THE FUTURE OF OUR ARMY.

New Zealand Mail, 18 January 1900, Page 15

THE FUTURE OF OUR ARMY.

(London* “Spectator.”)

s; r Wolfe Barry, in his letter to Wednesday’s “Times” raises a question whAli has been in many men’s minds during the last few days—the question whether our army is equal to the national needs. Ho asserts that, from the military point of view, wo are trading with insufficient capital, and he suggests that wo ought to add at once an oxtra hundred thousand men to the British army. Without endorsing this specific proposal, wo axe of opinion that Sir Wilfe Barry has raised a most important problem, and that there is need for a very careful stocktaking' in the military department. Again, wc agree with him that the problem should be tackled not merely by the Government and tiro soldiers, but by the outside public, anad especially By business men with clear heads and a fixed determination to force the nation to consider the army in the light of our Imperial responsibilities and of the animosities add jealousies created by our world-wide Empire. For this purpose nothing could be better than the formation of a League or Committee: —call it what you will—of civilians who, without attempting to dictate to the soldiers in regard to their own special business, should strive to educate public opinion in regal’d to our military requirements. Pending, however, action of that kind, it is by no means out of place for tlie press to discuss the lessons taught by the war and by the despatch of the army corps to South Africa. That events have shown that our. military strength is not great enough for our needs must, wo hold, be taken for granted. The problem is—what is the best way of increasing it with the least pecuniary sacrifice to the nation ? -

The notion of recourse to conscription we may dismiss at once as contrary to our habits and historical development. Wliat we might do at a supreme crisis wo need not consider, for our desire is to discuss ways and means for preventing the occurrence of that supreme crisis. Our army serves two needs. It acts as an Imperial police in India and elsewhere, ancl it is required to protect these islands, w e will say from invasion—for that- we entirely agree is the work of the fleet—but n om that dread of invasion which, human nature being what it is, could not but do incalculable harm were these islands ever denuded of troops. No one coukl accept more fully than we do that the fleet must be so large and so strong as to make it impossible for any invader to land, but it would be ridiculous to press this theory till nothing r-! f *V> . < r ol ;P oral «. i guard remained in (heat Britain. There is, besides this effi C^ h - 01 V 0U i tb ? ground of the moral m - E:l Sl a nd, another that is worth ■ p er T S ‘ x Y 0 do not want to tempt the Continental Powers to make even iSid nSU R 6 f S 4 UI attem Pt to invade Englf We , entirely denuded Engand °f tloops the temptation to try ° r eighty thousand uresistffilo ° U Tf C ° aS S A"° uld be almos t irresistible. _ It- is just as well not to guve our neighbours any excuse for making the attempt. \V e mav til o if ‘f!»‘ wo s lJl ,1,4 a “od tS Ljp A considerable military force in al , fffi But t to ondlt l o +i Aithin these islands. +v>o grant this is not to assert that sms normal desthfv i P % e ' S ’x-T llicll is the ThiAbeiim to “if !, a 81 / Jsh regiment, we should do it t 0 113 V, Jat wllat af-liome ndrfinnc -organise the sta-v----ifi such a P wtv om \ force n shall be able to Primary brnmess” l^ ° f r °° P ‘ S wbose Empire 6 poIl ® J . u S of the the following wtys im C To- n l&h - this - I’ 1 wo would increase i-TA' 1 • begm Wltl b Militia, and bn, tllc . efficiency 0 f the strength and 2 lt i i Up , to its foil » ballot hnU\° 11 d do 110 b bounty offered to Milfti lnoreas “*g l be we would m a ke t-b« v amen ’’ A’) next afiair of smart tiff Y ® oluanr .y less an joore the char^ b i a . ls > aad give it (3J more important ht v^ r(?Sular ],o: ' se i improving the Militit i, T’ eyen tbad the devising cf a rl , 111 md , services of tU*»f P < n foi utilising the Population which porti °L of the ondcrttaSS 1 ]® 1 ! 0 ** drill for doing tbit i f a rifle - Our Territorial Arrav R oforma special ar ° every year a ’ prcscnb there men i n full vigour ? larg ® number of thirty-five years oh) 1° ° f , thcm only mg out of the tj 01 so -’ who are passman 1 V th 1 Ve losing aII S an who haA finiOini i • . ever y army Reserve, Tb thnc ™ the Militia Eeser-e + passin S out of has finished his’ Vru-r• Vory man who |f d alsf >.to every man wf T lga ?. einont ’ ms service i n / I*, l has finished n °t more than f n w° s e orce and was aad to every ty ' fi , vc yea « of age Vo! ausec utivc vears ha « - been for j olunteer force A i, lfe an efficient in a f?rty-fivc, the rA was Kob more than «‘e following 6 fcS? nt sboald make . .Uiself 01} tJlc j. • t you will enrol you shall receive * ! ° ! Tcr ritorial 5 of £2, and y an annual hounyoa have not fSl agc of .sixty, if mditary ohlimatfe cai T y oub your Pemton of 10s t ’ A ll have a Your military clili ctnr CS death.' hability to h a c if a , ious shall bo fa) bo called out for the de-

fence of Great Britain or Ireland according to your residence, but in no ease to be sent out of these islands; (b) putting m an appearance every quarter at the military depot nearest to your place of residence; (c) firing a specified number of rounds at, rifle practice aurmg the year; (d)- going through sucli military exercises on six days in the year as shall be arranged by the military authorities [i.e., drills on Sat--11 r day afternoons in summer.]. Of course this is a-very rough scheme, but wo believe that in some such way as this a most useful reservoir of force would! be formed—a force which would not be used to fill up the regular battailous like the present Reserves, but would bo split up into battalions of its ?wn. As each man would be attached to the depot, armoury, or centre nearest his home, and as lie ivould be aecustomed to go there four times a year to get his 10s and to do his rifie practice, the work Of mobilisation would bo easy, and. rapid. Such men would not, perhaps,- make smart regiments or, yiaiade, but unless w r e arc' greatly mistaken, they would be extremely fonnida VvK- or fming hedgerows ancl hillsides, w -fN ext wo would iiitrociiice a new spirit jinto the Volunteer force. ' The attempt to turn thorn into imitation line regiments where the man never .trunks, but merely moves at the officer’s word like a little wheel m a machine, should be abandoned. The Volunteers should be treated as what they are namely, civilians with arms ill their hanos and plenty cf pluck in their hearts. The attempt to make them look and reet like regulars should be given up, but they should he taught above everything else to shoot. The chief test of Volunteer efficiencv should be good shooting. For the rest, their organisation should oc that of an irregular force. Except for just learning the simplest drill, they should be trained to rely each man on himself; the principal duty of the officers being to act as inspiriting guides and to keep suppues of rood and fresh ammunition in toe field In fact, a Volunteer battalion should model itself on a Boer commando, rather than on a British regiment. '(5) Lastly, we should very greatly increase the field and horse artillery ot the British army, both for foieign and home use. At present we nave a smaller proportion of guns to infantry than other armies. In future we ought to have the largest and most efficient force of regulars and liio-hlv artillery in the world. "Onr artillery force should be so large that even it we had sent a very largo number of batteries abroad we should have en- °. llgb M, fc borne to stiffen a- force of MilleiTrtorlal Army aud Volunteers f A ™ l b PA str °ng, besides providing roi the artillery force required to cooperate with th.e nucleus of regulars wao, of course, would always remain in the islands. Practically we cannot have too much mobile artillery. We do not say this because we have been run toThe V effi tbe , artillery idea owing to the efficiency shown by.that arm in tirn present war. _We are fully aware that' artillery has its limitations. We insist, however, on the need of a superabundance of artillery (because it L niM IC i° wblcb cannot bo improvised, and fy? because it is the only force in winch an army without the conscription can hope to rival one which has got ho 1011l 011 - A natio » which *o on. \ olunteors can practically have g whfdi a m!rf ° f artU - lery a naHoJ wi lnn n ai A ?T' VICO IS universal. ahaU be told, no doubt, that and tWrt arC cmde .and ill-digested, une that they are so in detail we are quite prepared to believe. At'the came time, we contend that in. tlie end the nation will carry out- our two chid Armv h f ar n to create a T GrriAuny for defence out of the -n-eat 4 r tT4 ( d,il ¥ ■“« °f all - ohe -found m the couiiti'v* 12) So Co^§P ome i XtQnt tbe tactics of finl vJ'U and to our Vi , Volunteers;, not as sham Regulars,, but as, true Irregulars Jiarpshooters who are not afraid of wlnfivould ab the proper moment, fA° fi® a fiJ° to spread over the ffice of the country before an invadinoenemy, and who would check his advance ‘ t GV ery ridge of down, every hedge every bank, every ditch. We have not mountains like the Boers but v-e •md C her abyriuth3 of enclosed fields, mid behind these our men might learn to fight as effectively as if they were rocks ancl kopjes. Given that these oim , ar A done and that, we make tiJery the most iiiimcrons 'nirl effective in the world, the hulk of our legular army may be quite safely left to its essential duties of Imperial police