THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1921. THE ISSUE IN CHINA.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LVIII, Issue 17942, 18 November 1921, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1921. THE ISSUE IN CHINA.

The Washington Conference is now approaching tho second, and most difficult, phase of its task. Agreement upon the principles of disarmament has been instantaneous and unanimous, and, though there will bo differences of opinion in applying details, acceptance of something like Mr. Hughes' plan is assured provided a simultaneous agreement upon Far Eastern questions is also possible. This qualification is important. A fundamental disagreement upon China would render the discussion of disarmament almost futile, and unless a basis of agreement upon China is discovered disarmament cannot be assured of any measure of continuity as an international policy. Logically, Far Eastern diplomacy should have been discussed beforo disarmament. Psychologically there is a good deal to be said for settling the easier question first, in tho hope that it will react favourably upon the negotiation of the more difficult question. Nevertheless the peace of the Pacific depends more upon the harmonising of Japanese, American, British, and Chinese views than upon the mero scrapping of warships, and it would be idle to deny that the nations are approaching this task with a great deal of nervousness, if not of anxiety. The two policies which must be reconciled may be stated in a few words. Tho historical American attitude was defined by Mr. Wilson in 1915 when he insisted upon the maintenance of the " political and territorial integrity of the Republic of China and the international policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door policy." The Japanese attitude has never been so categorically enunciated, but it has involved a subtle challenge to tho integrity of China and an attempt to place the Open Door under a Japanese keeper.

If it is important to know the two policies, it is still more important to understand the motives underlying them. The American policy is based upon a desire to keep the Chinese market, the greatest unexploited market) in the world, open to the commerce of all nations upon equal terms. It is the attitude of an honest, if not. altogether disinterested, outsider, there is a great deal to be said for it, and it has commanded the passive adhesion, if not always the active support, of the European nations. Japan's attitude is that of a neighbour, a close neighbour, and a neighbour whose economic position is highly precarious. A comparatively poor country from the agricultural point of view, Japan is already overcrowded and her population is increasing by about threequarters of a million every year. She is denied such relief as sho might gain by sending emigrants to North America, New Zealand, and Australia. In China Japan has always sought an outlet for her capital, for her people, and for her industrial enterprise The two policies present obvious points of antagonism, but they are not wholly irreconcilable. The wiser minds in Japan and the United States have already enunciated a compromise which may form a stable basis of peace without prejudicing the interests of China. Japan's first impulse undoubtedly was to seek territorial conquests in China, but experience has brought sounder judgment. The colonisation of Korea was not altogether successful, or at least it proved burdensome and expensive. It is difficult to speak with assurance of Japanese policy, which shows disconcerting fluctuations under the pressure of military interests, but on the whoie it may be said that Japan's inclination now is to regard China as an economic, and not as a territorial, field; to draw from China the raw materials and metals she lacks, and to build up a Chinese trade which will enable the unborn millions of Japan to live in their own country as an industrial population.

That is a sane and very reasonable policy, and the United States have already gone some distance toward recognising it. In the Ishii-Lansing agreement of 1917 the American Government admitted that " territorial propinquity " created special relations between countries, and that consequently Japan had special interests in China, particularly in the parts to which her possessions were contiguous. It happens that this agreement was made by a Democratic Administration. The Republicans stand traditionally for a " stronger" Chinese policy, and there are many Americans who hail the Washington Conference as an opportunity to "clip Japan's wings." It may be hoped that in being just to China America will endeavour to deal, reasonably with Japan. The conference should, and assuredly will, insist upon the territorial integrity of China and the Open Door policy. But the Open Door does not mean equality of opportunity. Japan's geographical position gives her a natural advantage in the Chinese market, a natural advantage already reflected in special interests which America will bo ill-advised to challenge. Japan must not be given a free hand to plunder China. She has clearly abused her position and must make restitution in Shantung and possibly in other territories. But it is too late in tho day to question her economic ascendancy in China, and it would be highly dangerous to do so. To drive Japan in upon horself, to deny her economic, as well as territorial, outlets would be like trying to smother a volcano. If Sir John Salmond has received the instructions which should have been given him he will be advising I the British delegation at Washington

to resist any attempt to secure the political isolation or the economic strangulation, of Japan. So littlo is it to tho interest of New Zealand that Japan should be driven into an irreconcilable attitudo that the result of the conference will not bo wholly agrceablo unless Britain retains Japan's friendship through direct alliance, through a triple entente including' the United States, or through a closer association of all nations. Unless there is such tangible evidence of Japan's goodwill the question will inevitably arise whether a five-three margin of naval strength is sufficient for the defenco of Dominions which lio so far from the United Kingdom and so closo to Japan.