BAFFLING THE KAISER

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 21344, 19 November 1932, Page 2 (Supplement)

BAFFLING THE KAISER

, SECRETS OF THE WAR ENEMY'S CODE MESSAGES HOW THEY WERE READ • / STORY OF ROOM " 40, 0.8.'* Some amazing secrets of the Great. War are revealed to the public for the first time in 4< 40. 0.T5., M a. hook of rcminiscences by Hugh Cleland Hoy, whose work in connection with the secret service operations 'of the Admiralty won high praise. The secret work of the Admiralty Intelligence Department, whoso job it was to intercept German code messages, track down spies and put up naval camouflages, was even more astounding than that of the American Black Chamber. .It is claimed that the war was won through the operations of a few men in Room 40, 0.8. The Germans changed their codes every 24 hours, yet within a very short time the.Admiralty experts had found the key, and were transcribing messages that were meant for high officials in the enemy ranks only. By this means many military and naval moves were frustrated. The next German move was never a surprise to the men in Room 40, 0.8., who knew, hour by hour, the progress and plans of the war. /Inside Information These watchful men may claim that their work led to the downfall of Trebitsch Lincoln and Sir Roger Casement among other spies and traitors. The experts gained inside information, they waited, and the spies, given enough rope, Boon tied a noose for themselves. ' The writer says: "It is now admitted that some of the finest espionage work both before and during the war was carried out. by Admiralty agents. The British Army, and the Allies reaped considerable benefit from' this. Just as our ships of war policed the seas and locked up the enemy fleet, so the secret service maintained its mastery of enemy communications, dogging their agents, tapping their wireless, and rendering abortive their attempts to break the world-silence that the silent service was determined from the start to impose upon the foe. " Of the service, too, rthe late Earl of Balfour said:

" ' To Room 40 the country owes an immense debt of gratitude—a debt which at the time, at least, could never be paid. Secrecy was the very essence of the work, and never was secrecy more successfully observed.' ... . Secret Carried to the Grave " And how true that was! When recently I met one of our most trusted naval officers who was at the Admiralty during the whole course of the war, he told me that he only learned of 40, 0.8.'s existence some years after the Armistice. One officer who worked in 40, 0.8. following his release from a war hospital in early 1915 until the Armistice, carried his secret to the grave with nim, and not very long ago his- widow learned from me for the first time of the responsible work of her husband, whom she had understood to be doing some vague ' clerking job ' at the Admiralty. " My oWn first deep impression of the unparalleled importance of this department was at the time of the Dogger Bank action, when 24 hours in advance we knew the number of German ships that had left for the scene and the exact time of their departure—all, of course, transmitted to us in German cipher from the listening stations on the East Coast. Messages to Neutral Countries " Much useful information was gathered / from Germany's communications with her confidential agents in neutral countries. The majority of such messages were sent to Madrid, whence they were forwarded elsewhere, but there was also a stream of cipher messages to America, Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria. The decoding of these was much facilitated by the fact that, whereas Germany daily changed her codes used for the fighting forces, this was not possible for her- links in neutral countries.

" It was through 40, 0.8. that we made the greatest scoop of the war—the communication from Herr Zimmermann, the German Foreign Secretary, to Count Bernstpriff, German Ambassador in Wash- • ington, that announced Germany's inten- ■ tion of beginning an unrestricted submarine camjaign. The capture of this wireless, popularly known now as the Zimmermann message, was the direct means of bringing America into the conflict. " One of the preoccupations of the Admiralty and other war services was the business of dealing with the would-be spycatchers who cropped up in unexpected numbers from every stratum of society. The suspiciousness of human nature was certainly never better exemplified than it was in this particular war-time hysteria, which affected not only tho ignorant and stupid but even members of the highest social fcircles. Al! Keports Investigated " Every day a stream of information from such people poured into the Admiralty. However ludicrous some of these reports might appear, they had to be investigated, for we could afford to run no risks, Society women, learning somehow or other that our Intelligence Division was the correct place in which to lay information, and not liking the atmosphere of Scotland Yard, were frequent callers at the Admiralty, for they were among the most ardent spy-hunters. Finally a special department was created at the Admiralty to investigate these too numerous reports. " At one time the Intelligence Division was asked to follow up the case of a retired engineer who had been arrested under suspicion of having, for enemy pay, j been involved in the blowing up of the Bulwark. This man, it appeared, was rehimself liberally in a bar at Chatham when the news of'the explosion arrived. ~ He promptly ordered drinks all round and lifting his own glass said: 1 To hell with Jacky Fisher.' / 'State of Intoxication " After a few more glasses the man grew genially expansive and hinted that he could, if he chose, explain the disaster, about which he expressed great satisfaction. ( " Inquiries demonstrated without any doubt that the engineer was merely a man in,a state of intoxication with a grievance

against tlie First Sea Lord, and that lie had not been guilty of any share in the explosion noj- of ai'ny act of treachery." One of the biggest pieces of work by 40, 0.8. was the detection of the spyactivities of Trebitsch Lincoln, onco an M.P.

" Lincoln was by birth a Hungarian Jew. He had in turn been a curate, a philanthropist's secretary, and a, Liberal M.P. At the beginning of the war he was no longer in Parliament, but he was still a member of llio National Liberal Club. He" always suffered from a consciousness of race, despite his cleverness and its appreciation by his English colleagues, and he declared that he was deeply insulted in his club during the early days of the war. Apparently he made up his mind to g?t even. " ' I made up my mind to shake England's dust off my feet,' Lincoln afterwards stated. ' I knew that what I was going to do was high treason. But my blood was boiling at all the calculated barbarities inflicted by a haughty perfidious raco upon innocent people.'

" Lincoln's scheme was to find out important military and naval secrets and betray them to Germany. I give here some examples of his code systems and of the revelations he was making to the enemv by their means :

" 'Weber, Rotterdam. Best love to Mary, love to Alice, and fondest love to aunt in Rosendaal. Do write. . .' " This meant:

" ' 'Weber, Rotterdam., Two Lord Nelson class battleships, two super-Dread-noughts.' "'This was written in what Lincoln called the ' family code.' There was also an ' oil code,' of which the following is an instance:

" ' Sherensky, Rotterdam. Cable prices five consignments vaseline, eight paraffin.' This meant:

"'Dover five first-class cruisers, eight sea-going destroyers.' "