THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1938 A ROBUST FOREIGN POLICY

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 23178, 26 October 1938, Page 12

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1938 A ROBUST FOREIGN POLICY

The events that lately shook Europe and disturbed the rest of the world have produced an urgent need to recast British foreign policy. This need is being met; surely, clearly, quickly, the new policy is emerging. It is not unrelated to the policy of recent years, but to call it new is justified by the unprecedented emphasis it places upon facts and principles hitherto given only halfhearted national heed. The exposition of it by Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary, leaves not the smallest doubt as to the determination of the present Government and has full warrant for claiming allegiance from the great body of the British people. There will be criticism of it, inside and outside Parliament. That ought not to be stifled, even if it could be. No doubt the days set apart in the House of Commons for debating the policy will be thoroughly devoted to searching examination of it. Parliament has no worthy purpose if this be not done. But Lord Halifax has, it seems, rightly gauged the feeling of the two Houses and of the people as ready to accept the main theses he has advanced on behalf of Cabinet. Dissentients, to assess their number by indications forthcoming in the days of emotional stress arid in those marked by calm review after war had been narrowly escaped, will constitute only a small minority. They will certainly have difficulty in arguing that the positive attitude of the Government is wrong. Lord Halifax has abundant reason for asserting that Mr. Chamberlain's unflinching perseverance in the cause of peace and his refusal to accept defeat places the world under an incalculable debt of gratitude. It is always easy to be wise after the event, and no virtue attaches to a belief that Germany never meant to make good the threat of war if the Czechoslovak Government, with or without backing, had persisted in opposing the Nazi demands. Mr. Chamberlain, wise before the event, especially in recognising the Nazi temper and the enormous obstacles in the way of effectual aid to Czechoslovakia, disdained a gamble with millions of lives.

Rightly, too, does Lord Halifax single out for particular note the evident fact that with remarkable unanimity simple folk in all countries—even in the totalitarian countries where they had inadequate opportunity to make themselves heard and felt—recoiled from the idea of war. In the Munich deliberations the democratic representatives were at a disadvantage, confronting as they did the certainty that the dictators could compel the slaves of their fiat to march, with or without a loyalty to the cause they had to serve. Yet this selfsame psychological revolt from war could be—and the British Government is right in holding that it can be—enlisted in moral support of a wide campaign for peace. Was not this assurance at the back of even the dictators' minds as the Munich conference proceeded 1 They could count upon subservience for the time being, and therefore held a winning position then; but could they hold it indefinitely, and might not military abuse of dictatorial power, in so searching a crisis, hasten an ultimate challenge of themselves and their constitutional systems? News from Germany to-day reinforces this partial analysis of the influences moulding their decision. It is possible, as Lord Halifax asserts, to underrate the Munich declaration, just as it is possible to exaggerate its value; but if the spirit of it, no matter how moderate in enthusiasm, can be kept alive and active, the strongest available guarantee against war can be created. That achievement, unfortunately, will take time, and the utmost now within reach is to take care that it shall not be robbed of its chance by folly, either in another mad outbreak of reckless hostilities or in neglect of occasions for promoting friendship. Upon this solidly practical principle the remodelled British policy is built. It takes account of contemporary facts. One is the actual revision of the Versailles Treaty, not by expunging or amending words but by deeds in which many Powers are participating, more or less unaware. In Article 19 of the League Covenant provision is made for the reconsideration of treaties that have become inapplicable and for consideration of international conditions whose continuance may endanger the peace of the world. It should be plain to all that real changes are making verbal injunctions effete; British policy will be shaped accordingly, in loyalty to the purport of the Covenant. Nevertheless, while the promotion of friendship is an enduring duty, there is equally a duty to see that reckless aggressions are checked by that most practical of means, ability to make them fruitless and futile. Such a policy implies "obligations in all parts of the world." Yet acceptance of such obligations, in present circumstances, carries with it a necessity to be strong; it is always to be interpreted in terms of ability to make protests good. Armaments developed to enforce a selfish will must be confronted with power to resist. The necessity is regrettable, but to shun it would be immoral. There is no call to interfere with other nations' internal affairs, but in the international sphere is an imperative task, demanding preparedness against those denying international responsibilities. The more this enunciation of policy is considered the more rational and robust it appears. It cannot be charged with blindness either to high ideals or to practical realities. Its essentially positive character should rally a nation convinced by events that peace is worth having, and sharing, and that it cannot be cheaply established in this generation.