THE New Zealand Herald. AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1917. AMERICA AND GERMANY.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIV, Issue 16456, 5 February 1917, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald. AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1917. AMERICA AND GERMANY.

The German notification to Washington of unrestricted submarining against all neutral ships which venture to approach Allied countries in Europe has had its expected result. Diplomatic relations with Germany have been broken off by the American Government and the first "overt act" affecting American citizens will be treated by Mr. Wilson as an act of war. With unabated hope he has informed Congress that he does not believe that Germany will carry out her threat but should she do so he will ask Congress for power "to protect Americans bh the high seas." This can only mean that the loss of American lives by I unrestricted submarining in defiance of international agreement will lead to war between the United States and Germany, though the precise form in which Mr. Wilson may wage war is not clear. Asylum in American ports would be lost by all German ships, and it is significant that in New York and other places there has been an evidently concerted attempt to run these "interned" vessels out to sea or in the alternative to sink them. The American Navy would be instructed to protect American shipping and in doing so would presumably co-operate with the Allied navies and reciprocate in the use of bases, the interchange of intelligence and the hunting of the common enemy. , Without the slightest doubt, German shipping in American ports would be made to pay forfeit for any American losses and German property in the United States would be security for American losses in Germany. There would probably be a stream of American volunteers into Canada. It remains to be seen whether Mr. Wilson

would consider active military assistance to the Allies on European battlefields as necessary "for the protection of Americans upon the high seas."

According to the German Ambassador to Washington the diplomatic results of the German "sink-at-sight" policy were foreseen and estimated; this is quite probable, for Germany has not hurriedly committed herself to an unconsidered course. Since the sinking of the Lusitania with many Americans aboard, the submarine question has been thrashed out not only as between Berlin and Washington but also as between opposing schools of German publicists. The latter have exhausted every possible argument for or against "ruthlessness," and the idea has been adroitly circulated and popularised that the mild and kindly faction led by BethmannHollweg has triumphed over the "ruthless" faction led by TirjJitz. As a matter of fact, the German submarines have been sinking every Allied or neutral ship they could torpedo or shell, Americans only excepted. They have not omitted to sink hospital ships when they could. The Germans may be able to temporarily increase their submarines, and they may, for melodramatic purposes, squander torpedoes where they might use shell or bomb, but that they have reached the limit of their capacity to injure us is proved by the statistical fact that it has gradually become much safer to sail under the Union Jack than under any European neutral flag. This is due to British defensive measures, including the arming of merchantmen, and the confidence of the British public in the reassuring statements of the Admiralty is cheeringly demonstrated by marine insurance rates being unaffected by recent German threats. Our merchant seamen arc as fearless and as steady as their brothers who serve under the White Ensign, nor have the seamen of any Allied nation failed to do their duty in ] this time of trial. Possibly because j they are not " tuned " to a national I spirit of self-sacrifice, neutral | nations appear to be more concerned than the Allies at, German submarining threats, but it will be observed that their concern changes to indignation as they become remote from the armies of the Kaiser. Spain is more outspoken than Holland or Denmark. Brazil uses language unheard in Sweden. The Germans could not have expected that Mr. Wilson could overlook their " sinJc-at-sight" threat, and they may even have been prepared to see an "overt act" followed by declaration of war. What they hoped "for was that they could frighten America into some compromise or that they could frighten its ; shipping from the Atlantic. In any case, they would calculate that the United States would not be able or willing to send men to the west front and that every ship sunk weakened the Allies, not only by the loss of its cargo but by the loss of its carrying capacity.

Germany is following the council of despair, but how desperate that council is we shall not be able to realise until the war is long over. She can injure us by her submarine policy, and is injuring us, but she cannot injure us enough to compel us to accept the settlement she wishes to impose on us under the cloak of " Peace " proposals. Her people, who expected that their Prussian masters would so easily and swiftly lead -them to the conquest and looting of the world, are feeling the grip of the blockade and fearing the outcome of the approaching campaign. They have taken part in the peculiar argument with which the German Government, while doing its worst, has striven to convince us that if we really angered her Germany could do far worse with her submarines. They have believed this. They have been persuaded that Britain and the Allies are only able to obtain supplies because the Kaiser is so J humane that he will not let the submarines do what they could. Wherefrom wo have despairing Germany insisting that victory shall be secured at any price and the Government yielding to a demand it has itself created." The German Government knows that if the war is prolonged victory must go to the Allies, and knows how faint is the hope that " unrestricted submarining " can affect the issue. Yet it must take every risk and multiply its difficulties and its embarrassments—oven quarrel with Mr. Wilson—not so much to win the war as to keep the German people convinced that it may still hope for victory.