THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1922. IRISH DEVELOPMENTS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIX, Issue 18025, 25 February 1922, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1922. IRISH DEVELOPMENTS.

The Republican element in Ireland has given an impressive demonstration of its strength by setting aside the Dail Eireann. That is the real meaning of the agreement made between Mr. Griffith and Mr. de Valera, and its implications may be serious. The Irish agreement contained a provision that 'the treaty should be submitted to the British House of Commons on the one hand and the Dail Eireann on the other, and, if approved, should be ratified by the necessary legislation. Approval has been given by both bodies, and in the normal courso of events a new Parliament would have been elected in Southern Ireland and the Constitution laid before it. But to avoid an open split with the Republicans the Provisional Government has agreed to postpone the elections, prepare the Constitution and allow the people to choose by popular vote between a republio and the Free State. From the treaty point of view this coarse is irregular, but the British people will not at this stage allow technicalities to weigh heavily upon them. Neither will they dissent from the proposition that the Irish electors should be the final judges of the treaty. What Is disquieting is the evidence disclosed of the strength of the Republican party. It has proved stronger in the Sinn Fein Congress than fa the Dail Eireann, and its strength in the constituencies can only be surmised. It undoubtedly commands the sympathies of a considerable section of the Irish army, and it probably has, if it cares to use them, means of coercion to its hand. > This, indeed, is the danger. The Republicans command large funds and their organisation is probably stronger than that of Mr. Collins and Mr. Griffith. If the Irish people are allowed to express themselves freely at the poDs there will be a large majority for the treaty, but there is at least a risk that coercion will be exercised by the Republicans. It is a risk the British Government can do nothing to avert. Its best, indeed its only, course is to withdraw its troops and trust completely to the Provisional Government, which is not without means of combating the propaganda of the Republicans. There are many difficulties to be overcome during the transition period in Ireland, the major one being the definition of the Ulster boundary. Fortunately this question" will not arise until after the passing of the legislation ratifying the treaty, and by that time the atmosphere may be calmer. In the meantime, however, it is important that the obligations of the United Kingdom to the South of Ireland and to Ulster respectively should be thoroughly understood. To the South it has granted a commission to determine the frontier mainly, but not wholly, on ethnographical considerations. To Ulster it has apparently granted a vital reservation. The character of this reservation may best be appreciated from a resume of the correspondence between Mr. Lloyd George and Sir James Craig so far as it affected this point. The British Prime Minister, in asking the Ulster Government to become a party to the Irish negotiations, wrote:—" The question of the area within the special jurisdiction of the Northern Parliament we have reserved for discussion with you." In refusing to enter the conference unconditionally Sir James Craig replied :—" We observe with considerable concern . . . that the area within the jurisdiction of the Northern Parliament is referred to as being open to possible revision. This question was very carefully and fully considered in all its aspects when the Government of Ireland Act was under discussion in Parliament last year. The area finally decided upon is defined in the Act and it forms no less essential a part of the Act than the powers conferred upon the Northern Parliament." Finally an agreed statement was given to Sir James Craig to take back to the Northern Parliament in which a promise was made that the rights of Ulster would be "in no way sacrificed or compromised" until new proposals were plaoed before the Ulster Cabinet. The agreement with the Sinn Fein delegates was then signed without further consultation of Ulster. It is plain that this agreement does, in rsspect to the boundary commission, materially involve Ulster's interests, and Sir James Craig has formally reserved his right to dissent. His attitude appears now to depend upon the scope of the commission. Mr. Collins anticipates that it will make large concessions to the South, several Ministers have hinted at a considerable transfer of territory, and the specific directions given to the commission lend colour to these assumptions. On the other hand Sir James Craig asserts—and he has apparently not been contradicted by Mr. Lloyd George—that an assurance was given him that only slight readjustments would be made to the boundary line.

There has apparently been a misunderstanding somewhere, and the British Government cannot expect Ulster to consent to the appointment of the commission without further explanation; neither can it reasonably force a boundary commission upon Ulster against her will because that would be a clear breach of faith. That a revision of the boundary is desirable cannot easily be disputed. A popular vote would probably result in the counties of Fermanagh and Tyrone joining the South. On the other hand, there are 35,000 Unionists in Donegal, 18,000 in Monaghan, and 17,000 in Cavan. A rectification of the frontier would probably transfer many of these Unionists to. Ulster. Whatever may be their position in future it has been distinctly unhappy in the past. They have been subjected during the past few months to a rigorous boycott which has driven many of them out of business. Their property has. been damaged and awards of compensation have been void of effect

bacause the county councils, controlled by Sinn Fein, have refused to levy compensation. The Unionist population under Sinn Fein administration is small compared with the Sinn Fein population under Ulster rule, but its title to be heard is at least as strong. It is therefore a matter of some importance that the full consent of Ulster should be won for a rectification of the frontier. Without her consent—and this depends ultimately upon the Free State Government displaying a reasonable attitude—any attempt at a redistribution of the population would only make fresh mischief.