INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

New Zealand Herald, Volume 82, Issue 25215, 30 May 1945, Page 5

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

LINES OF REFORM SKETCHED

By A. E, C. HARE. Ph.D. Voider Research Fellow in Industrial Relations, Victoria University College,

No. 11. Theoretically it is the duty of the Department of Labour to keep watch on all disputes, to see that the machinery for settlement is used without delay and to take whatever steps are necessary if the negotiations break down. In practice, however, the Department of Labour only comes into the picture when a dispute is reported to it and generally only after <;he initial steps to find a solution have failed. Thus the department often starts at a disadvantage. Its activities are not preventive, as they should he, but only curative, and often then only begun at a late stage in the disease. Moreover, though tlio Department of Labour administers the Strike and Lockout Emergency Regulations, which in theory cover all industries, it practically never intervenes in disputes in State enterprises such as the railways, State mines, or public works, and seldom handles disputes in the coalmining industry, which are the responsibility of the Department of Mines. The Department of Labour, therefore, only partially covers industry. Some important industries which give rise to much unrest are outside the scope of its work. Further, the Department of i Labour suffers from serious difficulties in handling industrial disputes. The chief of these arise from the gross understating of the department. The inspectors of awards, who are technically the source from which the. Department of Labour obtains information concerning locnl industrial disputes, are heavily overburdened with duties as inspectors of factories and weights and measures and with a host of other duties, besides that of keeping an eye on disputes. In the larger towns this is not so serious as in the country districts where, as nt Hamilton, for instance, the inspectors will have the greatest difficulty in keeping in touch with events in industries scattered over a very wide area, the dairy factories,- the meat freezing works, and the mines of the Waikato. In practice it is virtually impossible for the local inspector. to do more than to draw the attention of the department to a dispute once it has broken out; and the inspector himself may not hear of a local strike in a distant part of his district until a day or two after it has begun. Nobody's Business

The Department of Labour thus usually intervenes in the dispute at n late stage, and its intervention is usually limited to arranging a dispute* committee and to sending in the local conciliation commissioner. Little further attention is then given to the matter, unless the dispute takes a more serious turn or a breakdown of negotiations or threat of a strike make further steps urgent. There is no official of the department, with authority of a national scope, whose exclusive duty it is to anticipate troubles, to endeavour to prevent the outbreak of a dispute, to watch disputes once they have begun, and at evenstage to see that negotiations are proceeding satisfactorily. The fault thus lies chiefly in the fact that there is no organisation wholly and exclusively devoted to watching for industrial troubles, ready at the least ■ sign of- friction to set in motion the mechanism for settling disputes, always observing negotiations to see that no delay occurs, and ever alert to take the necessary steps to forestall trouble". It must he repeated that it is not new methods of settlement of disputes which are needed; it is the prompt and efficient use of the existing means, coupled with constant watchfulness to anticipate troubles by an official who is free from all other duties. Dominion Oommlsioner What steps should be taken? The first step should be the appointment of a Commissioner for Industrial Disputes, who should he given the responsibility for maintaining industrial peace throughout the Dominion. His function would not be that of adjudicating on disputes or acting as a conciliation commissioner, nor would he have any direct connection with the industrial conciliation and arbitration system. His sole duty should be that of watching for signs of industrial friction, of setting the appropriate machinery for the settlement of disputes in motion wherever these signs appear, and of seeing that the least possible delay occurs in so doing. He would necessarily have to receive daily reports on the progress of all negotiations and reports from all parts of the country on any signs of industrial friction. He would need to keep in close touch with both sides, so that he would immediately be informed of any likelihood of negotiations breaking down before they actually did so, and would therefore be ready to forestall trouble. The person appointed to such a position would need considerable abilities. He need not have a great knowledge of industrial law and the I.C. and A. Act, because his function would not be to negotiate detail, but rather to supervise negotiations carried on by others. The commissioner would, however, have to be a person of high personal standing in the public estimation, because he would hjive to be able to command respect from both sides; and it need hardly be added that no person attached to a political party would "be able to fulfil the difficult task of the commissioner, because he would be unlikely to be able to inspire confidence as an impartial seeker of industrial peace. Above Departmental Control Further, the commissioner would have to he given such high standing that he would be able, as occasion required, to make representations which would carry weight in the highest quarters, and so that he would have direct access to any Minister without working through the head of a department. Thus the commissioner should be responsible directly to the Prime Minister. It might seem as though the place for such an official should be in the Department of Labour; hut for two reasons this would be unsatisfactory. As has been pointed out, the Department of Labour does not cover all industries; and it is. essential that the commissioner should have power to intervene in railway disputes or disputes in the State mines or on Public Works. Second, the commissioner could not be attached to a department without making him subordinate to the permanent head of it; and anything which restricted the unfettered freedom of the commissioner to act in the interests of industrial peace would automatically stultify his work. The commissioner would have to be given the widest powers of intervention in industrial disputes, including disputes between the Government and its employees, and also the duty of representation where any policy or practice seemed to him likely to lead through friction to a dispute, whether or not it had already done so. An efficient commissioner would, of course, necessarily work rather by virtue of tho respect he inspired than by legal powers of intervention. While it seems essential that tht commissioner should be independent 01 any department, he would hare to work

in close conjunction with ths Department of Labour and with the conciliation commissioners. The work of the commissioner would depend to a great extent upon a rapid and accurate information service; and for this purpose it would hi necessary to appoint district assistants, working with the Department of Labour, to act as the eyes and ears of the commissioner. In the smallest centres it might be possible* to Triage use of the services of voluntary watchers of industry, whose function would be simply to report any signs of friction. Since much travelling might be involved, it might be necessary to appoint one or two assistant commissioners, to whom the Commissioner for Industrial Disputes could delegate his powers. Had a Commissioner for Industrial Disputes been at work, a number of the strikes mentioned might have been avoided. For instance, he would have called the attention ot the Government to the delays associated with the Railways Industrial Tribunal and the risk of industrial strife if a decision was not arrived at promptly. Again, when the miners' agreement was due to expire in April, 1944, he would have been in a position to urge the importance of calling a conference before Christmas, 1943, to forestall possible troubles. Working on the principle that prevention is better than cure, the commissioner would also have another function. , Centres of Trouble There are throughout the Dominion certain industrial establishments which are "plague spots"; that is, places at which there is constant friction, always threatenyig trouble which may at any time involve a whole industry in a dispute. These establishments are well recognised by officials of both sides in the industries concerned. It should be the duty of the commissioner to investigate, the reasons for the existence of bad relations in these establishments and to endeavour to ob- | better relations between the workers and the management by maintaining a constant watch over them ? by advice to the management find unions, and by whatever other steps seem necessary. Only by such means can these ever-present sources of industrial friction be gradually removed. The commissioner would also have the very important task of studying the means available for the settlement of disputes, and doubtless from time to time would be able to point to the existence of certain faults in the machinery and to suggest new ways of surmounting difficulties. He would therefore be able to make recommendations in the _ appropriate quarters whenever any improvement in negotiating methods became necessary and in this way would he able to maintain the machinery for settling industrial disputes at the highest possible pitch of efficiency. (Concluded)