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THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. MONDAY, MARCH 14, 1932. ECONOMY AND NAVAL DEFENCE.

Naval defence has meant and may mean so much to New Zealand that the suggestion of a reduction in expenditure on it, even .for the relief of the Dominion's exchequer, naturally arouses attention. It goes almost without saying that, if a proposal were made, either in Brilairf or in this country, to cut off all provision for the naval defence of this part of the Empire, such a proposal would be condemned by all save those of defeatist or pacifist persuasion. Any inclination to argue that New Zealand is safe from molestation—and therefore nerds no protection—is checked by remembrance of some fairly recent facts and of the assumption dominating the Disarmament Conference —that total abolition of preparedness for defence is unthinkable. Granting, then, a persistence of the need, the only practical questions relate to the requisite measure of provision for defence and the means of ensuring it.. Incidental to these is the apportioning of the cost, in such a case as that of this country's naval requirements, between it and the Homeland. At the outset the Homeland bore all the cost, safeguarding its offspring overseas and its own prospective gain from the maintenance of security. That policy could not indefinitely continue. The Dominions, having been given their

start in life and become eager to fend for themselves, have willingly shouldered an increasing share of the family burden, although no consistent rate of increase has ruled and no occasional deviation from the principle has been deemed wrung in unusual circumstances. If, may be taken as axiomatic that the exercise of practically complete ppwers of self-government will involve ere long an acceptance of full financial responsibility by the Dominions for pro-rata shares of the total Imperial cost. Indeed, this has been plainly stated by a Chancellor of the Exchequer as a matter for future arrangement, and no reasonable objection can be offered. Were they new States, wholly independent, the Dominions would be obliged to carry their own burdens. As it is, they must see the reasonableness of doing their utmost now in what remains a common task, remembering their debt of gratitude, accumulated through many years, and their persisting obligation to acknowledge what is still done for them. Their taxpayers, no matter how embarrassed, cannot be altogether happy in enjoying any relief got, by merely casting part of their load back on the taxpayers in the Homeland.

The National Expenditure Commission rightly notes that any saving in the vote for naval defence would depend, to an unavoidable extent, on a, policy arrangement entailing heavier demand on the British taxpayer. It would not necessarily be a transfer of a burden equal to the relief gained by this Dominion, for a reversion to the Admiralty of control of the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy might achieve appreciable economy. For one thing, there should thus be removed the expensive as well as anomalous excess in rates of pay that rule in the New Zealand Division, in comparison with Imperial rates. Other economies impossible under the present system of a separate division controlled by the Naval Board should be possible by resumption of the payment of an annual subsidy instead, the control being again vested in the Admiralty. It is recognised in Australia, where a separate division has long been in existence, that such an arrangement means additional cost of maintenance. If the present arrangement be continued, it would appear from evidence submitted to the Naval Board that an annual vote of £400,000 is the minimum necessity now, exclusive of a contribution in respect of the Singapore base. If an agreement with the Admiralty can be made whereby one cruiser only is to be maintained in New Zealand waters and the maintenance of the trawler Wakakura is to be suspended, this amount, it is thought, might be reduced by half. That is an attractive suggestion, and one that would be capable of citation at the Disarmament Conference as a gesture of British good faith in the South Seas ; but it has bearings on the whole question of Admiralty policy, and the Government cannot proceed with it unless there is a declared readiness to accept- the judgment of <hn Admiralty. This Dominion, it should be remembered, has undertaken to accept the. replacement of the " D " cruisers by two of the. " B " class, more costly 1o maintain: and even if the subsequent suggestion of the British Government be adopted—to substitute two of Ihc " beamier " class there would still bo an increase of cost. The proposed negotiation may be hampered accordingly. It, must bo examined on its merits, with regard to Imperial naval needs as well as considerations of Imperial or Dominion econ omv.

There may be found possible the proposed saving of £50,000 on the next, contribution to the cost of developing the Singapore Base, but again the matter of Admiralty policy is involved, although with less directness. The New Zealand Government has taken, with full warrant, the view that this development is vitally important to this country, and participation in the cost has not been grudged. No other view is reasonable, having regard to the risks to be run in this part of the world. These risks may be reduced by international agreements now under discussion at Geneva. If ko, the reduction can be made with equanimity. But the unsettled state

of affairs iri the East indicates a need for caution. The Singaporo project has been clearly within .the limits allowed by the Washington Conference, and has not been interprctablc as a menace to any other nation. On the other hand, it is essential to the adequate mobility of the Royal Navy in Pacific waters, in defence of crucial lines of the Empire sea communications. Given convincing assurances that the work will not be unduly hampered by I,his reduction of New Zealand's promised share, the economy can be gladly effected, but. in common with the vote for the New Zealand Division it should depend on negotiation with the Admiralty. All economies in insurance premiums, which these payments undoubtedly are, ought to he very carefully scrutinised by those best qualified to advise.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZH19320314.2.39

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 21131, 14 March 1932, Page 8

Word Count
1,032

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. MONDAY, MARCH 14, 1932. ECONOMY AND NAVAL DEFENCE. New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 21131, 14 March 1932, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. MONDAY, MARCH 14, 1932. ECONOMY AND NAVAL DEFENCE. New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 21131, 14 March 1932, Page 8

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