THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, FEBRUARY' 3, 1942 UNIFIED PACIFIC COMMAND

New Zealand Herald, Volume 79, Issue 24189, 3 February 1942, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, FEBRUARY' 3, 1942 UNIFIED PACIFIC COMMAND

In his first statement as New Zealand Minister to Washington, Mr. Nash has advocated the creation of a unified command in the Pacific area. There will be no dissent here, although the public is probably under the impression that the matter was settled on January 3 when General Wavell was named as supreme, commander of all Allied sea, land and air forces in the South-west Pacific area. Since then, however, Mr. Churchill has announced that the eastern approaches to Australia and New Zealand have been styled the Anzac area and placed under American command. Furthermore, the United States has accepted responsibility for communications, between North America and the Anzac area. Meanwhile it has emerged that. General Wavell's supreme command does not extend east, of Dutch New Guinea and, probably, no further west than the north-western tip of Sumatra. In the Pacific area, therefore, it appears there already exist three Allied commands or defence sectors and these are not all-embracing. Australia and New Zealand seem each to retain autonomy for home defence, and it may be that the northern approaches to Australia (East New Guinea and neighbouring island groups), belong to the Commonwealth and not to the Anzac sector. In addition, the extremely important considerations of the relationship of China and Burma to the Pacific commands remain for definition. From all this it is clear that the ideal of a unified Pacific command is far from realisation and that Mr. Nash has done well to raise the subject anew. He favours the formation in Washington of a Pacific War Council and of a single military command. A first question is to define the scope of the Pacific command, because on the western fringe of the Pacific the campaign laps over into the Indian Ocean. A convenient answer would be to include all countries directly affected by the Japanese offensive west of the international date line. That would leave the East Pacific as the province of the United States and Canada, as they would probably prefer. The unified Pacific command would then embrace the A-B-C-D Powers, with Australia and New Zealand. That would carry the zone as far west as 100 degrees east, or thereabouts. Burma represents a marginal case. At present the country is included in the Indian command, but its security is as vital to China as to India. If the old military link with India is retained, then the strongest and closest liaison with the Pacific command must be established. A single Pacific command stretching through 80 degrees of longitude appears to be a large order until it is remembered that the enemy is working under a single command and to a single plan—and with disturbing' efficiency. The best way to meet his singleness of purpose is by equal singleness of purpose, equal coordination, and equal combination. As it is, the enemy is being opposed by half a dozen different commands The tendency of each will be to concentrate on its own sectional problems, to seek to solve them separately by amassing all the force it can muster in its own area, and to place second the larger regional problem whose essence is the defeat of Japan. Thus the Dutch saw the attack on Amboina in relation to Java, while Australians-were quick to espy a threat to Darwin and New Guinea. Its primary significance, however, is "the threat to the eastwest line of Allied communications. Again, if every sectional command seeks' to amass and even hoard all the manpower and munitions it can procure, the building up of the strategic reserves essential to taking the initiative against Japan will be made slow and difficult, if not impossible. The solution is a unified Pacific command, exercising supreme authority and direction over the various sectional commands from China to the Anzac area. Its necessary complement in the political sphere would be a Pacific War Council, representative of the A-B-C-D Powers, the Dominions, India and Burma. The council would have to serve the command in respect of allocations of men, munitions and supplies, and its composition should give it the strength to influence Allied counsels and world strategy. Mr. Churchill has proposed London as the council's venue, but the Dominions' expressed preference for Washington carries many recommendations with it, the most notable being that the Chiefs of Staffs committee of -the United Nations meets in Washington and would be immediately accessible to the council's representations on behalf of operations in 'the Pacific.