DE WET ON THE WAR.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1611, 14 January 1903, Page 68 (Supplement)

DE WET ON THE WAR.

( cr New Zealand. Times/’)

General I>e Wet, who throughout the war was between the lines of nearly every despatch, is now before the world with a bulky book of his own, with many thousands of lines of narrative and criticism. The readers of that book will be appreciative, and then* interest will be sustained, partly by reason oi the personality of the writer, and partly on account of the importance of the events he describes, together with the greatness of the questions lie raises. In places, too, it will be as difficult f_r the reader to find the truth between the lines of the book as it Was for our troops to catch their author during his many between the lines of those despatches. First, as to the personality, the book appears to proclaim in every line that General De Wet is a man strong and brave, full of fight, with all his prejudices thick upon him. Whatever he says is absolutely honest, Oven when it is what known facts compel us to regard as -far from the truth. In which connection it may be remarked that the Boer leader, who by his own admission wanted in the last days to carry on a war which he in the same breath confessed to have become, from the Boer side, wholly impossible, is not precisely the best guide to pilot one through all the mazes of the strategy of so extended and eventful a struggle as the great war of 1899-1902. We see with what tremendous hopes he went into that struggle, and h© never lets us lose sight of the keen desire for independence which animated him throughout. Wo see him after the turning point of the war, when Ladysmith hau. been relieved, when Roberts had swep, the country up to Pretoria, and had got control of the commandoes operating on the immensely extended line of his communications, and when Buller’s army had come into touch with the host under the Commander-in-Chief —even then we see Be Wet hopefully certain of the result. Napoleon said in 1814, when the allies, having got between him and Paris, had left him in tl > air, “We wi,. beat them yet”; so De Wet and his tough brethren declared at Pretoria that they would starve Lord Roberts into submission. The rest of fne brotherhood lost the last remnant of this spirit in those terrible “drives.” De Wet alone hoped on, with the passion 01 the man who hated giving way, and always took to the stick to settle all differences on the subject, until forced to give way himself, and even now is at a loss to account for why he did it. It is a strong proof of the strength aiiu truth of his character that De Wet has adopted the conclusion that, after independence, loyalty is the best thing for brave men, who will he as valorous for the next best as they were for the best. That such a one should disparage Lore. Roberts’s strategy was only to be expected. ' Paardeburg, for instance, w. know to have been a tremendous factor in the war. De "Wet makes little c-f tiie scientific strategy that wrought that disaster to the Boer arms, by attributing it to a “colossal blunder” on the part of Gronje. Ho but repeats whai the Boers have said all. along, as Mr Anger, who acted as correspondent in their armies, tells with much circumstance in what is in some respects one of the best books on the war. De corroborates all, even to the allegation that he himself had opened a way for Cronje’s army, and that nothing but tlm obstinacy of Cronje kept him in the lines, where ho was forced to surrender. But neither the' Boers before him nor De Wet himself have explained what this “opening” was, nor have they dealt with the question of the terrible fire that must have swept over Cronje’s army the moment it leit the shelter of its entrenchments. The event justifies Cronje’s judgment rather than De Wet’s. The latter says, with reason, that this result unnerved the Boers for months, causing, among other things, the loss of the great battle of Poplar Grove, and the evacuation, without a shot, of Bloemfontein. The Boers have always maintained that at Poplar Grove their men fought well against the enormous force with which Roberts enveloped them. De Wet’s story agrees with the British accounts, that rhe Boers saw in the movements of the British general the makings for them of another Paardeburg, and got away out of the jaws of destruction as fast as they could. At Bloemfontein it required no allegation of Boer treachery to account for the abandonment of the place. The evident explanation is that after the capture of one army and the loss of a great battle by another, the Boers, in presence of an enterprising commander pressing his advantages, were unable to hold a city which, unprotected by natural con.' ditions, had not been put into a position of defence.

Of the resistless sweep of the British Marshal across the vast territory between th<? two Boer.capitals, during the whole of which the B6er armies, under their best general, Botha, who made no mistakes, could do no more than just keep out of reach of the relentless military machine forcing them backward, rebuilding the bridges and the railway line almost as fast as they were destroyed, 'and at the same time keeping the enemy on the move, giving him no chance to manoeuvre or concentrate —

concerning this great operation of war De Wet seems to be silent; at all events as to its strategic import. He is so, because he believed the Boers were drawing the Maarshal into a trap, -where, far from his base, they would starve his troops by cutting the railway lines. But the Marshal, who, of course, knew the danger and was anxious, as he said him- - self, proved that he could protect his lines. It was not lack of Boer discipline, though no doubt there was much to be desired, in the way of discipline ; it was the foresight of the Marshal which kept his lines open. Had Prirsloo and the others not been captured, it might have been otherwise. Hence, Prinsloo and the ether two leaders who surrendered with him are denounced by De Wet as traitors. He justifies the charge by pointing to his own escape from the trap. But De Wet got away because the officer who was in charge of the pass for which he was making was foolish enough to retire for a mile to give his horses the advantage of good grass, not knowing the enemy was so near. De Wet took instant advantage of the opening and galloped through, in the teetli of a heavy, but of course wild, fire, with his commando. The others were favoured by no such accident, and it is not fair to describe them, therefore, as traitors who sold their country. A good deal of the British success after Pretoria was, no doubt, due, as De Wet implies, to the advance of Buller’s & rmy into the Transvaal. But the credit, undoubtedly due to that British general for the skilful tactics which broke down the opposition to his junction of the army of the Trugela with the army of Pretoria does not diminish the credit due to the Marshal who devised the whole operation of which Buller’s advance was an appointed part. At the same time, all fair r minded men will glad that Buller’s later operations have received substantial Boer recognition. For the rest of his service, opinions differ, and though, we do not thinx there is much chance of a reversal of the verdict that has been pronounced against Buller, it will continue to be admitted that General Buller’s position before the Tugela was certainly mesr, difficult and quite unprecedented. But that cannot detract from the reputation of the man whose brain, after he had insisted on the relief of Ladysmith, devised the plan of campaign which opened with the relief of Kimberley, swept Cronje into the surrender of Paardeburg, captured Bloemfontein, swept on to Pretoria on a front of thirty-five miles, captured that city after a tougn battle, and maintaining himself there in spite of all the efforts of an active enemy, broke the back of the war. Roberts found chaos, and in a few weeks had struck home with the organised power of a first-class military instrument —with a force which prevented the enemy from ever making real headway again. No doubt some Boer commandoes failed to comply with instructions, hut on the other hand so did the British also. There De Wet’s criticism is answered by counterbalancing facts On the other hand the force of bis admission that the Marshal was ever overwhelming the commandoes with superior force —an admission which represente the highest compliment that can be paid to generalship—is not impaired by anything in De Wet’s pages.