SIGNS OF VICTORY.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 16169, 4 March 1916, Page 1 (Supplement)

SIGNS OF VICTORY.

VERDUN AND THE BALKANS. [BT C.E.S.] There are many signs that the war is entering its second great stage, in which the allies will be uniformly in the ascend ant, and will use their superiority to gain complete victory. Perhaps the most significant of these is the attack on Vordun. If that means anything at all it means that the allies have imposed their strategy on the Germans, and that for the first time the plans of the .war lords in Berlin bear the marks of fear and desperation. Some may consider the attack on this strong fortress—for Verdun is strong, not chiefly in its forte, but in its natural advantages of position—a fresh evidence of German strength, so great that it can still be used prodigally, but there is no ground whatever for such a view. No one who has given the matter a thought ever doubted the ability of the Germans to concentrate half a million or more troops' at a given spot, provided the other fronts were comparatively quiet, and to furnish them with guns and shells without stint. The power of Germany lo nuke such a concentration is not surprising, but it is distinctly surprising that such a concentration should have been made against Verdun of all places, and in the middle of winter of all times, unless one adopts the explanation that the German general staff is at the end, of its tether, and* knows it. - The Germans might have attacked Verdun with the same de.fccrramav tion at any other period of the war; in the meantime Verdun has grown not weaker, but stronger. They did not do so because there were weaker points in the allied line or because a decision in the West was not immediately required by tho Germans. Now thcro is apparently no weaker point in tho Franco-British line, and fear of the allied offensive in the spring makes a decision in France urgent, On any other grounds the attack on Verdun would bo mere folly, and the Germans are no fools at the trade they have mado their own. :.. T ..',.. „ _ ~ ~ Calmness' of France, " The second hopeful sign is that the German attack has not, so far as can be judged, interfered with the pro-deter-mined' plan of the allies. ■ Did Joffre fear the German blow at Verdun, all the French armies, in Alsace, Champaign. Artois and elsewhere, would blaze into activity, the British would strive to relieve' the pressure, and the Russians would charge in battalions across the frozen snows of Poland and Galicia, as they chivalrously rode down on East Prussia when the point of tho German spear was at the throat of Paris. But as far as we know nothing of this is happening. Tho calmness of France and her allies is tho most encouraging feature of tho situation It may be, as suggested by some military correspondents, that me allies will take advantage of tho German concentration in France to strike elsewhere. Valuable local gains may thus bo made. But it is not likely that the allies will allow their great offensive to develop prematurely unless tho German attack on Verdun assumes a dangerous phase. A general offensive spells waste of men and shells husbanded against tho time when all the allies can strike together under conditions most generally favourable, and apparently that time is not yet. Withdrawal from Durazzo. Down in the Balkans there arc streaks of the coming dawn. One hopeful augury is tho withdrawal from Durazzo. The Italians may still hold Vnlona, for they need it as a naval base with which they can close the mouth of the Adriatic, but their withdrawal from • tho capital of Albania marks the conclusion of the task that took them there, the rescue, for lurthcr service, of the remnants of the Sevvinn and Montenegrin armies. This Albanian operation is the most interesting evidence of co-ordination among the allies. For the first time Italians have acted beyond their own natural frontiers, 1 and the allies' latest ally— Essad Pasha and such of the Albanian tribes as lie has carried with him— have consented to leave their native mountains to wrest ultimate victory by service elsewhere. In Greece and Roumania things go well. In both countries the interventionist movement grows apace, tlio most tangible sign being that its leaders have been received by their respective kings. The allies have learned to expect no help ' from the neutral Balkan States, and it is precisely because of this that help may come. For the first time they arc about to show military superiority, and tin's may servo to convince Greece and Roumania, who have both been playing for .safety, that "the day " has dawned. The' Derby Groups. Perhaps one portent may be taken from Britain itself, where married men are about to be called to the colours. This may merely mean that the response from the earlier Derby groups was disappointing, but it may also mean that tho allies realise that the attrition period of the waiis over and arc about to strike with their full strength. Attrition is not the ideal process to apply to warfare. It was imposed on the allies by their 'unreadiness, and has been accepted till now because the margin of strength was against them. But one may bo sure that the allied commanders' will not fight a war of attrition when they have tho forces necessary to strike when, how, and where they like. The sudden call on practically the whole of Britain's reserve of man-power may mean that the blow is about to fall.