repeated itself, for it was Alexander 11., Emperor of all tho Itus.sias, who summoned the Brussels Convontion 0 f 1874—in tho interests of tho great uanso of humanity. Tho results from tho Brussels Convention wore undoubtedly many and great; but tho work of tho Hague Convontion almost escaped notice, owing to groat events that followed so closely upon its deliberations. Tho final Act embodying tho results of tho Conforcnco was passed in July, and the Conference then broko up. Tho different Towers soon afterwards handed in their ratifications or partial ratifications of its provisions, Croat Britain being amongst, tho number who handed in a partial ratification only. Yet within a very few months of tho sitting of the Conference our Mother Country was .suddenly plunged into a costly land war, of which tho oiul has not yet como. Obviously, thoroforo, tho Conforonco had failed to carry into effect any practical adoption of tlio ideal of universal peace. But it did achieve great and practical results in certain directions, and those cannot bo overlooked. Tho last decado has soon much of war, and for a short period of ton years tho list of land and sea struggles is a heavy one The furtherance of universal peace thus stands out in greater contrast, and a consideration of tlio riso of this idea, and tho practical results achieved, affords a distinct rdief at tho present tirno. An ideal of universal peace is not a new conception, and before considering tho results of tho great Peace Confarenco a brief history of the proposal may bo interesting. Tho foundation of tho idea has been firmly laid by writers of ovory nation, and different methods of carrying it into effect havo long been advocated. Tho most familiar of these proposed schemes is that of International Arbitration. But tho main obstaolo to tho success of this method' of averting war has always been well recognised—tho difficulty of tlio composition

of the Court of Arbitrators. It was necessary to find a tribunal to whose award civilised communities would bow with no more demur than they would exhibit in submitting to the decision of a Court of justice. No such tribunal could exist, because there could be no coercive power behind it: each referring; State would bo a Sovereign State, and thoreforo owning no superior. A- refusal to accept a decision would lead to the aggrieved party resorting to force to carry into effect the award, and so the starting point is again reached. In England a Peace Society _ was formed as far back as 1816, and this Society consistently advocated the principle of arbitration. lb further advocated by all the moans in its power a gradual, proportionate, and .simultaneous disarmament, by all the nations of Europe Following up .tho tenets of this Society," a groat national memorial from all tho Froo Churches of England was presented to our lato Queen about ton years ago. This document was signed by many thousands of England's best and noblest citizens. It prayed for tho recognition of tho principle of arbitration in lieu of war, and tho adoption of some practical step designed to promote the reduction of armaments; it freely recognised the difficulties that lay in tho_ way of action, but relied on tho high influence of England being exerted towards tho promotion of international poaco. Tho way for tho Peace Conference was therefore to a great extent paved by national opinion, and it is not surprising to find these two principles Iho main ones discussed by tho Conference. Tho question of disarmament got a short shift, from tho sub-committeo appointed to consider and report upon tho principle : it recognised that the restriction of military burdens was greatly to be desired for tho material and moral welfare of humanity, but could see no way to tho practical adoption of international disarmament. The difficulty was obviously to regulate by convention the fignro of effective forces, without regulating at the samo time other elements of national defence; and it was no less difficult to regulate tho elements of that defenco as organised in each country according to very different viows. The Conference passed as a unanimous resolution tho desirability for tho restriction of military budgets, br"t no roferoneo to tho matter waa niado in tho final Act passed. In view of this resolution, it is interesting to noto tho immediate effect of an outbreak of war. By how much have our military budgets increased since tho passing of tho resolution, and our military burdens become heavier in consequence? The final Act ombodying tho results of tho Conferenco contained tho following agreements and declarations: (1) A convention for tho pacific settlement of international disputes (arbitration). (2) A convention concerning tho laws and customs of war on lanrt. (3) A convention for tho adaptation to naval warfare of tho principles of the Geneva Convention. (4) A prohibition of tho throwing of projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other analogous means (this prohibition to be in forco for five years). (5) A prohibition of projectiles intended solely to diffuse asphyxiating or deleterious gases. (G) A prohibition of bullets which expand easily in tho human body. And here should bo noted tho varying attitudes taken up by some of tho Powers with regard to tho dHorenfc articles of tho Convention. Tho majority of the Powers ratified all six articles. Great Britain, however, ratified only the first three; tho United Stales-ratified 1, 3 and 4 only; Portugal ratified all the articles except tho prohibition of tho employment of expanding bullets, and Norway and Sweden all the articles excepting 3. Undoubtedly tho most important of the articles is that relating to arbitration. The project of arbitration provided that tho signatory Powers should each nominate not more than four members of tho Court, and" the Court of Arbitrators upon any reference should consist of any number of arbitrators choson by tho referring Powers out of this number. An ■lnternational Bureau was set up at the Hague, ai>d a procedure arranged. Tho Court thus provided for partakes of tho nature of a permanent Court, and so is better constituted than a Court consisting of arbitrators chosen by each side for a special case. It is truo that it will sti'l have no coercive forco at its back; but it must be rejnembered that disapprobation acts as a very strong sanction in the dealings of States and nations with each other. A very memorable instance is the action of Russia in 1870 with respect to tho Treaty of Paris. The Russian Government under that treaty was tirohihited from having a fleet in tho Black Sea, but takof tho outbreak of war. it

at onco repudiated its treaty obligations by establishing a fleet at the Dardanelles. This action was met by a howl ot indignation from tho other Powers or Kuropo, and tho result was that tho jUissiaa Government climbed down from iadefon.sihlo attitude. Ami whe . l ? ,u----poworfut nation like Russia shows itsolt amenablo to opinion, what may not'bo expected from tho smaller lowers, ihi. international arbitration is therefore no more theory unsupported by any practical efforts for its enforcement; it Has boon frequently resorted to in special cases, and has now passed into the mtor national rules laid down by nations for their guidance. The adaptation to naval warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention is likely to bo carried into effect in some shape in tho next naval war. Iho principles of tho Geneva Convention a. t wounded arc familiar to many; the rc Geneva cross worn by ambulance and bearer corps in tho field owes its origin to this Convention. Tho red cross betokens immunity to its wearers while engaged in their work. Yet tho present Boor" war has provided numerous instances of firing upon hospitals and ambulance bearers, calling forth strong protests from the Commander-m-Chief. Prom a legal point ot view, reprisals would bo absolutely justifiable, or at least a total disregard of the principles of tho Genova Convention when dealing with uncivilised belligerents. A in point is tho action of France in arming all medical attendants and bearers of tho ambulances with revolvers during tho native wars in Madagascar. ihe adaptation of the Genova Convention rules to naval warfare would imply the provision and maintenance of hospital ships, distinguished by distinctive flags, and similar provisions as to.tho treatment of wounded and the care and disposal of tho sick. Articles 5 and G were not adopted by Great Britain, but while the present war has witnessed the active disregard of Article 5 by the use of lyddite as a destructive agency, the use of expanding bullets by tho enemy has called forth severe protests from tho English Generals. And hero it is interesting to note the provisions of tho Declaration of St. Petersburg, promoted by Alexander 11., *nd signed in 1868 by all the civilised Powers, under which tho Powers agreed to renounce tho use by their forces on land or sea of an explosive projectile of a weight below 400 grammes —a little more than fourteen ounces—charged with fulminating or inflammable matter. It is an open question as to whether the conical bullets which are universal in modern armament do not in fact cause pain as severe and wounds as incurable as ever did tho explosive bullets which were just coming in about tho year 1868. Tho progress of science has often had tho effect of defeating attempts to increase tho area of humanity.

Tho Conference separated after almost unanimously voting certain further wishes, and specifying other matters as to which a further conference should ho held. Ono of these matters was, no doubt, dictated by recent events in the development of naval warfare—the consideration of tho question of the bombardment ■ of ports, towns and villages by a naval forco. Tho rules upon this point have received an unlooked for recognition in quite recent years, and the wish of the Conforonco was undoubtedly aimed at the pfaotice which has grown up with regard to this question. In 1882 tho French Admiral 1 Aube expressed an opinion so decided as to at once attract attention even outside his own country. Perceiving the fact that a great part of England’s strength lay in her largo and wealthy sea-port towns and cities, he expressed himself in an article on the naval warfare of tho future strongly of opinion that "armoured fleets will turn their powers of attack and destruction against the coast towns of tho enemy, irrespectively of whether they aro commercial or military, and will burn them and lay thorn in ruins, or at least will hold them mercilessly at ransom.” Ho was careful to point out that this was the true policy of Franco' against England, with the result that his country at onco identified itself with such a view hy placing him at tho head of the naval administration of tho country. When such a doctrine is examined closely, its proportions in relation to England aro at onco disclosed. This opinion was at onco combated as open to objections, and in England it was met by the unsound argument that tho navy should be sufficiently strong to prevent any such means of attack from without, quite apart from the strength of coastal defences. But in the naval manoeuvres of 1888 and 1889 an attempt was made to bring home to the coast towns the necessity for adequate defences by tho adoption of this very principle, and a practical illustration of how it might bo carried into effect. Imaginary bombardments and were inflicted all along tho coast; in some instances an officer was simply sent in with a message demanding a largo sum of money by a force which would not have dared to sot foot on land. It was objected that such a course gave an implied right to an enemy to act in a similar manner, but tho objection was answered by many naval authorities declaring such a course to bo a operation of war, and ono which it might bo expected an enemy would adopt. Other objections were urged against the view held by the French Admiral. _ It is not to he denied that contributions might bo levied by a maritime force where there was the ability to seize, or the power to enforce demands. But a demaud by an enemy for a sum of money from a place in which ho is not, which he probably dare not enter, which he cannot hold even temporarily, and consequently he is unable to seize and sack, stands on a different footing. An undefended town may fairly bo summoned by a vessel or squadron to pay a contribution ; if it refuses, a forco must be landed; if it still refuses, like measures may be taken to those which aro taken by armies in the field. A levy of money in any other way is not properly a contribution at all; it is a ransom from destruction. If it is permissible, it is so because there is a right to devastate, and because ransom is a mitigation of that right. These arguments form the main objections urged against the views given out by the French Admiral: and it must be conceded that England has identified herself with the practice. Here, undoubtedly, is good work for a future Conference to do in settling the harsh and severe rules upon this point. It is interesting to point out how nearly tho same considerations affect the colonies, and to show tho real significance of such an act of war with regard to them.. It is now an acknowledged fact that at the time of the Russian “scare” of 1878 it was intended by the Russian Government that the fleet lying at Vladiyostock should sail for tho Australian ports and lay them under contribution immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. The fear of a Russian invasion of ten years ago will still bo in tho minds of many. Our colony would probably have shared in such a scheme had it boon carried out, and would perhaps have been even better prey than the larger and better defended Australian ports. Tho small Australian squadron could do but little in watching* ah the same time the wholo of the Australasian ports.

Many other interesting points could bo raised with regard to the work of the

Conference, but enough has been said to indicate the progress of humanitarian principles which resulted in this meeting of the world’s delegates, and the position reached by their discussions and resolutions. Tho necessity for war exists as a present fact; but there are agencies at work everywhere seeking to control or weaken tho prodigious forces which seem to make for war, and to mitigate its severities and cruelties. Not tho least of those agencies is tho work done by tho great Peace Conference. Some few years ago, Lord Salisbury said“l feel it is our duty to maintain and sustain the federated action of Europe. Tho federated action of Europe, if we can maintain it, is our sole hope of escape from tho constant terror and calamity of war, the constant pressure _ of tho burdens of an armed peace which weigh down tho spirits and darken tho prospects of every nation in this part of the world.” Possibly here, and here alone, lies tho ultimate solution of the problem, and undoubtedly this utterance embodies all the schemes for tho establishment of a great and universal peace. Tho idea is a familiar one; but it marks a great stop in advance when an ideal which has heretofore been recognised only in tho columns of the organs of independent political thinkers, or by tho idealists, is taken up and confirmed upon the housetop of tho world by tho Prime Minister of England.

The subject of next -week’s Special Article will be “THE LEGAL PUNISHMENT OF CRIME/' By Mr W. E. Haseldon, S.M.